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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
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by 
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University of California San Diego, 2019 
 
 
Professor David O. Brink, Chair 
 
 
This dissertation provides answers to various philosophical questions about the nature 
and normativity of love and friendship. Chapter 1 introduces these questions and my answers to 
them, while chapters 2 through 5 elaborate on these answers. Chapter 2 addresses the questions 
about the nature of love and friendship and argues that they’re best understood as syndromes, or 
as non-accidental condition-clusters that are accompanied by some set of symptoms indicating 
their presence. It also defends the thesis that love and friendship are psychologically grounded in 
reasons as well as several theses about the relations these phenomena have to their objects’ non-
instrumental value.  
	  viii 
Chapters 3 through 5 address the questions about the normativity of love and friendship. 
Chapter 3 focuses on justification. It defends the rationalist position that love and friendship can 
be rationally assessed as justified or unjustified, and further argues that there are three types of 
reasons—value-based, quality-based, and history-based reasons—that can justify love and 
friendship. This chapter also argues that these phenomena are justified overall just in case the 
balance of reasons renders them rationally appropriate and defends the thesis that love and 
friendship can be completely rational.  
Chapters 4 and 5 address questions about the normative significance of love and 
friendship. Chapter 4 focuses on reasons. It argues that love and friendship generate person-
based and relationship-based reasons, that these reasons are a mix of moral and non-moral ones, 
and that these reasons can be special in two different ways. It also defends multiple theses 
pertaining to how the reasons of love and friendship stack up against others that we may have. 
Chapter 5 focuses on duties. It argues that love and friendship generate irreducible, sui generis, 
special moral duties that (1) are directly grounded in the augmented moral statuses that our 
beloveds and friends have for us in virtue of our special relationships with them and (2) outweigh 
competing duties unless the contents of the latter duties are more significant than those of the 
former duties and the difference in significance here has reached a certain threshold.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Love and friendship are common elements of human life. Many of us have been fortunate 
enough to experience them first-hand in the form of intimate, personal relationships with others, 
and they appear quite frequently on film and in various works of literature. They are celebrated, 
cherished, longed for, sought after, fought for, destroyed, and taken for granted. Most people, it 
seems, regard love and friendship as central sources of meaning and happiness in life while 
simultaneously acknowledging their great potential for frustration and pain. They’re so familiar, 
and so seemingly well known, that one might think them beyond the need for philosophical 
attention. However, just like other ordinary parts of human life, there are many philosophical 
issues surrounding love and friendship that call for philosophical treatment. These issues are the 
focus of this work, and the specific ones that I aim to address pertain to the nature and the 
normativity of love and friendship. Also, these latter issues that fall under the normativity side of 
the nature-normativity divide can be sub-divided into ones pertaining to the justification of love 
and friendship and ones pertaining to the normative significance of these phenomena. Let me say 
a bit more about these issues. 
 
1.1 The Topics of This Work 
 
Let’s begin with the three issues that fall on the nature side of the divide. First and 
foremost is the metaphysical issue of how we should fundamentally characterize and analyze 
love and friendship. What are love and friendship? What kinds of things are they, and what are 
	  2 
their constituent features? This issue is the largest of the three, so it shall receive the most 
treatment.  
The second issue here is whether love and friendship are psychologically grounded in 
reasons. Are love and friendship responses to perceived considerations that seem—if only 
unconsciously—to justify or warrant these responses? It’s important to note that the issue here is 
not that of whether love and friendship are psychologically grounded in normative or good 
reasons, or in considerations that actually provide justification for these phenomena. In fact, the 
issue of whether love and friendship are psychologically grounded in normative reasons is only 
intelligible against the background of the separate issue described here, which is that of whether 
love and friendship are psychologically grounded in what Franklin-Hill and Jaworska (2017) call 
normative motivational reasons, which refer to considerations that the subjects of these 
phenomena take (if only unconsciously) to justify or warrant their love or friendship. For in order 
to address the issue of whether love and friendship are psychologically grounded in 
considerations that actually provide justification for them, we must first determine whether love 
and friendship are psychologically grounded in considerations that are taken to justify them, and 
then we must determine whether or not the considerations actually provide the perceived 
justification. I will not be explicitly addressing the issue of whether love and friendship are 
psychologically grounding in considerations that actually provide justification for them, but the 
issues that I shall be addressing will provide the resources for addressing this other issue.  
The third and final issue here is how love and friendship relate to the value of their 
objects, and more specifically to how they relate to the non-instrumental value of their objects 
(as opposed to any instrumental value that these objects may have because of the advantages that 
they provide for lovers or friends). Are love and friendship responses to non-instrumental value 
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that our beloveds and friends possess? Do these phenomena instead involve mere projections of 
such value onto their objects? Or is the relation between these phenomena and such value more 
complex than these questions suggest? It’s important to see how this issue differs from the 
previous one and therefore warrants separate treatment.   
 Now let’s look at those issues that fall on the normativity side of the divide, beginning 
with those pertaining to the justification of love and friendship. The first issue here is whether 
love and friendship are the kinds of things that are subject to normative appraisal or rational 
assessment. Can these things be justified or unjustified? If they can be (and I will argue that they 
can), then this propels us into our next issue, which is that of what normative reasons might 
actually justify love or friendship. What are such reasons for love or friendship? Why love or be 
friends with anyone instead of no one? Why love or be friends with particular people instead of 
other people or no one? Answering these questions will unearth the normative reasons that can 
(pro tanto) justify love or friendship, which will then set us up to address the related issues of 
when love or friendship is all-things-considered justified by such reasons, and when they are 
instead all-things-considered unjustified. The last issue is whether love or friendship can ever be 
completely rational (i.e., guilty of no charge of irrationality), or whether they will instead always 
be irrational to some degree.  
 In addition, there are the normative issues pertaining to the normative significance of love 
and friendship, or to whether and how these things alter our normative situations. There are two 
sets of issues here that I shall address. One set pertains to what we can think of as the reasons of 
love and friendship. Do love and friendship give rise to new normative reasons? If so, what’s the 
nature of these reasons? Are they moral or non-moral reasons? Are they special reasons? If so, in 
what way are they special? And how do they stack up against other reasons that populate our 
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normative economies?1 The other set of issues here pertains to what we can think of as the duties 
of love and friendship. Do love and friendship also carry with them special moral duties, by 
which I mean moral duties that only participants of loving relationships or friendships have to 
each other because they are in those very relationships? If so, what are the grounds of these 
duties? And how do they stack up against other moral duties that we have?2  
 
1.2 An Outline of This Work 
 
These are the issues and questions that I will be addressing in this work. In the next 
chapter, I shall address those issues falling under the nature side of the nature-normativity divide, 
beginning with the central metaphysical issue of how we should fundamentally characterize and 
analyze love and friendship, which again will receive the most attention. After discussing the 
desiderata that successful views on this matter must satisfy, I will present and defend syndrome 
conceptions of both love and friendship, which, as the label suggests, understand these 
phenomena in terms of non-accidental clusters of conditions in people that are accompanied by 
some set of symptoms that indicate their presence. Starting with love, I will discuss other 
conceptions of it from both everyday life and the philosophical literature before pointing out 
their apparent shortcomings. Then I shall present my syndrome view of love as a response to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 These issues pertaining to the reasons of love and friendship addressed in chapter 4 are importantly different from 
the issue of the reasons for love and friendship dealt with in chapter 3. This latter issue is about the reasons that 
might back love and friendship themselves, while the former issues are about the practical reasons to do other things 
that love and friendship might create. The difference here is analogous to the difference between inquiring into the 
reasons that might back car ownership itself versus the reasons that we would acquire to do other things (e.g., spend 
money on repairs for a particular car) once we have taken the plunge and become car owners.  
2 These two sets of issues here do not exhaust those pertaining to the normative significance of love and friendship. 
A third set of issues, which lies beyond the scope of this work, pertains to what we can think of as the permissions of 
love and friendship. Do love and friendship carry with them special moral permissions, by which I mean mere moral 
permissions to do certain things that we only have because we are in loving relationships or friendships? If so, what 
are their grounds? These are important questions about the normative significance of love and friendship, but I will 
not address them in this work. 
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these other views, and indeed as an improvement upon them because it avoids their apparent 
shortcomings and satisfies the previously established desiderata. As I will argue, love is best 
understood as a condition-cluster that (1) varies across cases due to variations in love’s objects 
across cases; (2) contains an identifiable core—one of affectionate loyalty—that’s always present 
in some form, which allows us to univocally categorize the various cases and kinds of love as 
love despite the variation in love across cases and kinds; and (3) is accompanied by some non-
empty set of behavioral and emotional expressions indicating the condition-cluster’s presence, 
where this set of such expressions also varies across cases because their manifestation is a 
function of several factors that vary across cases. After presenting this syndrome conception of 
love and demonstrating its ability to satisfy the desiderata that successful theories of love must 
satisfy, I will then present my syndrome conception of friendship and demonstrate that it does a 
great job of satisfying the desiderata that successful theories of friendship must satisfy. As I will 
argue, friendship should be understood as a pair of comparable syndromes in two people, where 
these syndromes consist of love and respect for the other along with a disposition to enjoy the 
time spent with the other. And, just like with love, these syndromes are accompanied by certain 
behavioral and emotional expressions that indicate their presence, yet these expressions can vary 
across cases as well.  
Next I will move on to the issue of whether love and friendship are psychologically 
grounded in reasons. I will argue that they are, and also that these reasons must take a certain 
shape: they must consist in real or apparent facts pertaining to the traits, qualities, or statuses of 
our beloveds or friends. Last I will address the issue of how love and friendship relate to the 
value of their objects. However, because the answer here depends (among other things) on how 
we understand the “value” in question here, I will offer five different interpretations of this value 
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and then argue that there are different relations obtaining between these phenomena and this 
value depending (among other things) on which interpretation we’re under. As part of this 
discussion I will also be arguing for the radical thesis that love and friendship are literal creators 
of special, agent-relative moral value.  
 In chapter 3, I will venture out into normative territory and address those issues that fall 
under the justification of love and friendship. After a preliminary discussion about justification 
and the corresponding reasons that provide it, I will address the first issue of whether love and 
friendship are subject to being rationally assessed as justified or unjustified by arguing for the 
rationalist position that love and friendship are indeed subject to such assessment. Here I will 
address a few anti-rationalist arguments before offering some positive support for rationalism.3 
Next I will address the related issue of what normative reasons can actually justify love and 
friendship by arguing for a pluralist position according to which there are three types of such 
reasons—value-based reasons, quality-based reasons, and history-based reasons. Then I will 
respond to challenges to my pluralistic rationalism. After this I will move on to the issue of when 
love and friendship are all-things-considered justified or unjustified and will argue that they’re 
justified just in case the balance of reasons renders them rationally appropriate, where such 
reasons consist in non-comparative facts pertaining to (1) benefits or costs tied up with loving or 
being friends with people, (2) their character traits, or (3) intimate histories shared with them.  
 In chapters 4 and 5, I will address our final set of issues pertaining to the normative 
significance of love and friendship. Chapter 4 will focus on the reasons of love and friendship. 
After a brief discussion about the relationship between practical reasons and moral duties that is 
intended to justify my separate treatment of them, I will first address the issue of whether love 
and friendship give rise to new normative reasons and, if so, what kinds of reasons these are by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 I borrow the distinction between rationalism and anti-rationalism from Jollimore (2011).  
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arguing for three main positions. First I will argue that love and friendship do give rise to at least 
two types of reasons—person-based reasons and relationship-based reasons. Second, I will argue 
that some of these reasons are moral ones, while others are non-moral ones. And third, I will 
argue that some of these reasons are special in the sense of only being had by participants in 
loving relationships and friendships, while others are special in the sense that they’re stronger or 
weightier compared to other reasons with comparable contents that the relationship participants 
may have. After this I will move on to our last issue of this first set, which is that of how the 
reasons of love and friendship stack up against others that we may have. Since several questions 
actually arise here given the variety of comparisons between different kinds of reasons that we 
can try to make, I will address this issue by arguing for multiple theses that provide answers to 
these questions. My general answer to how the reasons of love and friendship stack up against 
others, however, is that sometimes they win and sometimes they’re outweighed; it all depends on 
the nature of the reasons in play.  
 Chapter 5 will then focus on the duties of love and friendship. After offering some 
clarifying remarks about these duties, including a detailed discussion of how they are special, I 
will address the issue of whether love and friendship generate special moral duties by arguing 
that they do. I will argue for this by offering some defeasible, phenomenological evidence for 
these duties and responding to three well-known objections—the voluntarist objection, the 
distributive objection, and the respect objection—to the reality of these duties. Then I will 
address the issue of the grounds of these duties by arguing for a non-reductionist theory 
according to which loving relationships and friendships generate irreducible, sui generis, special 
moral duties that are directly grounded in the augmented moral statuses that our beloveds and 
friends have for us in virtue of our special relationships with them. After arguing against 
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reductionist theories of these duties as well as several other non-reductionist theories of them, I 
will offer my theory as the most promising of the lot because it avoids the problems that plague 
its rivals. Last, I will address the final issue of how these duties of love and friendship stack up 
against other duties. On the one hand, when these competing duties have comparable contents or 
the contents of our duties of love and friendship are more significant than those of the competing 
duties, then the duties of love and friendship outweigh competitors. On the other hand, when the 
contents of our competing duties are more significant than those of our duties of love and 
friendship, which duties win out will depend on how much of a difference in significance there is 
here. If the difference here has reached a certain threshold level, then the competing duties will 
outweigh those of love and friendship. If, however, this threshold isn’t reached, and the contents 
of our competing duties aren’t that much more significant than those of our duties of love and 
friendship, then these latter duties will still win out even if their contents are comparatively less 
significant in their own right.    
 
1.3 The Aims and Limits of This Work 
 
At the most general level, this work aims to address a variety of metaphysical issues 
surrounding love and friendship, where some of these issues are non-normative ones and others 
are normative. It aims to offer a host of philosophical theories and positions that provide answers 
to several philosophical questions about love and friendship and that together constitute a 
provisional metaphysics of love and friendship that contains both non-normative and normative 
branches. It aims, in short, to offer a provisional account of the reality of these important 
phenomena by focusing on their nature and their normativity. As a treatise on the metaphysics of 
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love and friendship, this work does not offer an epistemology of love and friendship. It does not, 
for example, answer any important questions about when one knows—or is justified in 
believing—that someone loves them or that they share a friendship with them. Nevertheless, my 
syndrome theories of love and friendship advanced in the next chapter have epistemological 
merit because they provide a metaphysical framework for epistemological theorizing about these 
phenomena. For these theories imply that we can know when we have genuine love or friendship 
by ascertaining when their constituent features obtain, and so an epistemology of love and 
friendship should give us an account of when we can know or be justified in believing that they 
obtain.  
 Furthermore, even though this is best thought of as a metaphysical treatise, it is one that 
has interesting implications for, and connections with, both moral philosophy and theoretical 
psychology. Although chapter 2 will offer a non-normative metaphysics of love and friendship, it 
will simultaneously offer a basic theoretical psychology of these phenomena just by 
understanding them as psychological in nature. And the normative metaphysics of these 
phenomena advanced in chapters 3 through 5 hooks up with several interesting topics and 
discussions in moral philosophy. For instance, the metaethical doctrine known as moral 
rationalism is relevant to the normative significance of love and friendship dealt with in chapters 
4 and 5, while the positions on the reasons for love and friendship advanced in chapter 3 and 
those on the reasons of love and friendship advanced in chapter 4 have interesting implications 
for metaethical debates on the nature of normative reasons (these debates also inform the 
positions in chapter 4).4 If these positions are correct, then they will establish important 
constraints for metaethical theorizing about normative reasons, and at the very least they point to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 The basic idea of moral rationalism is that moral duties constitute or imply practical reasons, which means that if 
we have a moral duty to do something, then that fact by itself either constitutes a good reason for us to do it or 
implies that we have such reason to do it.  
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the need for metaethical theories of normative reasons to be sensitive to what they imply for love 
and friendship. Additionally, my discussion of the duties of love and friendship in chapter 5 
effectively contains a very modest defense of moral realism, and so the non-reductionist, realist 
theory of these duties advanced in that chapter has interesting and controversial implications for 
the intractable debate on moral realism.5  
 Besides these metaethical topics, the discussions in chapters 3 and 5 hook up to a few 
important topics and debates in normative ethics as well. My discussion of the reasons for love 
and friendship in chapter 3, for example, will intersect with value theory by covering ways in 
which love and friendship may be valuable or beneficial for us. Also, and more significantly, my 
non-reductionist, non-consequentialist theory of the duties of love and friendship advanced in 
chapter 5 has interesting and controversial implications for the central debate in normative ethics 
between consequentialists and non-consequentialists as well as the debate over the fundamental 
nature of morality between impartialists and their detractors. In fact, if my theory here succeeds, 
then it establishes the failure of consequentialism—or at least the failure of maximizing act-
consequentialism—and that morality is not, as impartialists maintain, just a system of categorical 
imperatives demanding that we do whatever will have the best payoff in terms of impartial value. 
Even though this work is a metaphysical treatise on love and friendship, then, it aims to establish 
some rather dramatic conclusions for moral philosophy.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The basic idea of moral realism is that moral properties and duties are genuine, objective features of the world.  
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Chapter 2: The Nature of Love and Friendship 
 
As I explained in the previous chapter, this chapter deals with the philosophical issues 
falling under the topic of the nature of love and friendship. These are the issues of (1) how we 
are to fundamentally characterize and analyze these phenomena, (2) whether these phenomena 
are psychologically grounded in normative motivational reasons,6 and (3) how these phenomena 
relate to the non-instrumental value of their objects. Addressing the first issue requires me to first 
nail down some desiderata that viable theories of love or friendship must satisfy. Then I will 
present my syndrome conception of love as a response to the variety of rival views of love’s 
fundamental nature that can be found in the philosophical literature and in everyday life and 
argue that this conception of love satisfies the previously established desiderata and avoids the 
shortcomings of those rival views. After this I will present my syndrome conception of 
friendship, which builds on my syndrome conception of love, and will argue that it also satisfies 
the earlier established desiderata. From here I will argue that love and friendship are 
psychologically grounded in normative motivational reasons. Last I will address the third issue 
by distinguishing different kinds of non-instrumental value and defending multiple theses about 
the relations that love and friendship have to these kinds of value in their objects, including the 
radical thesis that love and friendship are literal creators of agent-relative moral value in their 
objects.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Recall from chapter 1 that “normative motivational reasons” refer to the considerations that the subjects of love or 
friendship take, perhaps unconsciously, to justify or warrant their love or friendship.  
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2.1 The Desiderata That Theories of Love or Friendship Must Satisfy 
 
A successful account of love or friendship must satisfy some rather demanding 
theoretical desiderata. One of the most important here is that of extensional adequacy: a 
successful conception of love or friendship should capture all and only cases of love or 
friendship.7 However, since we cannot clearly locate these cases due to reasonable disagreement 
over them, a more realistic goal is to locate adequate ranges of them in order to provisionally test 
the extensional adequacy of our theories.  
 Let’s begin with love. Since I will be concerned in later chapters with the normative 
significance—and in particular the moral significance—of love and friendship, I will restrict my 
focus in establishing an adequate range of cases of genuine love to those that most clearly seem 
to be morally significant, which are those cases of interpersonal love in which the parties 
involved share a personal relationship. Restricting our range this way may constitute what Shpall 
(2017) calls unwarranted “humanism” with respect to love’s objects, but we can simply treat 
whatever range we come up with for our purposes here—along with whatever conclusions we 
draw from it—as tentative and revisable.  
Let’s start by locating the cases that tend to animate theories of love. Not surprisingly, 
some commentators focus primarily or exclusively on the love between romantic partners in 
order to theorize about romantic love (e.g., Nozick 1989; Giles 1994; and Green 1997).8 Though 
the details will certainly differ across cases, every case of love between romantic partners is of 
course characterized by romance. This typically includes a relatively stable, mutually consensual 
sexual dimension, but since there are asexual individuals who still seek or enjoy romantic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This desideratum appears to map on to what Harcourt (2017) calls the desideratum of “generality.” 
8 Nozick still recognizes other kinds of love (e.g. parental love).  
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relationships, the romantic dimension of love between romantic partners needn’t involve sex, and 
even when it does it goes beyond sex. In addition to sex (or instead of sex), romance presumably 
includes other intimate, leisure activities intended to (a) be shared specifically with the other and 
(b) indicate the special status of the other as one’s romantic partner. At any rate, the love 
between romantic partners must involve some form of romance. And yet, as a form of love, the 
love between romantic partners goes well beyond—and indeed runs deeper than—merely 
engaging in romantic activities. Besides engaging in these activities, romantic partners in love 
will characteristically feel deep affection for and attachment to each other, and they will trust and 
respect each other. They will also care deeply for each other, and will more generally be deeply 
devoted to each other. They will typically be ready to assist, support, comfort, or protect each 
other when needed—even if such things entail significant personal costs—and they each will 
expect the other to provide such things when they’re needed unless the personal costs of doing so 
would be too high or unreasonable. At the limit, romantic partners in love will be ready to give 
their very lives for each other when needed, yet they will not expect this of each other because 
they will each regard the loss of the other’s life as too costly.  
In a similar yet slightly different fashion, some philosophers focus on this central case of 
love between romantic partners as well as the case of love between close, non-romantic friends 
in order to craft their theories of such love (e.g., Abramson and Leite 2011; Jollimore 2011). And 
this, too, is hardly surprising because, apart from the romantic dimension that’s absent in the 
fresh case of close, non-romantic friendship love, such love is remarkably similar to that between 
romantic partners in terms of its characteristic features. Although there’s no romantic dimension, 
close friends who love each other typically spend lots of time together engaging in shared 
activities that are intended to (a) be shared specifically with the other and (b) indicate the special 
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status of the other as one’s friend. Also, just like we saw in the case of love between romantic 
partners, the love between close friends goes well beyond merely engaging in these shared 
activities. Besides this, close friends who love each other will feel deep affection for and 
attachment to each other, and they will trust and respect each other deeply—indeed much more 
so than most other people. They will also care deeply for one another and will be fiercely loyal to 
one another. Like romantic partners in love, close friends who love each other will typically be 
ready to assist, support, comfort, or protect the other when needed despite the personal costs, and 
they will each expect the other to readily offer such things when needed unless, again, the 
personal costs of such things are too high or unreasonable. As we might say colloquially, close 
friends who love each other “have each other’s backs” in the truest sense of that phrase, and they 
will each legitimately expect the other to have their back. 
In opposition to this tendency to focus only on these cases of reciprocal love between 
romantic partners or between close, non-romantic friends, however, is Harry Frankfurt’s 
insistence that parental love offers the most illuminating paradigm for theorizing about love 
(Frankfurt 2001, 2004). Here we are to think of the gentle, affectionate, devoted parent who 
pours the majority of her time, energy, and other resources into taking special care of her 
children. She is focused on providing for their basic needs and more generally for promoting 
their good despite the costs to herself. Like a loving romantic partner or a loving close friend, 
this loving parent is ready to assist, support, comfort, or protect her children despite the personal 
costs, which her children will of course come to expect from her. But rather than focusing on 
only some of these cases when it comes to theorizing about love in general, we should include all 
three of them in our range of cases to use for testing the extensional adequacy of our theories of 
love’s fundamental nature. In fact, these three cases—while certainly of central importance—are 
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a subset of what I shall call paradigmatic cases of interpersonal love, which also includes 
relevantly similar cases of love for parents, siblings, grandchildren, grandparents, or other 
traditional family members. And though these paradigmatic cases are probably the most 
important ones for testing extensional adequacy, they should not be the only cases of 
interpersonal love included in our adequate range for testing such adequacy. While we must be 
careful of being too inclusive here, in order to avoid being overly sentimental about love we 
should include what I shall call fringe cases of interpersonal love, such as those involving 
meddlesome aunts, cranky grandfathers, smothering parents, over-competitive siblings, or other 
people that we evaluate negatively as the beloveds (Velleman 1999; Zangwill 2013).9  
Now let’s move on to friendship, where it will be helpful to begin by looking briefly at 
how Aristotle thought of friendship. According to him there are three kinds of friendship, which 
are defined and differentiated by the three possible grounds of friendship: the pleasure gained 
from it, the utility gained from it, or the virtuous characters of the parties involved. Accordingly, 
the three kinds of friendship for Aristotle are pleasure-friendship, utility-friendship, and virtue-
friendship, where the last kind of friendship is the perfect or most complete kind, while the other 
two count as friendship because they approximate it. I think, however, that only this last kind of 
friendship, which has been called “end-friendship” or “companion-friendship” (Thomas 1990; 
Badwar 1993), is the only kind of friendship deserving of the name, so this is what I shall be 
focusing on in my ensuing discussions of friendship.  
Now we’ve already located one kind of true friendship to include in our case-range for 
testing the extensional adequacy of our theories of friendship: the case of close, non-romantic 
friendship sketched above. And while it’s of central importance, close friendship is not the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Some cases of professed love for the kinds of people that Velleman mentions will surely not be genuine, but it 
seems a bit too strong to write every such case off as inauthentic.  
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kind to include here. In fact, close friendship is probably not the most common kind of 
friendship; the most common kind is probably friendship that isn’t close. And though it’s hard—
if not impossible—to specify exactly how to differentiate between close and non-close 
friendship, the latter is probably best characterized as a watered-down version of close 
friendship. So unlike close friends, non-close friends will typically spend less time together 
engaging in shared activities. Furthermore, non-close friends won’t like or trust each other as 
much as close friends do, and they won’t be attached to each other. They also won’t care for each 
other as deeply or be as loyalty toward each other. Though they’ll typically be ready to assist, 
support, or stand up for each other, they typically won’t do so with the same readiness, or at the 
same level of personal sacrifice, as close friends will. Non-close friends will still “have each 
other’s backs,” yet they typically won’t do so to the extent that close friends will, and so the 
expectations that these friends will typically have of each other will be less demanding than 
those that close friends will have of each other.  
Although we have located only two kinds of friendship, this should be sufficient for our 
purposes here because, unlike love, friendship doesn’t seem to admit of many different kinds, but 
rather varies in intensity or degree. We can therefore move on to the next theoretical desideratum 
that theories of love or friendship must satisfy, which I shall call data accommodation: 
successful theories of love or friendship will accommodate or vindicate obvious, central truths 
about them. But since it would be too tall of an order to locate every such central truth here, I 
will focus instead on locating a healthy amount of them—particularly those that other 
commentators or theories have rightfully located—in order to test our theories.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Although extensional adequacy and data accommodation are similar in that they both require our theories of love 
or friendship to get certain pre-theoretical things right about these phenomena, they can be distinguished by what 
they require our theories to get right. Extensional adequacy assumes that we can pre-theoretically identify cases of 
genuine love or friendship (i.e. the extension of these terms) and then requires our theories to evaluate these cases 
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Let’s begin with a few truths pertaining to general features of love and friendship. First 
we have the basic fact that love and friendship are neither shallow nor fleeting, but are rather 
deeply rooted and stable (Naar 2013).11 Furthermore, their depth is clearly scalar: we can and do 
love some things more deeply than others, and friends clearly vary in closeness across cases.  
Another important and widely accepted datum is that love involves care or concern for 
its object (Brown 1987; Soble 1990; Giles 1994; LaFollette 1996; Noller 1996; Brink 1999; 
Frankfurt 2001; White 2001; Frankfurt 2004; Helm 2010; Abramson and Leite 2011; Jollimore 
2011; Smuts 2014a; Franklin-Hill and Jaworska 2017; Wonderly 2017). Another is that 
friendship involves mutual care or concern (Telfer 1971; Blum 1980; Annis 1987; Friedman 
1989; Badhwar 1993; Cocking and Kennett 2000; Jeske 2008; Helm 2010, 2013a; Seglow 2013). 
While it makes sense to care about someone without loving them or being friends with them, it 
doesn’t make sense to love or be friends with someone without caring about them and their good. 
Of course, this care takes a special form when it’s part of love or friendship. Lovers and friends 
don’t care about their beloveds and friends (or their good) for the sake of personal gain or in any 
other instrumental way, but rather do so non-instrumentally, or for the sake of the beloveds and 
friends themselves. Also, this care is partial: compared to concern for the good of non-beloveds 
or non-friends, lovers and friends are especially concerned about the good of their beloveds and 
friends, and they will generally privilege or favor this good in their deliberations and actions. 
And besides being non-instrumental and partial, this care is also particularized: unlike the non-
instrumental, impersonal concern that we might have for particular people as instances of general 
types of things (e.g., as sick or poor persons), lovers and friends care about their beloveds and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
correctly, whereas data accommodation assumes that there are obvious, pre-theoretical truths central to our 
understanding of love (e.g. love involves concern for its object’s welfare) and then requires our theories to 
accommodate or vindicate them.  
11 Naar only discusses love, but his observations about love can and should be extended to friendship.  
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friends as the particular things that they are rather than as a mere instances of general types of 
things (Frankfurt 2001, 2004). A central data point that viable theories of love must 
accommodate, then, is the fact that love involves this kind of special concern for its object, while 
one that viable theories of friendship must accommodate is that friendship involves special 
concern that’s mutual.  
 Other central data points pertain to certain affective aspects of love or friendship. For 
instance, it seems that love must involve a disposition to feel affection for the beloved,12 and in 
friendship it must be mutual: friends must have dispositions to feel affection for one another 
(Telfer 1971; Blum 1980; Armstrong 1985; Annis 1987; Thomas 1987; Friedman 1989; Thomas 
1990; Badhwar 1993; Cocking and Kennett 2000; Arneson 2003; Jeske 2008). For just as we saw 
with special concern, it doesn’t seem to make sense to love someone or be friends with them 
without being disposed to feel—and at some points actually feeling—affection for them even if it 
does make sense to be so disposed toward someone without loving them or being friends with 
them.  
Also, as many people agree, love involves what Kolodny (2003) calls emotional 
vulnerability: loving things makes us especially susceptible to certain beloved-focused emotional 
experiences or reactions (Brown 1987; Nozick 1989; White 2001; Helm 2010; Franklin-Hill and 
Jaworska 2017; Hurka 2017; Smith 2017; Wonderly 2017).13 So for example, the beloved’s joy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is in line with Noller (1996), who counts affection as an aspect of love, as well as Abramson and Leite 
(2011), who make love affectionate. My syndrome view of love, as we shall see, agrees with and vindicates this 
point, but it also insists that love is “affectionate” in two different ways that are worth distinguishing: love itself 
partly consists of the disposition to feel affection, which then, barring very unusual conditions, will manifest itself to 
some extent in the form of emotional expressions of this disposition (i.e., actual feelings of affection).  
13 Smith (2017) suggests that this emotional vulnerability is only present in personal love for others and is in fact 
what sets it apart from the impersonal love for humanity in general that Christianity champions. As I will argue later 
when addressing an objection to my syndrome theory based on the possibility of such impersonal love, however, if 
such “love” can obtain without emotional vulnerability then it falls short of genuine love, and is rather something 
that merely resembles it (e.g., Kantian moral respect in religious clothing). Smith himself recognizes that this 
impersonal “love” looks a lot like mere Kantian moral respect, yet he still accepts the idea that it’s genuine love 
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or happiness, along with events that will or might make her joyous or happy, will tend to elicit 
the lover’s joy, happiness, or even excitement. Similarly, the beloved’s safety and security, as 
well as things that will or might promote them, will tend to elicit the lover’s satisfaction, 
comfort, or relief. And conversely, the beloved’s sorrow, unhappiness, or suffering will tend to 
trigger the lover’s sorrow, unhappiness, or compassion, while events that will or might promote 
these negative states in the beloved will tend to trigger the lover’s hostility, anger, or indignation. 
Likewise, the beloved’s being in actual or potential danger will tend to trigger the lover’s worry, 
fear, or panic, while events that will or might put the beloved in danger will tend to trigger the 
lover’s hostility, anger, or indignation. Generally speaking, then, when we love something we are 
disposed to experience a certain pattern of beloved-focused emotional reactions, where this 
pattern consists, on the one hand, of (a) certain positive emotional reactions in response to the 
beloved’s positive welfare states as well as to events that will or might promote them, and on the 
other of (b) certain negative emotional reactions in response to the beloved’s negative welfare 
states as well as to events that will or might promote them. And in friendship, once again, these 
affective dispositions must be mutual.  
 Yet another affective data point here is the fact that love, sometimes at least, involves 
attachment to the beloved (White 2001; Abramson and Leite 2011; Harcourt 2017; Wonderly 
2017), where such attachment at least partly consists in affective dispositions to experience, on 
the one hand, feelings of security or comfort when in sufficient proximity to the beloved, and on 
the other to experience feelings of distress due to separation from the beloved or to the mere 
prospect thereof.14 The fringe cases of interpersonal love suggest that love needn’t involve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
instead of rejecting it based precisely on the fact that such “love” seems to be nothing more than mere Kantian moral 
respect in religious clothing.  
14 As it is defined here, attachment clearly resembles what we earlier called “emotional vulnerability” in that both 
constitutively involve affective dispositions to experience certain beloved-focused emotions. The difference, 
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attachment, but it’s clear enough that attachment will at least be involved in many of the 
paradigmatic cases of interpersonal love, especially the three central ones. And something 
similar is true of friendship. Cases of non-close friendship suggest that friends needn’t be 
attached to one another, while close friends will be—or at least are rather likely to be—attached 
to one another. However, unlike what we saw with special concern, affection, and emotional 
vulnerability, the attachment found in friendship needn’t be mutual.  
  Still other central data points pertain to certain conative and cognitive aspects of love or 
friendship. One important point here is the fact that love involves a non-instrumental desire for 
the beloved to fare well and flourish (Green 1997; Frankfurt 1998, 2001, 2004; Hurka 2017; 
Wonderly 2017), while another is the fact that, yet again, this desire must be mutual in friendship 
(Arneson 2003). It just makes no sense to think that we could love someone or be friends with 
them without desiring that they fare well and flourish for their own sake even if such desiring 
can occur outside of love and friendship. Additionally, love often involves a desire for a personal 
relationship with the beloved (Nozick 1989; Giles 1994; Green 1997; Reis and Aron 2008), 
while friendship involves mutual desires for the shared activities and experiences of friendship 
(Telfer 1971; Cocking and Kennett 2000; Jeske 2008).  
As for the cognitive aspects of love or friendship, the most important ones pertain to 
beliefs about and corresponding perceptions of the other’s value. Specifically, love clearly 
involves believing and perceiving that the beloved is irreplaceable or non-fungible (Ehman 
1976; Brown 1987; Kraut 1987; LaFollette 1996; Lamb 1997; Velleman 1999; Frankfurt 2001; 
White 2001; Solomon 2002; Kolodny 2003; Frankfurt 2004; Grau 2004; Landrum 2009; Helm 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
however, lies in the precise focus of these emotional experiences: The experiences that flow from emotional 
vulnerability are focused on the beloved’s welfare states and how things will or might affect them, whereas the 
experiences that flow from attachment are focused on the lover’s proximity to the beloved. For further discussion of 
attachment, see the similar yet slightly different analyses of Harcourt (2017) and Wonderly (2017).  
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2010; Jollimore 2011; Smuts 2013; Zangwill 2013; Wonderly 2017). If something is non-
fungible, then one cannot replace it without a loss a value, and so to regard one’s beloved as non-
fungible is to regard it as something that one cannot replace without a loss of value. Now even 
though we can probably admit that our beloveds, typically at least, can be replaced—I can, for 
instance, have a good romantic partnership with somebody other than Bethany or trade cats with 
a friend—we cannot, qua lovers, admit that we can replace our beloveds without a loss of value. 
Unlike replacing our mere commodities (e.g. vehicles) with others that fill their roles just as well 
or better, replacing our loved ones would inevitably leave us with a sense of loss that we could 
never reverse with another like object. The same is surely true about friendship: true friends will 
likewise regard each other as non-fungible. They will not just be able to replace each other 
without a sense of loss.  
Closely related to this doxastic-perceptual dimension of love, it seems, is the volitional 
fact that love involves an unwillingness to trade the beloved in for a replacement (Nozick 1989; 
Velleman 1999; Helm 2010; Zangwill 2013; Smuts 2014b). I don’t care what other cats are out 
there or what other potential romantic partners are out there; I wouldn’t trade my cats or my 
romantic partner in for different cats or a different partner precisely because I love them. And 
surely the same is true about friendship: true friends will not be willing to trade each other in for 
replacements.  
Although it’s not entirely clear how to categorize these next points, it seems that love 
further involves some kind of respect for the beloved, and when possible some level of trust in 
the beloved (Vlastos 1981; Helm 2010). More specifically, love must involve what Darwall 
(1977) calls “moral recognition respect” as opposed to “appraisal respect,” where the former is 
the kind of respect championed by Kantian moral theory and the latter is the common notion of 
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respect that refers to the positive regard of others based on the positive appraisal of their 
characteristics. Love needn’t involve appraisal respect because we can easily envision fringe 
cases that lack it.15 However, love does need to involve moral recognition respect because, yet 
again, it just makes no sense to love someone without also morally respecting them even if the 
opposite makes perfect sense. As for trust, cases of parental love for infants demonstrate that it’s 
not always involved in love because it’s not always possible to trust or distrust something. The 
other cases of interpersonal love, by contrast, are those in which trust is possible, yet they do not 
suggest any particular level or profile of trust in the beloved. They rather suggest that the trust 
involved in love varies considerably, and even that there can be significant distrust involved 
(think again of the fringe case we just envisioned earlier in this paragraph). Nevertheless, it’s 
hard to imagine loving something that you cannot trust in the slightest, so it seems that love must 
involve, when possible, at least some level of trust in the beloved.  
Something similar is again true of friendship. Although levels of trust will vary across 
cases (and perhaps even within cases), friendship must involve mutual trust (Blum 1980; 
Armstrong 1985; Annis 1987; Thomas 1987; Friedman 1989; Thomas 1990; Badhwar 1993, 
Lamb 1997; Jeske 2008). It must also involve mutual respect (Armstrong 1985; Friedman 1989; 
Badhwar 1993), yet it not’s entirely clear what form this respect must take. Friendship does 
necessarily involve mutual moral respect for the same reason that love must involve such 
respect, but unlike love, which can survive without appraisal respect, it’s not so easy to envision 
a case of true friendship where such respect isn’t mutual. Let’s go ahead and say, then, that 
friendship must involve mutual respect of both varieties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 As an illustrative example of such a case, imagine a sibling who loves her brother just because he is her brother 
even though he’s had a long history of drug addiction, virtually non-existent employment, and constant mooching 
off of her and other family members along with some occasional theft of their property. While appraisal respect can 
surely facilitate love and may even be present in most cases, it will not be present in cases such as this one.  
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 In addition to those things already countenanced, there are several others that 
commentators have claimed to be involved in friendship. Besides, for instance, the desires for 
shared activities or experiences that friends mutually have, friendship characteristically involves 
actually shared activities or experiences (Telfer 1971; Blum 1980; Armstrong 1985; Annis 1987; 
Badhwar 1993; Jeske 2008; Helm 2010; Helm 2013a; Seglow 2013). Friends typically spend 
time together, whether they’re just passing the time with one another or engaging in more 
defined joint pursuits. And these shared activities or experiences of friendship must take a certain 
form. Friends do not share the activities or experiences of friendship accidentally, or as the result 
of the parties engaging in their own pursuits (e.g., such as two people that just so happen to be 
attending the same concert). They also don’t share them as foreseen by-products of doing their 
own things. Rather, they do so intentionally. Also, they do not engage in these activities or have 
these experiences with each other solely for the sake of cooperative mutual advantage (e.g., 
cooperative monetary gain or business exchange), or only as part of occupying certain roles that 
demand such activities or experiences (e.g., members of an admissions committee). Friends do 
and experience things together when their agency runs free and at least partly for the sake of 
doing or experiencing it particularly with one another. Friends also tend to enjoy these activities 
and experiences (Blum 1980; Badhwar 1993).  
Moreover, many commentators maintain that the shared activities and experiences of 
friendship must involve some degree of intimacy (Blum 1980; Thomas 1987; Friedman 1989; 
Thomas 1990; La Follette 1996; Jeske 2008; Helm 2010, 2013a; Seglow 2013), while some 
maintain further that these intimate activities will involve the sharing of self-information (Annis 
1987; Thomas 1987; Friedman 1989; Thomas 1993; Jeske 2008). However, it seems a bit too 
strong to claim that friendship must involve intimacy, as we could imagine a couple of “manly” 
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fishing buddies who regularly get together to drink and fish without ever getting intimate in any 
way. Perhaps intimacy is a rather common part of friendship, especially close friendship, but we 
shouldn’t hold it as being a necessary feature of friendship (Armstrong 1985). Accordingly, let’s 
say that intimacy and the sharing of self-information are sometimes involved in friendship, 
especially in close friendship, yet they needn’t be involved in friendship per se.  
 Finally, some commentators claim that friendship must involve an equality of some kind 
between the friends (Thomas 1987; Friedman 1989; Thomas 1990; Helm 2010). Unfortunately, 
it’s not at all clear what such equality amounts to, and I don’t see much value in embarking on a 
full-blown inquiry into this matter. Instead, I think that we can plausibly interpret such equality 
in terms of our final feature of true friendship, which is that friends must be mutually receptive to 
influence, direction, and interpretation (Cocking and Kennett 1998, 2000; Helm 2010). If two 
people claimed to be friends yet one party was (a) completely resistant to the other’s influence or 
direction, (b) completely insensitive to the other’s interpretation of their thinking or behavior, 
and (c) had all authority over what they do when spending time together, then it’s hard to see 
them as real friends. Real friends, by contrast, will be susceptible to influence from the other on 
their behavior or thinking. They will be open—indeed especially open—to direction by the other, 
whether this direction takes the form of explicit directives to behave or think in certain ways or 
whether it is instead merely implicit in how the other behaves or thinks. Neither will try to 
dominate the other or the time they spend together, and each will be sensitive to how the other 
interprets their behavior or thoughts. Such mutual receptivity is not only a defining feature of 
true friendship, but it explains how friendship can be a vehicle for moral growth or deterioration, 
and why friendship plays such a large role in gender socialization.  
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 In addition to extensional adequacy and data accommodation, two final desiderata that 
theories of love or friendship must satisfy are what I shall call normative neutrality and moral 
illumination. According to the former, theories of love or friendship cannot define them in ways 
that makes them ideal or good by definition, but must rather define them neutrally in order to (a) 
preserve the important distinction between membership in the kind and excellence of that kind 
and thereby (b) allow for love or friendship to take good and bad forms (Harcourt 2017). 
According to the latter, theories of love or friendship must be able to explain why love or 
friendship is a positive moral phenomenon that’s nevertheless morally dangerous (Cocking and 
Kennett 2000).  
 
2.2 The Fundamental Nature of Love 
 
With our desiderata nailed down we can now move on to our first issue of how to 
fundamentally characterize and analyze love and friendship. Let’s start with the former. What is 
love? It is, to be sure, a unidirectional logical relationship obtaining between a subject (or a 
lover) and an object (or a beloved): love obtains between a lover, L, and a beloved, B, just in case 
L loves B. Love is also the glue—whether unidirectional or bidirectional—that holds together 
and partly defines loving relationships, where these “relationships” here are not mere logical 
ones, but are rather more substantial ones that are typically grounded in a shared history of 
interaction and that typically involve repeated interaction over time that, in turn, typically 
involves expressions of love, such as showing special concern for the other. But what is this glue 
that holds together and partly defines loving relationships? What is the fundamental stuff that 
grounds the unidirectional logical relationship of love?  
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The answer that I shall present and defend here is inspired by the dizzying array of views 
on the fundamental nature of love that can be found in the scholarly literature and everyday life. 
According to many of these views, for example, love is an attitudinal phenomenon: it’s an 
attitude, or a collection of attitudes, that we have toward things. Perhaps the most familiar of 
these views, which is very prevalent in popular culture, is the purely affective view—let’s call it 
“Affective Primitivism”—that construes love as a mere feeling of affection toward the beloved. 
(I have yet to hear this view clearly echoed in the philosophical literature, but Kraut (1987) 
comes close by asserting that love is a feeling.) Yet in contrast to this purely affective attitudinal 
view are conative views, which construe love as a set of desires that we have toward the beloved 
(Nozick 1989; Green 1997; Reis and Aron 2008), as well as cognitive ones, which instead 
construe love as an appreciation or an awareness of the beloved’s value (Ehman 1976; Velleman 
1999), or primarily as a way of seeing the beloved and the world (Jollimore 2011).16 And in 
contrast to these apparent “purebred” attitudinal views are those that seem to construe love as a 
hybrid attitudinal state consisting of affective, conative, and cognitive attitudes (Soble 1990; 
Helm 2010).  
However, in opposition to all of these attitudinal views, some people think of love as a 
behavioral phenomenon: love is not a feeling or any kind of attitude, but is rather something that 
we do.17 And in a similar yet slightly different fashion, Harry Frankfurt (2001, 2004) maintains 
that love is primarily a volitional phenomenon—a “configuration of the will” in his elegant and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Two things should be noted here. One is that Green and Nozick are only interested in romantic love rather than 
love in general (even though Nozick countenances other, non-romantic objects of love). The other is that Jollimore, 
who appears to be interested only in interpersonal love, says many things to suggest that such love, on his “vision” 
view, isn’t purely cognitive or even solely attitudinal, so it may not be accurate to categorize him as a cognitivist 
about love. He does, however, appear to put himself into the cognitivist-attitudinal camp by explicitly claiming that 
love is a kind of perception (p. xi) and repeatedly claiming that it’s largely an appreciation of the beloved (pp. xv, 6, 
25, 99). 
17 In my experience this behavioral view has not been nearly as popular as Affective Primitivism, yet I have come 
across a few adherents of it. My aunt Glenda recently expressed this behavioral view by posting a meme on 
Facebook that said something like love is not something that you say, but something that you do. 
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memorable words—rather than an attitudinal one: love has less to do with believing, feeling, or 
mere desiring than with having a practical, disinterested concern for the beloved, where this 
consists in having a certain set of volitional dispositions and constraints geared toward the 
promotion of the beloved’s good for its own sake.18 Other accounts construe love as a kind of 
attachment to the beloved (Abramson and Leite 2011; Harcourt 2017), where this again at least 
partly consists of the affective dispositions described earlier.19 Still other accounts construe love 
more broadly as set of different kinds of dispositions (Naar 2013; Franklin-Hill and Jaworska 
2017), or instead as a complex of different attitudes and dispositions (Hurka 2017), or as a state 
of valuing a personal relationship shared with the beloved that’s constituted by an enormously 
complex set of attitudes and dispositions (Kolodny 2003). 
 Now even though each of these views seems to get something right about love, each still 
appears to fall short in some way. The attitudinal views that construe love as solely affective, 
cognitive, or conative will each be too simplistic for failing to recognize love’s two other 
attitudinal dimensions as well as love’s dispositional and volitional dimensions. And the hybrid 
attitudinal views, at least as I’ve interpreted them here, still fall short by not recognizing love’s 
dispositional and volitional dimensions.20 Similarly, the purely behavioral view is much too 
simplistic for failing to recognize love’s attitudinal and dispositional dimensions; and it more 
generally fails by misconstruing love as an outward performance rather than an internal 
condition of the organism. Also, if we continue to maintain the intuitive distinction between 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Noller (1996) makes a strikingly similar claim when she says that love is not primarily about having one’s own 
needs fulfilled; it’s rather primarily about caring for the other person.  
19 Abramson and Leite (2011) are only concerned with what they call the “reactive love” between romantic partners 
and close friends, which they construe as an affective attachment.  
20 This charge may not stick if I have unfairly represented these views as purely attitudinal. It may also not stick if 
desires count as volitional states and at least one of the attitudinal states that such views claim to constitute love 
should be given a dispositional analysis.  
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attitudes and dispositions, then Naar’s purely dispositional view falls short for failing to 
recognize love’s attitudinal dimensions.21  
Furthermore, even if Jollimore’s vision view and Frankfurt’s volitional view can avoid 
similar charges of oversimplification, they fall short by claiming that love is primarily a matter of 
either perception or volition when love isn’t largely a matter of anything in particular. 
Frankfurt’s view also seems to misconstrue love as being too narrowly focused: on his view love 
is focused solely on the beloved’s good instead of her agency or will (Ebels-Duggan 2008).22 As 
for the attachment views, they run afoul of the fringe cases of interpersonal love, which suggest 
that love can’t just be attachment because it needn’t even involve attachment. They also suffer 
from their own problems with oversimplification by not explicitly recognizing all of love’s 
attitudinal and dispositional dimensions. So for example, Abramson and Leite (2011) construe 
love for friends and romantic partners as an affectionate attachment to them that typically 
manifests itself in good will and other characteristic ways, but this still doesn’t explicitly 
recognize the conative and cognitive dimensions of love that the attitudinal views of love get 
right or the volitional dispositions of love that Frankfurt’s view champions. At best this view 
merely gestures towards many of the attitudes and dispositions that constitute love.  
Last we have Kolodny’s relationship view, which runs into problems by making love 
metaphysically dependent on the parties involved sharing a personal relationship. Most 
significantly, this dependence implausibly renders interpersonal love in the absence of such a 
relationship impossible. Stump (2006) presses this point by offering the literary example of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 This charge will not stick if attitudes are to be given dispositional analyses. If so, then Naar’s view may not be at 
odds with the one that I propose and defend here.   
22 Though Ebels-Duggan’s criticism of Frankfurt’s “benefactor view” seems on point here, her “shared-ends view” 
seems to suffer from the opposite problem because it construes love as solely focused on promoting the beloved’s 
ends that issue from her will. In other words, while Frankfurt’s view misconstrues love as being too narrowly 
focused on the beloved’s good, Ebels-Duggan seems to misconstrue love as being too narrowly focused on the 
beloved’s will.  
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Dante’s unrequited love for Beatrice, with whom he shares no personal relationship whatsoever, 
as a counterexample to this view. Still other—and indeed more troublesome—apparent 
counterexamples are cases of parental love for human organisms that are still in, or freshly out 
of, the womb, as the parties involved don’t appear to share the requisite relationships. Moreover, 
by fundamentally construing love in terms of valuing a personal relationship, this view doesn’t 
seem to capture the fringe cases sufficiently well. For even though we may value our 
relationships in such cases, we might instead resent them or find them mostly burdensome, and 
may ultimately wish that we didn’t have them.  
Since these views seem to get some stuff right about love yet ultimately fall short in some 
way, we must find a new way of understanding love that does justice to what these views get 
right yet avoids their apparent shortcomings. And to this end, I propose that we fundamentally 
understand love as a syndrome that’s typically caused by a shared history of interacting.23 More 
specifically, I propose that we should think of love as a rather complex, organically-caused, 
psychological condition of the organism that’s (a) typically caused by a shared history of 
interacting and (b) defined by an organized cluster of conditions that are accompanied by a non-
empty set of symptoms indicating that cluster’s presence in the organism. Fully understanding 
love, then, requires that we first distinguish between the condition-cluster that just is love, on the 
one hand, and the non-empty set of symptoms that indicate its presence on the other.  
Next we must understand what the condition-cluster and the corresponding set of 
symptoms look like. Beginning with the condition-cluster, it isn’t completely uniform across 
cases, but instead varies in principled ways depending on love’s object. Also, despite its 
principled variation across cases, the condition-cluster has an identifiable core that’s always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 I owe this idea of treating love as a syndrome to David Brink. I later came across the same idea in Kolodny 
(2003), Franklin-Hill and Jaworska (2017), and Hurka (2017).  
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present in some form, which allows us to univocally categorize the various cases and kinds of 
love as love despite the principled variation in love across cases and kinds. I will unpack this 
core in much more detail in a little bit, but at a basic level my syndrome view claims that an 
affectionate loyalty constitutes this core of love, where the loyalty part here is in turn partly 
constituted by special concern.  
As for the corresponding set of symptoms that indicate love’s presence, my syndrome 
view claims that it must be non-empty because it seems impossible for love to be present without 
manifesting itself in some way, at some time. Nevertheless, there can be considerable variability 
within this set of symptoms across cases because the manifestation of these symptoms is a 
function of several factors. Besides manifesting differently across cases due to variability in both 
the lover’s nature and the beloved’s nature, their level of manifestation will differ across cases 
because their manifestation will be a function not only of the lover’s love, but also of the 
presence or absence of other psychological conditions in the lover (e.g., depression), the nature 
of various environmental factors bearing on the relevant parties (e.g., how intertwined their lives 
are), and perhaps other things. And though we’ll get into the specific nature of these symptoms 
in a bit, in general these symptoms are going to consist in certain emotional experiences as well 
as certain kinds of behavior. 
Now let’s dig a little deeper and get into the specifics of the condition-cluster that 
constitutes love as well as the corresponding symptoms that indicate its presence, beginning with 
the ever-present, affectionate loyalty that constitutes the core of the condition-cluster. According 
to my syndrome view, the following two constituents constitute love’s core, which always partly 
or completely constitutes love:  
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(1) A disposition to feel particularized affection for the beloved.  
(2) Loyalty toward the beloved.  
 
And the first constituent here is important because it captures the truth in Affective 
Primitivism—namely, that feelings of affection are integral to love—yet it corrects this popular 
view by specifying that it’s the disposition to have such affection that’s a constituent of love and 
that this disposition is merely a constituent of love rather than the whole of it. It also importantly 
specifies that the disposition is to feel particularized affection for the beloved, or affection for 
the beloved as the particular thing that it is rather than as an instance of a type. So for instance, 
unlike the affection that I’m disposed to feel toward the feral cats as cats running around my 
apartment complex, I’m disposed to feel affection toward my beloved cats as the particular cats 
that they are. And the loyalty constituent here, which captures the true but vague idea that love 
involves “commitment” or “devotion” to its object (Lamb 1997; Frankfurt 2004; Helm 2010; 
Jollimore 2011), is, like love itself, an enormously complex, multi-dimensional phenomenon that 
varies in principled ways depending on love’s object. It requires quite a bit of unpacking.  
Let’s start with the fact that to be truly loyal to someone is to have a curiously mixed 
orientation toward that person. On the one hand, the subject of loyalty regards its object in the 
property-like way of belonging to her (Oldenquist 1982). Phaedra’s loyal nurse, for example, 
must see Phaedra as her Phaedra.24 On the other hand, the subject of loyalty sets its object as a 
final end, or as something of ultimate, non-instrumental importance (Oldenquist 1982). 
Phaedra’s loyal nurse has certainly set Phaedra as such an end. Furthermore, objects of loyalty 
are special both as perceived belongings and as final ends. As perceived belongings, objects of 
loyalty are, unlike mere pieces of property, treated as irreplaceable or non-fungible. Since she is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I borrow the characters of Phaedra and her nurse from Euripedes’ play Hippolytus.  
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loyal to Phaedra, Phaedra’s nurse will necessarily see Phaedra as irreplaceable and also will 
necessarily be unwilling to trade her in. As final ends, objects of loyalty are both privileged and 
particularized. Compared to the majority of our final ends, our objects of loyalty receive 
privileged treatment. They’re more important ends that, generally speaking, enjoy priority and 
partiality in deliberation and action. Also, our objects of loyalty are set as final ends as the 
particular things that they are rather than as instances of certain types of things. So for instance, 
Phaedra’s loyal nurse has set Phaedra qua Phaedra as a privileged final end, which wouldn’t be 
the case if, say, the nurse had set Phaedra qua queen as such an end. In this latter case the nurse 
wouldn’t be loyal to Phaedra; indeed, she wouldn’t really be loyal to any particular person at all 
since her “loyalty” would be readily transferrable to anyone who happens to occupy the slot of 
queen.  
Thus far, then, we have seen that love’s loyalty consists of two overarching dimensions. 
The “belonging” dimension consists in the subject regarding the beloved as an irreplaceable 
belonging that she’s unwilling to trade in, while the “final-end” dimension consists in the subject 
setting the beloved as the particular object that it is as a privileged final end. Now this latter 
dimension requires its own unpacking because to set another person qua that person as a 
privileged final end depends on the person’s nature. If that person is sufficiently developed (e.g., 
the adult Phaedra), it amounts to setting both her good and her will as such as privileged final 
ends, where the former refers to the person’s welfare, happiness, or the like, while the latter 
refers to things such as the person’s wants, preferences, decisions, aims, or goals. The final-end 
dimension of love’s loyalty in these cases, then, consists in two analogous sub-dimensions based 
in these ends: one of them—which is none other than the special concern for the beloved that 
many commentators stress as a core feature of love—is all about the beloved’s good, while the 
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other is all about the beloved’s will. By contrast, if the person is in the womb or a neonate that 
lacks a will (e.g., the unborn or newborn Phaedra), then setting that person qua that person as a 
privileged final end only amounts to setting that person’s good as such an end. So in these cases, 
the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty effectively collapses into special concern for the 
person.25  
 Spelled out in more detail, the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty is to be understood 
as follows. When love’s object lacks a will (e.g., the unborn Phaedra), the final-end dimension of 
love’s loyalty collapses into special concern for the beloved, where this concern is oriented 
toward the beloved’s good and is further analyzed as follows. At the most fundamental level, this 
concern is constituted by the belief and corresponding perception that the beloved’s welfare, as 
the particular thing that it is, is a privileged final end that must be respected, protected, 
supported, advanced, or otherwise promoted. And in addition to this fundamental doxastic-
perceptual part, love’s concern is constituted by other cognitive elements as well. Consequent on 
the fundamental doxastic-perceptual component, it seems, is a circumstantially robust, 
heightened attentional sensitivity to the beloved’s welfare states and to how events will or might 
affect these states (Franklin-Hill and Jaworska 2017). In other words, because of how lovers 
represent the beloved’s welfare, both this welfare and any events that will or might affect it take 
on a special salience for them across a wide range of circumstances (if not all circumstances). 
Furthermore, in virtue of representing the beloved’s welfare as a privileged final end that must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 I want to note two things here. First, Brink’s (1999) distinction between the object and the manner of love can 
help to illustrate my claims in this paragraph. Regardless of whether we have a sufficiently developed Phaedra or a 
neonatal Phaedra, in both cases the object of love—the thing that is loved—is a person. However, because of the 
agential differences between these objects, the manner in which we love these objects, which constitutively involves 
setting them as privileged final ends, differs: with a sufficiently developed Phaedra, we set her good and her will as 
such ends, but with a neonatal Phaedra, we set only her good as such an end because she lacks a will. Second, I may 
be wrong to assume here that neonates lack a will. Perhaps they have a very rudimentary one with only wants. If so, 
then the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty may not quite collapse into special concern, although it may be 
dominated by it.  
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promoted, the lover will be cognitively disposed—again across at least a wide range of 
circumstances—to certain normative perceptions. In particular, the lover will be disposed to 
perceive (a) facts pertaining to how actions will or might affect the beloved’s welfare as special 
reasons to perform, or to refrain from performing, those actions; and (b) actions that will or 
might affect the beloved’s welfare in certain ways as mandated or forbidden by especially 
stringent requirements or constraints (Frankfurt 1998, 2001, 2004; Jollimore 2011).26 
 Besides these cognitive constituents, love’s concern is partly constituted by affective, 
conative, and volitional components as well. Starting with the affective, love’s concern is partly 
constituted by the set of affective dispositions that define the emotional vulnerability outlined 
above (Smuts 2014a; Franklin-Hill and Jaworska 2017; Wonderly 2017). As for the conative, 
love’s concern is partly constituted by a non-instrumental desire for the beloved to fare well and 
flourish (Wonderly 2017), as well as the related desires for others to show the beloved goodwill 
and to know how the beloved is actually faring. And finally, since mere desires aren’t enough to 
dispose the will to action, we must further include here a set of volitional dispositions geared 
toward the promotion of the beloved’s good (Frankfurt 2001, 2004). So love’s concern, under 
my syndrome view, is partly constituted by a set of circumstantially robust, volitional 
dispositions to (a) non-instrumentally respect, protect, support, advance, or otherwise promote 
the beloved’s welfare, and indeed to (b) generally privilege the beloved’s welfare over the 
welfare and the wills of non-loved objects. 
However, when love’s object has a will (e.g., the adult Phaedra), the final-end dimension 
of love’s loyalty has another sub-dimension in addition to that of love’s concern. This new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 I again want to note two things here. First, special “reasons” here refer to normative or good reasons. Second, 
ends-in-themselves or reasons are only “special” or “privileged” in a relative or relational sense: they’re only 
“special” or “privileged” relative to, or in relation to, others that aren’t (or that aren’t as much—there will be layers 
of privileging in our hierarchy of ends and their corresponding reasons). 
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dimension—let’s call it love’s service—is oriented toward the beloved’s will and is to be 
analyzed in an analogous fashion. So at the most fundamental level, love’s service is constituted 
by the belief and the corresponding perception that the beloved’s wants, preferences, decisions, 
aims, and goals—all as the particular things that they are—are generally special or privileged 
ends-in-themselves that must be respected and served.27 And consequent upon this doxastic-
perceptual part is a circumstantially robust, heightened attentional sensitivity to the beloved’s 
wants, preferences, decisions, aims, and goals, as well as to things that do or might relate to 
them. Also consequent upon the doxastic-perceptual part is a set of cognitive dispositions to 
perceive (a) facts pertaining to how actions will or might relate to the beloved’s wants, 
preferences, decisions, aims, and goals as special reasons to perform, or to refrain from 
performing, those actions (Ebels-Duggan 2008; Jollimore 2011); and (b) actions that relate to 
these things in certain ways as mandated or forbidden by especially stringent requirements or 
constraints.  
Next there are the analogues of the affective dispositions that constitute the emotional 
vulnerability of love’s concern as well as those of the conative and volitional elements of this 
concern. So as part of love’s service, the lover is disposed to experience a certain pattern of 
beloved-focused emotional reactions, where this pattern consists, on the one hand, of positive 
reactions in response to the fulfillment of the beloved’s will as well as to events that will or 
might promote this fulfillment, and on the other of negative reactions in response to the 
frustration of the beloved’s will as well as to events that will or might promote this frustration. 
So for example, the beloved getting what she wants or prefers, or her carrying out a decision or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Notice the inclusion of “generally” here, which is not included in love’s concern. For unlike the beloved’s 
welfare, which is always a special end for the lover, the beloved’s wants, preferences, decisions, aims, or goals are 
only generally so. Certain things here—such as a desire to commit suicide or a decision to cheat on one’s romantic 
partner—need not be (and probably will not be) graced with the same treatment enjoyed by the beloved’s will more 
generally.  
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achieving a goal, will tend to elicit the lover’s satisfaction, happiness, or even relief, as will those 
things that help the beloved. And conversely, the beloved not getting what she wants or prefers, 
or her failure to carry out a decision or achieve a goal, will tend to elicit the lover’s 
disappointment, frustration, or sadness, while those things that promote this failure will tend to 
elicit the lover’s dissatisfaction, unhappiness, or even hostility. As another part of love’s service, 
the lover has non-instrumental desires for (a) the general fulfillment of the beloved’s will, (b) 
people to generally respect and serve this will, and (c) to know the beloved’s will. Finally, love’s 
service also contains a set of circumstantially robust, volitional dispositions to non-
instrumentally respect and serve the beloved’s will, and indeed to generally privilege this will 
over the welfare and the wills of non-loved objects.28  
Now let’s go beyond love’s core and look at how love is sometimes partly constituted by 
other constituents as well depending on love’s object. Consider first the difference between cases 
in which love’s object is a sufficiently developed being with a will that can affect the lover 
through action versus those cases in which in isn’t. In the latter cases, love’s object cannot be 
trusted or distrusted; it’s just not the kind of thing that can be either precisely because it lacks the 
requisite will. In the former cases, however, love’s object is an appropriate object of either trust 
or distrust because it has such a will. My syndrome view of love maintains that love will behave 
differently across these cases because of the difference in the applicability of trust: when and 
only when love’s object is an appropriate object of trust or distrust is love partly constituted by 
(3) some level of particularized trust in the beloved. In fact, it seems that such trust is a rather 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 It’s worth nothing here that these sets of volitional dispositions constitutively involved in love’s concern and 
love’s service under my syndrome view appear to map onto the “standing intentions to act in the beloved’s interests” 
that Kolodny (2003) includes as constituents of love.  
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fundamental constituent of love in these cases, as it’s hard to imagine having any of love’s core 
constituents toward something that you don’t trust whatsoever.29  
Next consider cases in which the beloved is another sufficiently developed being with an 
independent will and the capacity to act and speak. In these cases, the lover is completely subject 
to the beloved’s actions and words, and compared to those that issue from non-loved people, the 
lover is especially sensitive to her beloved’s actions and words. Generally speaking, the 
beloved’s positive actions or words will tend to have greater positive impacts on the lover than 
they would have if they came from the non-loved, while negative actions and words will tend to 
have greater negative impacts. Of course, there are certainly exceptions to this general tendency: 
your parents or longtime spouse telling you, for instance, that you’re attractive may not be 
anywhere near as uplifting as a stranger or causal acquaintance saying so. Nevertheless, your 
beloved’s words and deeds tend to carry extra power for you, especially when they’re negative. 
It just cuts deeper when our loved ones disrespect, wrong, or otherwise mistreat us compared to 
when the non-loved do so in comparable ways. And since none of this can apply to cases where 
the beloved lacks an independent will or the capacity to speak and act, my syndrome view of 
love maintains that love will again behave differently across cases due to differences in its 
objects’ wills: when and only when its object has an independent will with the capacity to speak 
and act is love partly constituted by (4) an emotional sensitivity toward the beloved’s words and 
deeds such that her words and deeds as such tend to have greater emotional impacts on the lover 
compared to those from the non-loved.30 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 The fact that such trust seems so fundamental to love in these cases suggests that such trust may be only a 
necessary, enabling condition of love rather than a constituent of it. I must admit that I’m not entirely sure where to 
draw the line between necessary, enabling conditions and full-blown constituents of love, but even if I’ve placed 
trust on the wrong side of that line here, my syndrome view would only need to be modified accordingly rather than 
rejected.  
30 This emotional sensitivity—and perhaps the emotional vulnerability defined above—could be part of what Giles 
(1994) has in mind when he claims that vulnerability seems to be a central feature of (romantic) love.  
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 Consider next cases of romantic love. Such love makes no sense in the absence of a 
desire for a romantic partnership, and so my syndrome view claims that romantic love is partly 
constituted by (5) a desire for such a relationship with the beloved.31 A similar desire may also 
be a constituent of other kinds of love, such as parental love or non-romantic friendship love, 
although the specific relationships desired across these cases will of course be different. By 
contrast, such a desire will be absent in at least some of the fringe cases of interpersonal love—
we may desire no intimate relationship with loved ones that we don’t enjoy being around—yet 
it’s difficult to draw a hard and fast line between cases of interpersonal love in which love is 
partly constituted by such a desire and cases in which it isn’t. Perhaps the only thing that we can 
say is that such a desire is likely to be present in those paradigmatic cases of interpersonal love 
outlined earlier, especially the three central cases of romantic love (where it must be present), 
non-romantic love between close friends, and parental love, whereas it’s not likely—or at least 
considerably less likely—to be present in the fringe cases. And something similar is true of (6) 
attachment, which is an inherently particularized phenomenon (i.e., we only become attached to 
things as the particular things that they are rather than as instances of a type). It will again be 
absent in at least some of the fringe cases, but in at least many of the paradigmatic cases—such 
as the three central cases—it will be a constituent of love. And though it’s again difficult to draw 
a hard and fast line between cases in which love is partly constituted by attachment and those in 
which it isn’t, generally speaking it’s much more likely to be a constituent of love in the 
paradigmatic cases and less likely in the fringe cases. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I want to note two things here. First, this desire seems to map on to the desire for a “we” or a union that Nozick 
(1989) and Giles (1994) believe to be constitutive of romantic love. Second, “the” desire in question here is perhaps 
best understood as a set of desires for all of the various things that constitute a romantic partnership. So for example, 
“the” desire for a romantic partnership that’s partly constitutive of romantic love is perhaps best understood as a set 
of the romantic lover’s desires for whatever such a romantic partnership consists of, including (a) the desire to 
engage in consensual sexual activity with the beloved and (b) the desire for the beloved to reciprocate the lover’s 
desires toward the beloved that Green’s (1997) conative theory claims as constituents of romantic love as well as (c) 
the desire to be loved back that Giles (1994) claims to be a constituent of such love.   
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 To summarize briefly, then, under my syndrome view love is always constituted by at 
least the two core constituents that compose affectionate loyalty, and sometimes it’s further 
constituted by particularized trust, emotional sensitivity, attachment, or a desire for a personal 
relationship of the appropriate type.  
This brings us to the emotional experiences and kinds of behavior that constitute love’s 
symptoms under my syndrome view. According to this view, because love is constituted by the 
two core constituents and often by some combination of the other four non-core constituents as 
well, the set of symptoms that indicate love’s presence will consist of emotional experiences and 
certain kinds of behavior that flow from these constituents. So for example, the disposition to 
feel affection toward the beloved that lies at love’s core will result in actual feelings of affection 
toward the beloved, where this affection may in turn lead to affectionate glances, soft shoulder 
punching, hugging or kissing, or other behavioral expressions of this affection. And love’s 
loyalty, which also lies at love’s core, is perhaps the most fruitful source of the expressions in 
question. The affective dispositions of love’s caring and love’s service, for instance, will 
typically manifest themselves in the emotional reactions outlined above. Likewise, the 
heightened attentional sensitivities of each sub-dimension here will often result in the lover 
literally paying attention to the beloved, while the volitional dispositions of each will typically 
manifest themselves in behavioral patterns of non-instrumentally respecting and serving both the 
beloved’s welfare and its will at the expense of competing considerations.  
Similar things could be said about love’s other constituents, but instead of going into 
what their manifestations might look like rather than leaving this up to the reader, it’s worth 
reiterating that there must be room for considerable variability in the level and nature of 
symptoms that love expresses across cases, which means that the examples provided here (e.g., 
	  40 
affectionate glances) shouldn’t necessarily be taken as required manifestations of love such that 
their absence automatically indicates love’s absence. Nor should the mere presence of certain 
behaviors that resemble these symptoms be taken as such symptoms. Affectionate glances or 
hugging, for example, may be such a symptom, but it may also be an instrumentally beneficial 
bluff. Patterns of respecting and serving others may be symptoms of genuine loyalty toward 
them, or they could instead be ultimately self-serving behaviors. Determining when certain 
behaviors or apparent emotional experiences are genuine symptoms of love may not be easy or 
straightforward, and the fact that certain behaviors or appearances can mimic genuine symptoms 
of love points to the need for an epistemology of love that tells us when certain things are, or are 
likely to be, genuine symptoms of love rather than imposters. Such an epistemology, however, 
will have to be developed elsewhere. It’s more important at this point to take a look at how well 
my syndrome view of love satisfies the desiderata that theories of love must satisfy yet avoids 
the shortcomings of the other views.  
 
2.3 Satisfying the Desiderata of Love 
 
Beginning with extensional adequacy, it doesn’t look like my syndrome view founders on 
any of the cases that need to be captured. Unlike the attachment views or the relationship view, 
respectively, my view doesn’t founder on the fringe cases of interpersonal love by implying that 
love always involves attachment or that it always involves valuing a relationship shared with the 
beloved.32 Instead, my syndrome view seems to capture both the fringe and the paradigmatic 
cases quite well. Starting with paradigmatic cases of parental (or grandparental) love for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 To be fair, Abramson and Leite (2011) do not pretend to offer an account of love in general; they only offer an 
account of the “reactive” kind of love that we find in cases of romantic love and friendship love. However, the 
fringe cases strongly suggest that their view could not be extended into a viable account of love in general. 
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unborn or neonates who lack wills, my syndrome view claims that the two core constituents, 
attachment, and a desire for an intimate, personal relationship of the appropriate type constitutes 
this love. My view also claims that the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty in these cases 
collapses into love’s concern. However, over time these beloveds will develop their own 
independent wills and will eventually become people that can act and speak. Accordingly, my 
syndrome view further claims that, in such cases, the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty will 
not only sprout an extra sub-dimension over time corresponding to the development of the 
beloved’s will (i.e., love’s service), but that the trust and emotional sensitivity constituents will 
become part of the lover’s love as well.  
Consider next the paradigmatic cases of love between romantic partners and between 
close, non-romantic friends. In these central cases the beloved is a separate individual that has an 
independent, sufficiently developed will to make them fitting objects of trust and emotional-
sensitivity, so my syndrome view claims that love in these cases is constituted by the two core 
constituents, trust, emotional-sensitivity, attachment, and a desire for an intimate, personal 
relationship of the appropriate type. It also claims that the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty 
in these cases consists of love’s concern and love’s service.   
Finally let’s consider the remaining cases of interpersonal love. In these cases, too, the 
beloved is a separate individual that has an independent, sufficiently developed will to make 
them fitting objects of trust and emotional-sensitivity, so my syndrome view claims that love in 
these cases is constituted by at least the two core constituents, trust, and emotional-sensitivity, 
and that the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty again consists of love’s concern and love’s 
service. It also claims that, more often in the paradigmatic cases compared to the fringe cases, 
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love is further constituted by attachment or a desire for a personal relationship of the appropriate 
type.  
 Moving beyond extensional adequacy we come to data accommodation, and as I will 
show my syndrome view accommodates the data we located earlier while bringing greater clarity 
to it. Let’s begin with those data points pertaining to love’s depth and stability. The most basic 
point here—that love is deep and stable—is easily accommodated by my syndrome view. For on 
this view, love is always partly constituted by loyalty, which in turn is analyzed as an 
enormously complex phenomenon that’s deep and stable by being multi-dimensionally rooted in 
our psychologies. Moreover, on my syndrome view love is sometimes partly constituted by 
attachment, which itself seems deep and stable. As for the scalar nature of love’s depth, my 
syndrome view easily accommodates this, too, because on this view love’s depth can vary in 
many places. The mere presence of attachment makes love deeper than love without attachment, 
while the affection that lovers as such are disposed to feel can be deeper or more intense. Also, 
the trust and emotional-sensitivity constituents all appear to be scalar as well, and loyalty varies 
in depth depending on how much its object is privileged in relation to other final ends.  
Next we have the fact that love involves special concern for its object. Under my 
syndrome view, love “involves” this concern in two related ways. First, love involves this 
concern in the sense that love—and in particular the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty—is 
partly constituted by the various attitudinal and dispositional components that jointly constitute 
this concern. Second, love can and often will involve corresponding expressions of this concern, 
which my syndrome view treats as symptoms of love. And something similar will be true of 
most of the other data points as well. Under my syndrome view, the set of beloved-focused, 
welfare-based, affective dispositions constituting what we called “emotional vulnerability” along 
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with the non-instrumental desire for the beloved to fare well and flourish are both constitutive 
parts of love’s concern, and so love will involve them in the same dual fashion: on the one hand 
love involves them both in the sense that it’s partly constituted by them, and on the other love 
can and often will involve corresponding expressions of them. Ditto for the disposition to feel 
affection or for attachment: love involves the former, and may involve the latter, in the sense of 
being partly constituted by the former and perhaps the latter; and love can and often will involve 
corresponding expressions of them. And when it comes to the related points of (a) believing and 
perceiving that the beloved is irreplaceable or non-fungible and (b) being unwilling to trade the 
beloved in, once again love involves both in the sense that love’s loyalty is partly constituted by 
both, and it also may involve corresponding expressions of them.  
 Now let’s take the claims that love involves, when possible, some level of trust in the 
beloved and that love often involves a desire for an intimate, personal relationship of the 
appropriate type with the beloved. As we’ve seen, under my syndrome view love involves trust 
only in cases where the beloved has a will that can affect the lover and can therefore be an 
appropriate object of trust, and yet again love involves trust in these cases in the same dual 
fashion: on the one hand love involves trust by being partly constituted by it, and on the other 
love can and often will involve corresponding expressions of trust. Something similar, of course, 
is true of the desire for an intimate, personal relationship of the appropriate type with the 
beloved: only in some cases will love be partly constituted by this desire and involve 
corresponding expressions of it.  
 Then we have the idea that love involves moral recognition respect for the beloved, 
which my syndrome view accommodates as follows. Though it’s hard to pin down exactly what 
such moral respect amounts to, it roughly amounts to setting other people as final ends. So, since 
	  44 
loyalty to others, as we’ve seen, fundamentally amounts to setting them, as the particular people 
that they are, as privileged final ends, loyalty encompasses and entails moral respect even though 
it goes beyond it. Accordingly, on my syndrome view love involves moral respect in the same 
two ways that it involves loyalty: on the one hand love is partly constituted by the various 
attitudinal and dispositional components that jointly constitute them, and on the other love can 
and typically will involve corresponding expressions of them.  
 This brings us to the final desiderata of normative neutrality and moral illumination, 
which my syndrome view satisfies quite well. Beginning with normative neutrality, my 
syndrome view analyzes love neutrally and thereby preserves the possibilities of both good and 
bad love. More specifically, if we understand “good” love to be rational love and “bad” love to 
be irrational love, then it’s clear that my syndrome view allows for both possibilities because it’s 
perfectly neutral on the question of whether the condition-cluster that constitutes love in any 
given case is sufficiently backed by normative reasons. Alternatively, if we understand “good” 
love to be love that’s valuable or beneficial to either the lover or the beloved and “bad” love to 
be love that’s burdensome to either the lover or the beloved, then again my syndrome view 
allows for both possibilities by remaining neutral on the question of whether the condition-
cluster that constitutes love in any given case will be beneficial or burdensome to either party. 
For all that my syndrome view has said about the fundamental nature of love, love could bring 
meaning and fulfillment to the lover, or it could instead bring her misery and hardship. Likewise, 
love could be a welcome addition to the beloved’s life that satisfies her overwhelming desire to 
be loved and showers immense benefits on her, or it could instead be an unwanted reality that the 
beloved wishes wasn’t there. On either interpretation of “good” and “bad” love, then, my 
syndrome view virtuously allows for both possibilities.  
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Then we have moral illumination, which my syndrome account satisfies with the final-
end dimension of love’s loyalty. For on the one hand, as we’ve seen this dimension of love’s 
loyalty amounts to setting the beloved’s good and her will as privileged final ends, where this 
loyalty is partly constituted by volitional dispositions to respect and serve these ends. Therefore, 
since many—if not the majority—of love’s objects will be other sentient beings, love will 
generally respect and serve the ends of morality by generally respecting and serving the welfare 
and wills of these beings. On the other hand, since the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty 
privileges the welfare and will of its object, there’s always the risk of privileging these ends too 
much, or of respecting and serving them in immoral ways.  
Now that I’ve shown how my syndrome view satisfies our desiderata quite well, I must 
address how it simultaneously avoids the shortcomings of rival views. For starters, we’ve already 
seen that my view doesn’t seem to founder on the fringe cases of interpersonal love. Also, unlike 
most of its rivals, my syndrome view clearly construes love as a condition-cluster that’s fully and 
appropriately multi-dimensional: rather than presenting love as solely attitudinal or dispositional, 
on the one hand, or as primarily or completely cognitive, affective, conative, or volitional on the 
other, it construes love as a condition-cluster that’s attitudinal, dispositional, cognitive (indeed 
perceptual, doxastic, and attentional), affective, conative, and volitional, where none of these 
dimensions are considered primary. It therefore avoids the problems with oversimplification or 
overemphasis that most of its rivals seem to face. And unlike the purely behavioral view, my 
syndrome view doesn’t misconstrue love as an outward behavioral performance rather than an 
internal condition of the organism, but instead virtuously construes love as such an internal 
condition while managing to incorporate behavior into the right story about love in the form of 
corresponding symptoms of love.  
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Furthermore, unlike the views of Frankfurt and Ebels-Duggan, respectively, my 
syndrome view doesn’t construe love as being solely focused on the beloved’s good or her will, 
but rather construes love, through the final-end dimension of love’s loyalty, as being focused on 
both. And besides being more intuitively appealing, this dual focus of my view better explains 
what I shall call love’s fragmentation, which refers to the occasional phenomenon of love pulling 
the lover in opposite behavioral or emotional directions. I know that my cats, for instance, don’t 
much like going to the vet, and so my love for them makes me not want to take them. At the 
same time, though, I know that taking my cats to the vet is for their own good, so my love also 
makes me want to take them. I also imagine that it’s not unusual for loving parents to face 
situations in which they want to give their beloved children whatever they want just because they 
want it, while simultaneously wanting not to give their children what they want because doing so 
would not be good for them. And similarly, we may sometimes have mixed emotions toward our 
beloveds getting what they want, making certain decisions, or adopting certain goals. We might, 
for instance, be somewhat glad or happy about these things on the one hand, yet simultaneously 
worried, disappointed, or worse about them on the other. On my syndrome view these 
experiences are explained by love’s loyalty, and in particular by the dual nature of the final-end 
dimension of this loyalty: it’s all about respecting and serving the beloved’s good and her will, 
and though respecting and serving these things largely overlap and are typically in harmony, this 
dual service creates an internal conflict in the form of the lover being torn in conflicting 
behavioral or emotional directions in certain circumstances. 
Before moving on to consider two important objections to my syndrome view of love, it’s 
worth highlighting the fact my view vindicates a few plausible intuitions that many of us have 
about love. For example, many of us quite plausibly believe that there’s at least a tension—if not 
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an outright inconsistency—between loving something and regularly abusing it. Such things don’t 
fit easily together, and for many of us they don’t fit together at all. But why is there such a lack 
of fit here? On my syndrome view, such regular abuse not only suggests a lack of moral 
recognition respect, but more generally a lack of loyalty. In particular, this regular abuse consists 
of volitional dispositions to mistreat the other, which runs directly counter to respecting and 
serving the other’s welfare and will. Furthermore, many of us have certain plausible beliefs about 
the nature of romantic love. More specifically, we believe that, when we love other persons 
romantically, we do not (a) merely use them for consensual sex, (b) view them as people to 
merely settle for until better people come along, or (c) regard them as personal servants. Treating 
others in any of these ways is flatly inconsistent with romantic love, and under my syndrome 
view it’s not hard to see why: these orientations toward others imply a willingness to trade them 
in for better replacements and no belief in their non-fungibility, and more generally a lack of 
loyalty towards them. These orientations also imply no desire for a romantic partnership and no 
attachment. Someone who’s oriented toward another in any of these ways, then, simply cannot 
love that person romantically because he lacks most of the constituents of such love.   
Despite its apparent ability to satisfy the earlier established desiderata that any viable 
theory of love must satisfy, there are at least two important objections to my syndrome view of 
love that target its extensional adequacy. The first objection maintains that my view is 
extensionally deficient (and therefore false) because it doesn’t capture genuine cases of love in 
which the lovers are very small children or non-human animals because such creatures aren’t 
sufficiently developed to house the requisite, complex mental machinery of love. While it’s hard 
to say exactly when a creature is sufficiently developed in terms of this mental machinery to 
qualify as a potential subject of love under my syndrome theory, it’s clear enough that really 
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small children and at least most non-human animals, including our companion animals, will not 
qualify, yet there are surely (a) many genuine cases of parental love throughout the non-human 
animal kingdom, (b) many genuine cases of very small children loving their parents, and (c) at 
least some cases of non-human companion animals loving their “owners.”  
Although intuitively forceful, this objection doesn’t necessarily sink my theory because 
it’s not entirely clear that it has located genuine cases of love that my theory fails to capture. 
Though it’s understandable—and perhaps even irresistible—to interpret certain behaviors of very 
small children or of non-human animals as indicators of love for others, the fact that love seems 
to be a very complex, multi-dimensional mental phenomenon coupled with their lack of mental 
development casts serious doubt on the idea that very small children and most non-human 
animals can genuinely love. While I admit that it would be very nice if my cats genuinely loved 
me as I do them, and if genuine love could be found throughout the non-human animal kingdom, 
and if really small children could love others as they presumably say or act like they do, the 
reality may very well be that most non-human animals, including our companion animals, simply 
cannot genuinely love because they cannot reach a sufficient level of mental development to do 
so, and that many small children, though capable of telling others that they love them and acting 
like they do, at best have something that merely resembles true love for others and must yet 
develop into full-blown subjects of love. Perhaps genuine loving, like fluently speaking a 
language or being virtuous, can only be found in people that have reached a rather high level of 
mental development. Furthermore, even if there are some genuine cases of love in which the 
lovers are non-human animals or small children, it’s not entirely clear that my theory cannot 
capture them. For at this point it’s just not clear what these cases look like, yet without these 
details we cannot definitively say that my theory fails to capture them.  
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The second objection, by contrast, maintains that my syndrome view fails because it 
renders impossible the kind of universal, impersonal love for humanity that Christianity 
champions. For under my syndrome view love must be directed toward particular objects as the 
particular objects that they are rather than as instances of object-types, which implies that love 
for other people must be personal rather than impersonal.33 However, even if this Christian ideal 
of universal love is extremely difficult to achieve, it’s surely possible to achieve, and so my 
theory must be false.  
 Though also quite forceful, this second objection doesn’t necessarily sink my view either 
because Christianity arguably encourages an ideal that at best almost reaches true love. To see 
why let’s construct a hypothetical, secular ethical ideal that almost reaches true love that I’ll call 
Affectionate Kantian Respect, which someone lives up to when she meets the following 
conditions. Whenever she sees another person, P, she feels affection for P as a person. She also 
regards P, as a person, as one of her people and as something of non-instrumental importance in 
its own right. Digging deeper, she regards P’s good and P’s will as things of non-instrumental 
importance in their own right that must be respected and served as far as possible. She’s disposed 
to pay attention to how P is faring and whether P needs help with her ends; she sees facts 
pertaining to how things will or might affect P’s welfare or ends as normative reasons to do or 
not do certain things; she desires for P to fare well and for P to get what she wants within 
morally acceptable limits; she’s disposed to feel good when P fares well and gets what she wants 
within morally acceptable limits and bad when P doesn’t; and she has volitional dispositions to 
non-instrumentally respect and serve P’s welfare and ends as far as possible. She’s even disposed 
to trust P until she has sufficient evidence to warrant distrusting P.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 My syndrome view here is thus in agreement with Frankfurt (2001, 2004), Jollimore (2011), and Zangwill (2013), 
which means that this objection, if successful, would sink their views as well as mine. 
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Now even though this Kantian ideal clearly resembles true love, it falls short of it and 
should therefore be distinguished from it because there’s no partiality or favoritism toward any 
of its objects as particular objects. While everyone is an object of the Kantian saint’s 
affectionate respect, no one is a privileged individual. No one is special. So long as something is 
merely a certain kind of thing—namely, a person—it receives the same impartial treatment as 
any other person. The kind of concern that the Kantian saint has for other people is not special—
it’s impartial and general rather than partial and particularized. Furthermore, if we were to 
weaken this ideal in order to make it more achievable—for example, by extracting the 
disposition to feel affection for any other person as a person or boiling it down to non-
instrumental universal goodwill—then it would even more clearly fall short of true love by 
lacking even more necessary features of such love. For surely there can be no love for something 
without a disposition to feel affection for it, and so our Kantian ideal will fall shorter of universal 
love if it no longer contains the disposition to feel affection for any other person as a person. 
This ideal will fall even shorter of universal love if we were to boil it down to non-instrumental 
universal goodwill because such goodwill needn’t be accompanied by the disposition to feel 
affection for any other person as a person, any emotional vulnerability toward others, or any trust 
in others. Consequently, any religious analogues of these Kantian ideals would fall short of true 
love as well for the same reasons. Perhaps there are practical reasons to call such ideals “love,” 
but this only means that it’s sometimes prudent to fudge the truth. Strictly speaking they don’t 
amount to true love. 
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2.4 The Fundamental Nature of Friendship 
 
This brings us to the question of how we should fundamentally characterize and analyze 
friendship. What is friendship? Unlike love, which we saw to be a unidirectional logical 
relationship, friendship is a bidirectional logical relationship: friendship obtains just in case two 
people are friends with each other, and two people, X and Y, are friends with each other just in 
case X is a friend of Y and Y is a friend of X. So even if there could be situations in which only 
one person can be said to be a true friend, such a situation, even if it involves a true friend, does 
not involve a true friendship. For that we must have two people that are friends with each other.34 
And besides being a bidirectional logical relationship, friendship is a “relationship” in the more 
substantial sense of being something that’s grounded in a shared history of interaction and that 
typically involves repeated interaction over time that, in turn, typically involves expressions of 
friendship, such as mutual loyalty. But what is this something that’s grounded in a shared history 
and tends to express itself? What is it that materializes in the parties involved that makes them 
friends with each other?  
Here I propose and defend an answer to the question of friendship’s fundamental nature 
that’s similar too—and indeed that largely piggybacks on—my answer to the previous question 
about love’s fundamental nature: friendship should be understood as a pair of very comparable 
syndromes that obtains between two people due to a shared history of interacting, or as a pair of 
very similar condition-clusters obtaining between two people as the result of a shared history of 
interacting that is accompanied by a set of symptoms that indicate the presence of these 
condition-clusters in the two parties. So, just like we saw with love, to understand friendship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 It is, therefore, possible for person X to befriend person Y without Y reciprocating because it’s possible for X to be 
a friend of Y without Y being a friend of X. In such a situation, however, we would only have a single friend rather 
than a true friendship.    
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under my syndrome view of friendship, we must again draw a distinction between the pair of 
condition-clusters that constitutes friendship and the corresponding symptoms that indicate the 
reality of this pair.  
 Now let’s take a closer look at these things, beginning with the pair of condition-clusters 
that constitutes friendship. According to my syndrome view, while these condition-clusters could 
be exactly the same, they needn’t be strictly symmetrical; they only need to be very comparable. 
Accordingly, the syndromes that obtain between and thereby make people friends can be 
somewhat different from each other, on the one hand, yet must be largely the same on the other 
in order to be very comparable. Despite the fact that these syndromes that jointly constitute 
friendship can vary, then, under my syndrome view of friendship there is a common core to each 
of the syndromes—and therefore a (relatively) symmetrical core to friendship itself—that allows 
us to characterize people as friends within and across cases.  
What makes up this core? In agreement with other commentators (Thomas 1990; 
Badhwar 1993; Helm 2010, 2013a), my syndrome view of friendship claims that this core is 
largely constituted by mutual love, and indeed by a mutual love that, according to my syndrome 
view of love, would have to obtain between the kinds of people that can be friends. So for 
starters, given the core of love under my syndrome theory, the core of friendship under my 
syndrome view of it consists of (1’) mutual dispositions to feel particularized affection for the 
other and (2’) mutual loyalty, where the final-end dimensions of this mutual loyalty are both 
two-dimensional. Also, since the parties involved will have the right kind of wills to be 
appropriate objects of trust and emotional-sensitivity, the core of friendship further consists of 
(3’) mutual particularized trust and (4’) a mutual emotional sensitivity toward each other’s words 
and deeds such that each one’s words and deeds tend to have greater emotional impacts on the 
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other than they would otherwise have if they had instead come from the non-loved. And though 
interpersonal love in general needn’t be partly constituted by a desire for a personal relationship 
of the appropriate type, the mutual love between friends is partly constituted by (5’) mutual 
desires for—or at least the symmetrical openness to—the interactions, activities, or experiences 
of friendship as described above.35  
In addition this mutual love, the other elements of friendship’s core under my syndrome 
view of it are (6’) mutual appraisal respect, which again refers to the kind of respect constituted 
by the positive regard of another based on the positive appraisal of that person’s characteristics 
(Darwall 1977), as well as (7’) mutual dispositions to experience enjoyment due to interacting or 
to engaging in the activities or experiences of friendship. Under my syndrome view of 
friendship, then, it’s these seven conditions that jointly constitute the core of friendship that 
defines it. And venturing beyond this core, just as we saw with love, friendship is also sometimes 
partly constituted by attachment even though it needn’t be so. This attachment may be 
symmetrical or asymmetrical, and when it’s symmetrical it signifies a close friendship.  
Next we come to the symptoms of friendship, which, like those of love, generally consist 
in certain behaviors and emotional experiences that typically flow from the various constituents 
of the pair of condition-clusters that constitutes friendship. Perhaps the most characteristic 
symptoms here are (a) the interactions, activities, and experiences of friendship as described 
earlier, including intimacy and the sharing of self-information, along with (b) mutual enjoyment 
of these things. And just like we saw with love, the mutual loyalty that constitutes a large part of 
friendship will typically manifest itself in a variety of behavioral and emotional ways (e.g., the 
parties will mutually influence each other’s behaviors through suggestion or direction). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Just to be clear, my syndrome view of friendship maintains that mutual love is always involved in friendship 
because it’s always part of the core of friendship. This may seem objectionable because it doesn’t allow room for 
friendship without love, but I will deal with this kind of objection to my view in the next section.  
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However, there is no particular set of symptoms that must be present in order for two people to 
be friends. There can be a significant amount of variability in the set of symptoms that indicate 
friendship because the manifestation of these symptoms will again be a function of several 
factors. Friends will typically display their loyalty and share activities, for example, but they may 
not do so if they live far away from each other and live independent lives, or if they have too 
many other pressing matters to deal with in their lives (such as more important friends or loved 
ones to which to attend). Friends may typically engage in intimate, non-sexual behaviors 
together and share information about themselves with each other, but the internalization of 
certain norms, such as masculine gender norms, may inhibit such behavior among friends. 
Friends also typically enjoy their shared activities and experiences, but they of course need not 
always enjoy them, and a depressed or a stressed friend may consistently have a hard time 
enjoying them.  
 
2.5 Satisfying the Desiderata of Friendship 
 
Just like my syndrome view of love, my syndrome view of friendship does quite well in 
terms of satisfying the desiderata that viable theories of friendship must satisfy. Beginning again 
with extensional adequacy, my syndrome view of friendship doesn’t seem to founder on either 
close or non-close friendships, but rather appears to capture them pretty well. For under my 
syndrome view of friendship, close friendship is constituted by the seven conditions that jointly 
constitute the defining core of friendship along with mutual attachment, and it will typically 
manifest itself in a variety of ways, especially in the characteristic ways just described above. By 
contrast, non-close friendship is constituted by the seven conditions that jointly constitute the 
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defining core of friendship, and though attachment may be present in one of the parties, it’s not 
likely to be present in either party. Also, compared to close friendships, the dispositions to feel 
affection, the loyalty, the trust, the emotional sensitivity, and the desires for friendship activities 
and experiences that partly constitute friendship will tend to be less deep in non-close 
friendships, and the corresponding symptoms will tend to be less abundant. This captures the 
basic idea from earlier that non-close friendships are probably best thought of as watered-down 
versions of close friendships.  
 Of course, it’s easy enough to envision potential counterexamples here. Consider, for 
instance, the humorous case from the television show Seinfeld where Jerry tries to “break up” 
with a guy from his past named Joel who wants to be friends with Jerry even though Jerry 
doesn’t really like him and doesn’t want to hang out with him. When Jerry tries to end things, 
Joel breaks down and cries, so out of pity Jerry takes it back and says that they can still be 
friends. But since Jerry (at best!) doesn’t really have affection for Joel, has no desire to engage in 
the activities and experiences of friendship with him, and isn’t disposed to enjoy the time they 
spend together, they don’t count as friends under my syndrome theory of friendship even though, 
by their own lights, they are friends. Now this, to be sure, is an interesting case, but it doesn’t 
necessarily constitute a genuine counterexample to my theory. For one thing, just because Jerry 
and Joel think that they’re friends doesn’t mean that they are. People can be wrong about 
whether their relationships are genuine friendships. Also, the fact that Jerry is motivated to spend 
time with Joel out of pity rather than affection and the desire for the activities and experiences of 
friendship strongly suggest that they are not really friends (a “friend” out of pity is no friend at 
all). So even if my syndrome view does imply that Jerry and Joel aren’t real friends, this doesn’t 
sink my view because, upon closer inspection, it doesn’t look like they’re real friends.  
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Other, and perhaps more troublesome, potential counterexamples here are (a) what 
appear to be the all-too-familiar cases of small children being friends despite the fact that they do 
not house the requisite mental machinery of friendship under my syndrome view of it, and (b) 
cases of non-close friendship where the friends don’t love each other. Don’t these cases sink my 
view? Not necessarily. Like the case of Jerry and Joel, these cases may not be genuine cases of 
friendship. The people involved may do what friends do, but as the case of Jerry and Joel shows, 
people can do what friends do without being friends. Small children may not be able to house the 
requisite mental machinery of friendship, but they will hopefully grow into it, and before they do 
so they can be legitimately called “friends” even if in reality they are merely friends-in-training. 
Two people who don’t love each other under my syndrome theory may appear to be friends by 
hanging out all the time, but since they don’t love each other, they don’t have the mutual 
psychological depth to warrant calling them friends rather than people who merely pass the time 
together or engage in activities together. Although we shouldn’t make friendship too hard to 
come by here, we also shouldn’t make it too easy to come by.  
 Overall, then, none of these potential counterexamples clearly work, and so my syndrome 
view still appears to satisfy the desideratum of extensional adequacy. Let’s move on then to the 
next desideratum of data accommodation, which my syndrome theory also satisfies quite well. 
Starting with the fact that friendship is deep and stable, my syndrome view of friendship 
accommodates this easily by making mutual love, which is deep and stable, a constitutive part of 
friendship. As for the related point that friendship varies in closeness, my syndrome view 
accommodates this in part by making mutual attachment, which makes friendship deeper or 
closer when present, something that may or may not be a constituent of friendship. My view 
further accommodates this fact by construing friendship in terms of mutual affection, loyalty, 
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trust, emotional sensitivity, and desires for friendship activities and experiences, all of which can 
vary in depth across cases of friendship. And when these things are comparatively deeper, the 
friendships they constitute tend to be closer, while the opposite tends to be true when these 
things are not as deep.   
  Most of the other data points here are accommodated by my syndrome view of 
friendship in the same dual fashion as we saw earlier when looking at how my syndrome view of 
love accommodated the data of love. Under my syndrome view of friendship, for instance, 
friendship involves things such as mutual dispositions to feel affection and mutual special 
concern (which is part of mutual loyalty) by being partly constituted by them. Friendship also 
can, and typically will, involve corresponding expressions of these constituents, which again are 
treated as symptoms of friendship. And since the mutual emotional vulnerability and the mutual 
desires for each other to fare well and flourish are constituents of mutual special concern, they 
will be involved in the same dual fashion as it was. Likewise for the mutual desires for the 
shared activities and experiences of friendship, the mutual trust, the mutual moral and appraisal 
respects, the mutual dispositions to enjoy spending time together, and the mutual attachment. On 
the one hand, friendship always involves everything but the mutual attachment in the sense that 
it’s partly constituted by them all under my syndrome theory, and sometimes friendship is further 
constituted by mutual attachment. On the other, friendship can involve corresponding 
expressions of these things—which my view again treats as symptoms of friendship—and it 
typically will involve corresponding expressions of the mutual desires for the shared activities 
and experiences of friendship, the mutual trust, the mutual moral and appraisal respects, and the 
mutual dispositions to enjoy spending time together. And most notable here are the expressions 
of the mutual desires for the shared activities and experiences of friendship and the mutual 
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dispositions to enjoy such things, which, respectively, take the form of actual shared activities 
and experiences along with actual enjoyment of such things. I earlier described these things as 
characteristically, yet not necessarily, involved in friendship, and my syndrome view of 
friendship accommodates this fact by construing these things as symptoms of friendship that are 
typically, but not necessarily, present.  
 Next we have the data points to the effect that friendship sometimes, yet not always, 
involves intimacy and the sharing of self-information, and that it always involves the mutual 
receptivity to influence, direction, and interpretation. Starting with intimacy and the sharing of 
self-information, my syndrome theory accommodates the fact that friendship only sometimes 
involves these things by making them characteristic symptoms of friendship that may 
nevertheless be absent in certain cases of genuine friendship. As for the mutual receptivity to 
influence, direction, and interpretation, my syndrome theory can accommodate this with the 
mutual loyalty and the mutual emotional sensitivity that partly constitute friendship under my 
theory. Because friends are mutually loyal, on the one hand, they will each have a set of 
circumstantially robust, volitional dispositions to serve each other’s wills, which is why they are 
mutually receptive to each other’s influence and direction. On the other hand, because friends are 
particularly sensitive to the other’s words and deeds, they will be particularly sensitive to how 
they interpret each other.  
 This brings me to the final desiderata of normative neutrality and moral illumination, 
which my syndrome view of friendship also satisfies quite well. Starting with normative 
neutrality, my view analyzes friendship neutrally and thereby preserves the distinction between 
“good” and “bad” friendship. More specifically, if we understand the former to be rational 
friendship and the latter to be irrational friendship, then my syndrome view of friendship 
	  59 
preserves this distinction because it allows friendship to be sufficiently backed or forbidden by 
normative reasons. If, however, we understand “good” friendship to be valuable to the parties 
and “bad” friendship to be burdensome, then again my syndrome view preserves the distinction 
because it allows for both valuable and burdensome friendships. And if we instead understand 
“good” friendship to be that which serves as a vehicle for the growth or preservation of moral 
virtue and “bad” friendship to be that which leads to moral deterioration in the parties, then again 
my syndrome view preserves this distinction because it makes room for both possibilities 
through mutual loyalty and the expressions of friendship, which can have either kind of effect on 
our moral characters.  
As for moral illumination, my syndrome view of friendship satisfies it quite easily 
through its mutual loyalty condition. For on the one hand, since friendship is partly constituted 
by this mutual loyalty, each party will set the other’s welfare and will as privileged end-in-
themselves, and so each party will have circumstantially robust, volitional dispositions to respect 
and serve the other’s welfare and will. Therefore, since these dispositions will tend to manifest 
themselves in the form of actually respecting and serving these ends, friends will tend to serve 
the ends of morality at least with respect to their friends. On the other hand, since each party will 
set the other’s welfare and will as privileged ends, they perpetually run the risk of privileging 
these things too much, or of respecting and serving them in immoral ways.  
 
2.6 The Psychological Grounds of Love and Friendship 
 
Now that we’ve addressed the issue of how to fundamentally characterize and analyze 
love and friendship, we can move on to the next issue of whether these phenomena are 
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psychologically grounded in (normative motivational) reasons. Are love and friendship 
responses to considerations that we take—perhaps unconsciously—to warrant such responses? 
On the surface it may not look like it because love and friendship are not the kind of things that 
we can straightforwardly choose or will on the basis of perceived reasons that seem to warrant 
them. Though love and friendship may typically depend on voluntary choice for their existence 
and, indeed, may sometimes even depend on the parties involved (a) voluntarily committing to 
having the relevant type of relationship with each other or (b) voluntarily choosing to do things 
calculated to initiate or sustain such a relationship, we still can’t straightforwardly choose to start 
or continue loving someone, or to initiate or continue being friends with someone, on the basis of 
facts about them that seem to make loving or being friends with them rationally appropriate as 
we can straightforwardly choose to enter or remain in our cars on the basis of facts that seem to 
make such behavior rationally appropriate. The facts that seem to make loving or being friends 
with others rationally appropriate may indeed motivate people to voluntarily commit to loving or 
being friends with these others, or to voluntarily choosing to do things calculated to initiate or 
sustain love or friendship with them, but these voluntary actions alone cannot successfully lead 
to or sustain true love or true friendship. Whether such love or friendship will be successfully 
initiated or sustained is never due solely to our voluntarily choices to initiate or sustain them 
because we cannot voluntarily choose to initiate or sustain the psychological realities that 
constitute these phenomena. We might be able to make these realities possible or more likely 
through our voluntary choices, but whether these realities actually materialize also depends 
crucially on mysterious factors of fortune that lie beyond our control that must work in tandem 
with our voluntarily choices to produce or sustain love or friendship (Thomas 1987, 1990). In 
fact, these factors of fortune beyond our control are needed to complete any process of initiating 
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or sustaining love or friendship set into motion by our voluntary choices, which means that love 
or friendship still ultimately “just happen to us” even if our voluntary choices have played a role 
in their materialization (Thomas 1987, 1990). Therefore, since love and friendship are not things 
that we can straightforwardly choose or will on the basis of perceived reasons that seem to 
warrant them, but are rather things that are ultimately due to factors beyond our control, it’s 
tempting to see them as things that aren’t psychologically grounded in reasons (i.e., things that 
happen to us aren’t the kinds of things for which we have reasons; we only have reasons for what 
we do or will).  
 Now even though love and friendship cannot be straightforwardly willed on the basis of 
perceived reasons that seem to warrant them, and are indeed things that must ultimately just 
happen to us, this does not show that they aren’t psychologically grounded in reasons. Just 
consider the analogous case of belief, which is a mental state that is psychologically grounded in 
reasons even though it, too, cannot be straightforwardly willed or chosen on the basis of 
perceived reasons or evidence that seems to support it, but is rather, much like love or friendship, 
something that must ultimately just happen to us. For even though our voluntary choices may put 
us in a position to come to believe certain things, we still must rely on other, psychological 
factors beyond our control to ultimately produce beliefs in us. Even if we’re staring at conclusive 
evidence, E, for some belief, B, we cannot, by a sheer act of will, come to adopt B on the basis of 
E as we can straightforwardly will to do things on the basis of perceived reasons that seem to 
warrant them. For these beliefs to actually materialize, the part of our rationality that’s beyond 
our control—the part that ultimately produces the doxastic results that are warranted by the 
evidence in our cognitive grasp—must be functioning properly. But even though this is true, it 
doesn’t mean that belief is not something that we hold on the basis of considerations that we 
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take—perhaps unconsciously—to warrant them. Belief is indeed such a state; and so both love 
and friendship, which are likewise things that cannot be straightforwardly willed on the basis 
reasons, and are rather things that ultimately just happen to us, can still be psychologically 
grounded in reasons.  
 In fact, there are some pretty good grounds for thinking that love and friendship are 
psychologically grounded in reasons. Consider first the familiar scenario in which a beloved asks 
her lover for reasons why she loves her and the lover responds by trying to unearth such reasons. 
In such a scenario, the beloved isn’t seeking explanatory reasons that illuminate the mere causal 
history of the lover’s love: she isn’t seeking a story about God or good fortune creating the right 
causal circumstances for the lover’s love to materialize, or about the psychological, 
physiological, biological, or social conditions and causal processes involved in the 
materialization of the lover’s love. The beloved here is instead asking for reasons that are 
supposed to render her lover’s love for her an appropriate or fitting response to her, and so the 
beloved is effectively presupposing that her lover’s love for her is psychologically grounded in 
the relevant reasons. Also, since the lover responds to the request by trying to locate and provide 
the relevant reasons rather than rejecting the beloved’s request as resting on a mistaken 
presupposition, the lover is effectively vindicating the beloved’s presupposition here. This 
familiar scenario, then, strongly suggests that love is psychologically grounded in the relevant 
reasons. And since we can easily envision an analogous scenario occurring between friends, we 
also have reason to think that friendship is likewise psychologically grounded in the relevant 
reasons.  
 Additionally, there are some normative grounds for thinking that love and friendship are 
psychologically grounded in reasons. If—as I will argue in the next chapter when we venture 
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into normative territory—love and friendship are subject to normative appraisal or rational 
assessment, then it seems reasonable to think that they will be sensitive to this fact. More 
specifically, if any given case of love or friendship is either justified or unjustified, then it’s 
plausible to suppose that any instance of love or friendship will be sensitive to this fact by being 
grounded in what are taken to be reasons that justify it. Again the analogous case of belief is 
instructive here. Belief is definitely subject to normative appraisal or rational assessment: any 
given belief will be justified or unjustified, warranted or unwarranted. And given this, we should 
expect belief to be sensitive to this fact by being psychologically grounded in what’s taken to be 
evidence that justifies or warrants it, which seems to be exactly what we find to be true about 
belief. Analogously, then, we should expect love and friendship to be the same way if they, too, 
are subject to normative appraisal or rational assessment.  
 Assuming then that these are good grounds for thinking that love and friendship are 
psychologically grounded in reasons, the next question to ask is: what reasons are they grounded 
in? Though the specific reasons that ground love or friendship probably vary across cases, I think 
that we can establish what these reasons will generally look like from reflection upon the nature 
of love and friendship. First, though, we should draw distinctions between initial and continuing 
love, as well as initial and continuing friendship, since the reasons that we might have for these 
things may change over time due to our changing relationships with others over time.  
Now the central kind of reason here can be uncovered by revisiting Aristotle’s three kinds 
of friendship—pleasure-friendship, utility-friendship, and virtue-friendship, which are again 
defined and distinguished by what psychologically grounds the relationship between the parties 
involved. Aristotle thought that only the last kind of friendship is true or perfect friendship, while 
the others are degenerate cases that only approximate, and that merely resemble, real friendship. 
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And it’s not difficult to see why: people who associate with each other only because of the 
mutual pleasure they gain from each other’s company or because of some other personal benefit 
gained from each other (e.g., they just want someone else to spend time with them) may behave 
like friends do, but they don’t have the right orientations to each other to be true friends because 
they are only in it for their own advantage. In particular, people who associate with each other or 
have a relationship solely for their own personal advantage will lack many of the mutual 
characteristics that constitute friendship: they will at least lack mutual special concern and 
mutual loyalty, which are both non-instrumental and particularized orientations toward others, 
and they will probably lack the mutual beliefs in the other’s non-fungibility and the mutual 
unwillingness to trade the other in for a replacement. For if all one cares about is fun or some 
other personal advantage, then wouldn’t this make that person’s associates who are valued only 
for how fun or otherwise advantageous they are replaceable without a loss of value? Wouldn’t 
such a person be willing to trade in these associates for replacements if those replacements 
would be more personally advantageous? The upshot here is that true friendship, whether initial 
or continuing, cannot be psychologically grounded in one’s own personal advantage, but must 
instead be grounded in what’s taken to be the other’s good character traits. This isn’t to say that 
friendship must be grounded in the other’s good character traits, as this would rule out friendship 
between people with lousy character traits. Instead, friendship must be psychologically grounded 
in what are taken to be the other’s good character traits, even if these evaluations are massively 
wrongheaded or factually mistaken.  
 Now the case of love, by contrast, is curiously a bit messier than this, even though it, too, 
cannot be psychologically grounded in one’s own personal advantage because anyone who’s 
oriented toward another solely for the sake of such advantage will at least lack the special 
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concern and loyalty that largely constitute love, and they will probably lack the belief in the 
other’s non-fungibility and the unwillingness to trade the other in for a replacement that also 
partly constitute love. Unlike friendship, which seems to be psychologically grounded solely in 
what are taken to be the other’s good character traits, it seems that love can be psychologically 
grounded in different kinds of considerations depending on whether it’s initial or continuing love 
that we’re talking about here. Starting with initial love, though it can, and in many cases will 
(e.g., the case of friendship love), be grounded in what are taken to be good character traits, it 
seems that it can also be grounded in biological-relational traits. Recall, for instance, the fringe 
case of love envisioned earlier in footnote 14 in which the lover loves her brother simply because 
he is her brother. In this case the brother is loved not because of his good character traits, but 
rather just because he is the lover’s brother. And I would also imagine that something similar is 
true in other cases of love, such as cases of parental love for the unborn, infants, and the like. 
Though their parents may love them because they are precious or adorable or whatever, chances 
are their parents love them simply because they are their children. So it seems that the 
psychological grounds of initial love, then, can be found in what are taken to be the beloved’s 
good character traits or in biological-relational traits that the beloveds can have.   
 Finally we have continuing love, and though it, too, can be grounded in the beloved’s 
good character traits or in her biological-relational traits—the psychological grounds of initial 
love can, and in many cases will, continue to so ground love—a third set of relevant traits here 
are traits that the beloved can have in virtue of non-biological relationships shared with the lover. 
So for example, in many cases of romantic love, such love is initiated before the parties involved 
get married, and so the parties’ initial love for each other cannot be grounded in their marital 
relationship. However, after the parties get married, then each one’s love for the other can, I 
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presume, be psychologically grounded in the fact that the other is one’s spouse. So when it 
comes to continuing love, it seems that it could be psychologically grounded in good character 
traits as well as relational traits that are either biological or non-biological in nature.  
  
2.7 Love, Friendship, and the Value of Their Objects 
 
This brings us to the final issue of this chapter, which is how love and friendship relate to 
the non-instrumental value of their objects. When we love others or are friends with them, are we 
responding to their non-instrumental value? Or are love and friendship instead bestowals or mere 
projections of such value onto others? According to appraisal views they are responses to non-
instrumental value, while according to bestowal views they are mere projections of such value 
(Helm 2010, 2013b). However, I think that the relationship between such value and these 
phenomena is much more complicated than these views suggest. In fact, I think that there are 
multiple relationships here, and that to see them all we must look at the different ways in which 
“non-instrumental value” can be interpreted. 
 One way to interpret “non-instrumental value” is in terms of intrinsically valuable 
qualities. On this interpretation, then, the issue in question becomes that of whether love and 
friendship are responses to intrinsically valuable qualities that others possess, or whether they 
merely project such qualities onto others. Let’s begin with friendship, which we saw above to be 
psychologically grounded in what’s taken to be the other’s good qualities, where these qualities 
are considered “good” in and of themselves rather than because of their advantageousness for the 
friend. Because friendship is psychologically grounded in this way, friendship is always at least a 
response to what’s taken to be non-instrumental value. However, whether friendship is a 
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response to such value or a mere projection of it depends on whether (a) the other person actually 
has the apparently good qualities that they seem to have as well as whether (b) these apparently 
good qualities are, in fact, good. If either of these conditions is not met, then friendship will be a 
mere projection of non-instrumental value under this interpretation of it. For if, on the one hand, 
the other person doesn’t really have the apparently good, friendship-grounding qualities that they 
seem to have, then our friendship with them cannot be a response to their good qualities. Instead, 
we would be effectively projecting these apparently good qualities—and thus non-instrumental 
value—onto them. On the other hand, if the other person did really have the apparently good, 
friendship-grounding qualities that they seem to have, but these qualities were actually lousy or 
objectively valueless ones instead of good ones, then although we would be responding to the 
other’s actual qualities here, we would still be projecting non-instrumental value onto them. By 
contrast, friendship is a response to the other’s intrinsically valuable qualities—and thus to non-
instrumental value—when and only when (a) they actually possesses the apparently good, 
friendship-grounding qualities that they seem to have, and (b) these apparently good qualities are 
actually good ones.  
 Something similar will be true of love, except the situation here is a bit more complicated 
and indeterminate given the more expansive psychological grounds of love. We saw above that 
these grounds can be found in what are taken to be the beloved’s good character traits (just as we 
see in friendship), but they can also be found in relational qualities that the beloveds can have in 
virtue of biological or other relationships with their lovers. Insofar as love is grounded, then, in 
the beloved’s apparently good character traits, the story about love’s relation to the non-
instrumental value of its object will be the same under this first interpretation of such value as 
the story just told about friendship. Things get more complicated and indeterminate, however, 
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when we consider the other possible grounds of love. Everything hangs on whether those who 
love on the basis of these extra grounds see the relational qualities in question as non-
instrumentally valuable, and of course on whether these qualities are in fact so valuable. The 
qualities of being someone’s sibling or of being someone’s spouse, for example, seem to be 
neutral ones. If they are, then if people do love in virtue of such qualities and see them as 
possessing non-instrumental value, then these people would clearly be projecting such value 
rather than responding to it. If, however, these people don’t see such qualities as possessing such 
value, then these people would not be projecting or responding to such value. And if, by contrast, 
the love-grounding qualities do constitute non-instrumentally valuable qualities, then those who 
love in virtue of them will be straightforwardly responding to non-instrumental value under this 
interpretation of it.  
 Besides referring to intrinsically valuable qualities, we could instead interpret “non-
instrumental value” as some sort of holistic, intrinsic, non-moral value that our beloveds or 
friends may possess. So for example, I used to have a red ’88 Isuzu Pickup that had the kind of 
value that I’m talking about here. Besides its obvious instrumental value, the truck as a whole 
had sentimental value, which is a kind of intrinsic, non-moral value that I obviously projected 
onto the truck. Similarly, it seems clear enough that we see our beloveds and our friends as 
having such sentimental value just by being our beloveds and our friends, where such value is 
known to be only in our minds and is therefore a mere projection onto our beloveds and friends. 
We have also seen that a constituent of both love and friendship is the belief in, and 
corresponding perception of, the beloved’s non-fungibility, which for our purposes here means 
that love and friendship both constitutively involve seeing the beloved as holistically possessing 
an intrinsic, non-moral, unique—and therefore irreplaceable—value. And whether this 
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perception merely projects such value onto the beloved or is instead a response to such value 
straightforwardly depends on whether our beloveds and friends actually have such value: if they 
don’t have such value, then this perception projects it onto them; if they do have such value, then 
this perception is a response to this value. But do our beloveds and friends ever have such value, 
or do love and friendship always merely project such value? Rather than trying to answer this 
question here, I will have to save it for the end of the next chapter when I address what’s known 
as “the fungibility problem.”  
 In addition to the interpretations already considered, one final way to interpret “non-
instrumental value” here would be in terms of non-instrumental moral value, where this, in turn, 
could be either the basic, intrinsic kind that every person as such is thought to possess, or else a 
special kind that belongs uniquely to beloveds and friends as such. On this interpretation, the 
issue in question becomes that of whether love and friendship are responses to either kind of 
non-instrumental moral value that others may possess, or whether they merely project such value 
onto others. And it is my contention that love and friendship are not responses to either kind of 
value, nor are they mere projectors of either kind of value. More specifically, I think that, on the 
one hand, love and friendship are not responses to the basic kind of moral value that we all 
intrinsically possess solely in virtue of our personhood, nor do they merely project this kind of 
value onto their objects. For as we saw in the previous section, love and friendship are 
psychologically grounded in apparently good character traits or, in the case of love, in relational 
qualities, not (pace Velleman 1999) in our mere personhood or any generic value that such 
personhood may have. So neither love nor friendship is a response to our basic moral value. And 
since we have such value just because of our personhood, we have it before we can be the object 
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of love or friendship, which means that neither phenomenon merely projects such value onto 
their objects.  
On the other hand, I also maintain that love and friendship are not responses to, nor mere 
projectors of, any special kind of moral value that beloveds and friends as such may possess, but 
are instead literal creators of such special moral value. For one thing, people obviously could 
not have special moral value as beloveds and friends before love or friendship materializes; they 
could only have such value as the result of these things. So love and friendship cannot be 
responses to the special moral value in question here. However, love and friendship do seem to 
project special moral value onto their objects. For as we’ve seen, both of them are constituted in 
part by loyalty, where such loyalty sets the other’s welfare and will as special or privileged ends-
in-themselves rather than as generic ones with equal moral importance to any other person’s 
welfare or will. And by assigning this special or privileged status to the beloved’s or the friend’s 
welfare and will, which outstrips the impartial moral importance of welfares and wills across 
persons, love and friendship appear to project this special value onto their objects. Nevertheless, 
love and friendship do not merely project this special value because, as I shall now argue, our 
beloveds and friends as such have special moral value for us.  
Imagine that you are standing on the shore of a body of water and two people are in the 
water drowning. You can save one, and only one, of the drowning individuals with minimal risk 
to your own welfare. Now suppose that one person is not a loved one or a friend, while the other 
is one of these things. No matter who that first person is, the second person here, unlike the first, 
has a moral claim to your rescue simply because they are your loved one or your friend. Of 
course, both people here could have moral claims to your rescue on the basis of different facts. 
The first person may be a doctor who will be unable to save more lives should you refuse to save 
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them, or they may be loved by many other people who will suffer from their loss, or they may be 
more virtuous than your loved one. But this doesn’t change the fact that your loved one seems to 
have a special moral claim to your rescue here because they are your loved one while the other is 
not. And this seems to suggest that your loved one here really has special moral value for you. In 
fact, if we stipulate that there are no morally relevant differences between the drowning 
individuals other than the fact that one person is your loved one or your friend while the other is 
neither, then it seems rather obvious that you should, on pain of moral failure, save the former 
individual. It is of course bad to not save someone when you can, but here you cannot avoid bad 
consequences, and it would surely be worse—and therefore wrong—to let your friend or loved 
one drown rather than the stranger. But if it would be morally worse and thus wrong to let your 
friend or loved one drown, then that person’s basic welfare must be more important, or have 
greater moral value, than the other’s welfare (which is why the friend or loved one has a special 
moral claim to your rescue in the first place).  
 Furthermore, consider the apparent moral asymmetries with respect to straightforwardly 
wronging your loved ones or friends compared to wronging strangers instead. As concrete 
examples, consider the differences between maliciously sabotaging a stranger’s lifelong goal of 
becoming a doctor vs. doing it to a friend or a loved one, and the differences between punching a 
stranger in the face out of boredom vs. doing it instead to a friend or a loved one. Though all of 
these actions seem wrong, it would clearly be worse—indeed morally worse—to treat our friends 
or loved ones in either of these ways. But why is this true? Because the welfare and the wills of 
our friends and loved ones as such are generally more important, or generally have greater moral 
value, than the welfares and the wills of others. Overall, then, it appears that our friends and 
other loved ones as such have special moral value for us; and so even if love and friendship do 
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involve projections of special moral value onto their objects, these aren’t mere projections 
because love and friendship give rise to special, agent-relative moral value.  
Of course, the idea that love and friendship can literally give rise to special, agent-relative 
moral value may seem too fantastic, far-fetched, or metaphysically extravagant to accept, but this 
worry will evaporate if we are willing to accept other ideas about moral value. In particular, 
suppose that we accept the idea that people really possess a basic moral value in virtue of their 
personhood such that their welfares and wills are morally important for everyone. Now let’s 
further suppose that we accept the intuitive idea that, while all people possess a basic moral 
value in virtue of their personhood, it’s nevertheless the case that virtuous people have more 
moral value than the vicious such that the welfares and the wills of the former are generally more 
important to respect and promote than those of the latter. By accepting these ideas, we are 
accepting, first, that people possess a basic, agent-neutral moral value, and second that some 
people can possess comparatively more or less agent-neutral moral value in virtue of their moral 
character. But if we accept the idea that good moral character, which is special and intrinsic to 
the individual, can augment moral value in an agent-neutral way, then it’s not much of a stretch 
or any more metaphysically extravagant to think that love and friendship, which are special 
relations between people, can augment moral value in an agent-relative way.36  
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I’ve addressed the three issues pertaining solely to the nature of love and 
friendship. Beginning with the central metaphysical issue of how to fundamentally characterize 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 I will elaborate on these ideas in chapter 5 when discussing my non-reductionist account of the special duties of 
love and friendship.  
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and analyze these phenomena, we’ve seen that they’re best understood as complex, 
psychological syndromes within and between people that typically stem from a shared history of 
interacting. More specifically, love is best understood as an organically caused, affectionate 
loyalty that can take different shapes across cases and that manifests itself in a variety of 
behavioral and emotional ways, while friendship is best understood as an amalgam of mutual 
love, mutual appraisal respect, and mutual dispositions to enjoy spending time together that can 
also take different shapes across cases and that also manifests itself in a variety of behavioral and 
emotional ways. Next we inquired into the psychological grounds of love and friendship, and 
there we found that friendship is grounded in what are taken to be the other’s good qualities, 
while love is grounded in what are taken to be the beloved’s good qualities or in relational 
qualities that the beloveds can have due to shared relationships.  
Last we addressed the thorny of issue of how love and friendship relate to the non-
instrumental value of their objects, where we found that the relation here depends (among other 
things) on how we interpret the notion of “non-instrumental value.” If we interpret it to mean 
“intrinsically valuable qualities,” then the relation here will be different across cases. Starting 
with friendship, it’s a response to non-instrumental value when the other person actually 
possesses the apparently good, friendship-grounding qualities that they seem to have and these 
apparently good qualities are actually good ones, otherwise it’s a mere projection of such value 
onto the other. As for love, it’s relation to non-instrumental value on this interpretation of it is a 
bit more complicated. Insofar as love is grounded in the beloved’s apparently good qualities, 
love’s relation to such value is no different than friendship’s relation to it: love is a response to it 
when the beloved actually possesses the apparently good, love-grounding qualities that they 
seem to have and these apparently good qualities are actually good ones, otherwise it’s a mere 
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projection of such value onto the beloved. However, insofar as love is grounded in relational 
qualities, its relation to non-instrumental value under this interpretation of it depends on whether 
(a) the lovers see these qualities as non-instrumentally valuable ones and (b) these qualities are 
actually valuable in this way. If (a) is true but (b) is false, then love is a mere projector of non-
instrumental value. If (a) and (b) are instead both false, then love is neither a response to nor a 
projector of such value. And if, finally, both (a) and (b) are true, the love is a response to such 
value.   
 If, however, we interpret “non-instrumental value” to refer to the special, holistic, non-
moral, purely sentimental value that our beloveds and friends as such seem to possess, then it’s 
clear that such value is a mere projection onto our beloveds and friends because we know it to be 
only in our minds. And if instead we interpret “non-instrumental value” to refer to the holistic, 
non-moral, non-fungible value that we can’t help but see in our beloveds and friends, then 
whether love and friendship are mere projectors of such value or responses to it depends on 
whether our beloveds and friends actually have such value: if they don’t have such value, then 
love and friendship merely project it; if they do have such value, then love and friendship are 
responses to it. And finally, if we interpret “non-instrumental value” to refer to either the basic, 
intrinsic kind of moral value that every person as such is thought to possess or to a special kind 
of moral value that belongs uniquely to beloveds and friends as such, then love and friendship 
are neither responses to nor mere projectors of either kind of value. Instead, they appear to be 
literal creators of the special kind of moral value.  
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Chapter 3: Love, Friendship, and Justification 
 
Now that I’ve addressed those issues falling under the nature side of the nature-
normativity divide, we’re ready to venture out into normative territory, beginning with those 
issues that pertain to the justification of love and friendship. As explained in chapter 1, the first 
issue here is (1) whether love and friendship are subject to being rationally assessed as justified 
or unjustified. If they are (and I will argue that they are), then we can ask (2) what reasons 
actually justify love or friendship as well as (3) when love or friendship is all-things-considered 
justified or unjustified. And the final issue here is (4) whether love or friendship can ever be 
completely rational (i.e., guilty of no charge of irrationality), or whether they will instead always 
be irrational to some degree.  
Since this chapter is about justification and reasons, which are concepts that tend to be 
used ambiguously in philosophical discussions of love and friendship, I will begin by 
distinguishing different kinds of justification and reasons that will be important for our 
discussion. Then I will defend the basic rationalist thesis that love and friendship are subject to 
rational assessment. Next, I will address the issue of what reasons actually justify love or 
friendship by defending a pluralistic theory of these reasons according to which there are three 
basic kinds of such reasons—value-based reasons, quality-based reasons, and history-based 
reasons.37 After this, I will briefly address the issue of when love or friendship is all-things-
considered justified or unjustified by essentially arguing that either is justified just in case the 
balance of reasons renders it rationally appropriate. Lastly, I will address multiple arguments 
purporting to show that love and friendship will always be irrational to some degree. Although 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Hurka (2017) seems to offer the same pluralistic theory of the reasons for love.  
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there will always be cases of irrational love or friendship, I will defend the attractive idea that 
there can be cases of love or friendship that are guilty of no charge of irrationality whatsoever.  
 
3.1 Justification and Reasons 
 
At the most basic level, the relationship between justification and reasons is pretty 
simple: reasons constitute or provide justification. However, both “reasons” and “justification” 
admit of different interpretations, where the different interpretations of one map onto those of the 
other. So for example, in chapter 1 I drew a distinction between normative reasons, which are 
considerations that actually justify our beliefs, actions, or whatever, and normative motivational 
reasons, which are considerations that we take to justify our beliefs, actions, or whatever. This 
distinction, then, corresponds to the distinction between actual justification for our beliefs, 
actions, or whatever, which is a normative matter, and perceived justification for these things, 
which is a psychological matter. We dealt with this latter matter with respect to love and 
friendship in chapter 2 when dealing with the nature of these phenomena, so in this chapter we’ll 
be concerned with the possibility of actual justification and the normative reasons that might 
provide it. Before we can directly tackle this issue and other related ones, though, we must draw 
some more distinctions that correspond to different senses of “actual justification” and the 
“normative reasons” that can provide it.  
 Let’s begin by drawing a distinction between fact-relative justification, evidence-relative 
justification, and belief-relative justification.38 Something enjoys fact-relative justification when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 This distinction here is inspired by Parfit’s (2011) distinction between fact-relative, evidence-relative, and belief-
relative wrongness. It appears to improve upon the distinction between “objective” and “subjective” justification by 
showing that there are at least three types of justification rather than only two, and that these three types can be 
placed, in the order as presented, on a spectrum of objectivity to subjectivity.  
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objective facts justify that something regardless of whether or not we have access to or 
awareness of those facts. So for example, if there were an airplane part falling from the sky and 
about to lethally crush me as I write this, this fact would justify my moving out of the way so as 
to avoid getting crushed to death. Chances are that I wouldn’t know and couldn’t know about 
this, but this fact, if it were a fact, would still make it appropriate for me to move out of harm’s 
way and would therefore justify me doing so. By contrast, something enjoys evidence-relative 
justification when the available evidence justifies that something, or when the available evidence 
suggests a conclusion that would, if it were an objective fact, justify that something in the fact-
relative sense. So for example, as I sit here and write this I hear nothing that sounds like airplane 
parts falling from the sky above me, and more generally I detect nothing in my environment 
indicating any impending doom from a falling airplane part. I could of course be mistaken about 
this, but the available evidence strongly suggests that I am safe where I sit, and this, if it were an 
objective fact, would justify my action of remaining where I am. I am therefore justified relative 
to the available evidence in remaining where I am. And then there’s belief-relative justification, 
which something enjoys when it’s justified relative to one’s beliefs. So if I come to sincerely 
believe that I’m going to be crushed to death by a falling airplane part, then I’d be justified in the 
belief-relative sense in moving out of harm’s way because, if my belief were true, then I’d be 
justified in the fact-relative sense in moving out of harm’s way. For the sake of simplicity and 
because both evidence-relative and belief-relative justification are to be understood by reference 
to fact-relative justification, my focus in this chapter will be on the possibility of love and 
friendship enjoying fact-relative justification and, accordingly, on the objective facts—which in 
turn constitute the normative reasons—that might provide it.  
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Next let’s draw an important distinction between what I shall call agent-relative 
justification and agent-neutral justification, which corresponds to a distinction between agent-
relative reasons and agent-neutral reasons. Agent-relative justification is of course supplied by 
agent-relative reasons, which are reasons that people have in virtue of something beyond their 
mere personhood, their moral agency, or their causal position in the world.39 So for example, I 
have no reason to work on my dance moves because I have no desire to become a better dancer 
for its own sake and no other aim that would be served by becoming a better dancer. Other 
people, however, might have the goal of becoming a better dancer for its own sake or some other 
aim that would be served by becoming a better dancer, so these individuals would have a reason 
to work on their dance moves (namely, it will help them reach, or will increase the odds that they 
will reach, whatever goal they have here). Only some people have reasons to work on their dance 
moves, and they have them in virtue of something beyond their mere personhood, their moral 
agency, or their causal position—namely, some desire or aim that they have, such as impressing 
other people with their dance moves. Any reasons that people might have to work on their dance 
moves, then, will be agent-relative reasons. In fact, all of our reasons that are grounded in our 
desires or aims are agent-relative reasons.  
There are, however, other plausible candidates for agent-relative reasons besides those 
that are grounded in our desires or aims. Reasons grounded in accrued benefits, for example, will 
be agent-relative ones as well. For some things will be beneficial for some but not for others, and 
so facts about the benefits of things will be reasons only for some people in virtue of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This characterization of agent-relative reasons obviously strays from the orthodox conception of such reasons as 
justifying considerations that make essential reference to the agents that have them and is informed by Jeske’s 
(2008) unorthodox conception of such reasons as those based in more than our mere causal positions in the world. 
For as we shall see later, quality-based reasons for love or friendship can come in both agent-neutral and agent-
relative varieties, and yet the agent-relative ones make no reference to the agents that have them (they instead, like 
all quality-based reasons, cite facts about the beloved’s or friend’s qualities). The orthodox account is therefore 
inadequate because it cannot accommodate these agent-relative reasons.    
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dispositions to benefit from these things rather than their personhood, moral agency, or causal 
position. Also, our intimate relationships with others appear to ground agent-relative reasons 
(Jeske 2008). In virtue of my romantic partnership with Bethany I have a reason to privilege her 
over others (she is my beloved spouse) that no one else has, while all of her friends—and only 
her friends—have a reason to privilege her over strangers (she is their friend Bethany). It’s the 
intimate relationships rather than our personhood, moral agency, or causal position that gives us 
these reasons, which makes them agent-relative ones.  
By contrast, agent-neutral justification is supplied by agent-neutral reasons, which are 
reasons that people have just because of their personhood, their moral agency, or their causal 
position in the world.40 It’s controversial whether there are any such reasons, but moral reasons 
are the paradigmatic example of them. So if, say, it is morally obligatory to not harm the 
innocent, then the very fact that not harming the innocent is morally obligatory could count as an 
agent-neutral moral reason not to harm the innocent because it would be a moral reason for every 
moral agent as such. Also, facts about how our actions will harm or will not harm others could 
count, respectively, as moral reasons against or for performing those actions, and they would be 
agent-neutral ones because we would have them because of our causal position in the world (i.e., 
our ability to harm or not harm). Both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons and their 
corresponding kinds of justification will be relevant to our ensuing discussion about love and 
friendship. 
 Finally let’s draw the very important distinction between pro tanto justification and all-
things-considered justification. Something enjoys pro tanto justification when it’s justified by 
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reasons as those based in one’s mere causal position in the world. I’ve modified her characterization so that we can 
accommodate all possible agent-neutral moral reasons (namely, facts about right and wrong) as well as the agent-
neutral, quality-based reasons of love and friendship that I will discuss in a bit.  
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some set of reasons to the extent that it’s backed by that set of reasons regardless of any other 
reasons that might be in play. So for example, the fact that I would respect your property rights 
by not stealing your car is a reason that supplies pro tanto justification for me to not steal your 
car because not stealing your car is justified to the extent that it’s backed by this reason 
regardless of any other reasons that might be in play. Suppose further, however, that stealing 
your car is the only way for me to heroically speed down the highway and save a child who’s 
just been kidnapped. If this were true, then I would have pro tanto justification to not steal your 
car as well as pro tanto justification to steal your car because each option here is backed by a 
reason that justifies that option to the extent that it’s backed by that reason. By contrast, 
something enjoys all-things-considered justification when, and only when, it’s justified overall—
or rendered rationally permissible—by some set of reasons.41 Unlike pro tanto justification, 
which is supplied by reasons regardless of whether there are any other reasons in play, all-things-
considered justification is supplied by a set of reasons that’s not outweighed by competing 
reasons.42 Returning then to the example of stealing or not stealing your car, though both options 
are backed by a set of reasons and therefore enjoy pro tanto justification, the option that’s backed 
by the set of reasons that isn’t outweighed by the set of reasons backing the other option will 
enjoy all-things-considered justification as well. Generally speaking, then, something enjoys all-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 By logically equating all-things-considered justification with rational permissibility I do intend to imply that such 
justification is not to be logically equated with rational optimality. Something is rationally optimal just in case it’s 
backed by the strongest set of reasons, and though this is sufficient for all-things-considered justification (and for 
rational permissibility), it isn’t necessary. In cases of ties, where some set of reasons favors A and another set favors 
not-A yet neither set outweighs the other, neither set of reasons will render what they back rationally optimal, but 
they will render either option all-things-considered justified (and rationally permissible).   
42 The following considerations suggest that things will enjoy all-things-considered justification so long as they’re 
backed by sets of reasons that aren’t outweighed by competing sets of reasons. In cases like those envisioned in the 
previous footnote where sets of competing reasons tie and therefore neither set is outweighed, we’re justified in 
doing either option. Alternatively, in cases where there’s no tie and one set of reasons does outweigh the other, 
we’re justified in doing whatever is backed by the strongest set of reasons, which is the only set of reasons that isn’t 
outweighed by the other. Since these two kinds of cases seem to be the only possibilities here, and in both it’s a set 
of non-outweighed reasons that renders something all-things-considered justified, it seems to follow that all-things-
considered justification is supplied by a set of reasons that isn’t outweighed by competing reasons.  
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things-considered justification when, and only when, the reasons that support it are not 
outweighed by the reasons that speak against it. Like agent-relative and agent-neutral 
justification, both pro tanto and all-things-considered justification will factor into our ensuing 
discussion about love and friendship. In fact, the second issue that we shall address is concerned 
with locating reasons that provide pro tanto justification for love and friendship, while the third 
issue that we shall address is concerned with specifying when love and friendship are all-things-
considered justified or unjustified.43  
 
3.2 Are Love and Friendship Subject to Rational Assessment? 
 
We’re now ready to address whether love and friendship can be justified or unjustified as 
rationalism maintains, or if they rather elude rational assessment altogether, as anti-rationalism 
maintains.44 Let’s start by considering a couple of arguments against rationalism. One argument 
is that love and friendship are analogous to being hungry or being in pain, which are not subject 
to rational assessment.45 Being hungry or in physical pain aren’t things that can be rational or 
irrational, but are rather mere effects of causal factors beyond our control that ultimately just 
happen to us. Love and friendship, the argument maintains, are the same way: as things that 
ultimately just happen (or don’t happen) to us due to causal factors beyond our control, love and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Before moving on it’s worth noting that Smuts (2014a) seems to offer another, extremely loaded conception of 
“justification” that’s both psychological and normative and that draws a non-accidental link between the 
psychological and the normative. Put in the terms used here, he seems to think of “justification” as what we take to 
be our justification that non-accidentally amounts to actual justification. In other words, Smuts seems to think that 
“justification” for love (or anything else) would have to consist in normative motivational reasons for it that amount 
to full-blown normative reasons for it, where the former reasons non-accidentally amount to the latter reasons 
because the former reasons are responses to the latter reasons. I will not be explicitly addressing the question of 
whether love can ever have this kind of justification, but my discussion of the psychological grounds of (or the 
normative motivational reasons for) love from the last chapter as well as the upcoming discussion of the normative 
reasons for love in this chapter provide the psychological and the normative materials for doing so.  
44 I borrow the “rationalism/anti-rationalism” distinction from Jollimore (2011).  
45 I’m here extending an argument that Smuts (2013) presses only in the case of love. I must extend it given my 
syndrome view of friendship, which holds that mutual love is partly constitutive of friendship.  
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friendship are not subject to rational assessment. However, once again the case of belief shows 
that love and friendship, even if ultimately due to factors beyond our control, may still be subject 
to rational assessment because belief is certainly subject to such assessment even though it, as we 
saw in the last chapter, is ultimately due to psychological factors beyond our control. Love and 
friendship cannot be written off as eluding rational assessment altogether, then, just because 
they’re likewise ultimately due to psychological factors beyond our control.  
 A second argument against the rationalist thesis that love and friendship are subject to 
rational assessment maintains that these phenomena aren’t subject to such assessment because 
they aren’t responsive to reasons.46 You can’t talk someone out of loving another or being 
friends with that other just by citing reasons against these things, yet if love or friendship were 
subject to rational assessment then they would be responsive to these reasons. However, the case 
of belief blocks the inference from reasons-unresponsiveness to not being subject to rational 
assessment because belief is often unresponsive to reasons that speak against it even though 
belief is, once again, subject to rational assessment. Religious beliefs, for example, are subject to 
rational assessment even though they’re often unresponsive to the reasons against holding them. 
Likewise, the fact that love and friendship are sometimes—or even most of the time—
unresponsive to reasons does not signify that they aren’t subject to rational assessment. At most 
this shows that they’re irrational sometimes or even most of the time, just as belief that isn’t 
responsive to reasons is irrational rather than non-rational or a-rational. So love and friendship 
cannot be written off as eluding rational assessment because they’re sometimes or even mostly 
unresponsive to reasons. In fact, to accuse them of being unresponsive to reasons seems to imply 
that there are reasons to which they’re unresponsive, yet if there are such reasons, then they’re 
subject to rational assessment.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 I’m again extending an argument that Smuts (2013) presses only in the case of love.  
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Let’s now consider some modest grounds in favor of the basic rationalist thesis that love 
and friendship are subject to rational assessment. First of all, it’s pretty easy to think of cases 
where they seem to be rationally appropriate as well as cases in which they seem to be rationally 
inappropriate. Love for one’s own small children seems rationally appropriate, while love for the 
small children of complete strangers down the street seems rationally inappropriate (Kolodny 
2003). Love for a life partner or friendship with a person that’s playful, sensitive, kind, caring, 
supportive, respectful, and loyal seems rationally appropriate, while love for a partner or 
friendship with a person that’s cold, overly selfish, insensitive, controlling, abusive, and disloyal 
seems downright irrational. Yet such evaluations, as assessments of love or friendship’s 
rationality, imply that these phenomena are subject to rational assessment.  
Moreover, recall the first strand of support for the thesis in the previous chapter that love 
and friendship are psychologically grounded in (normative motivational) reasons. There we 
considered the familiar scenario in which the beloved (or the friend) asks her lover (or her friend) 
why she loves (or is friends with) her and the lover (or friend) responds by trying to locate the 
relevant reasons that psychologically ground her love (or friendship). This scenario strongly 
suggested that love and friendship are psychologically grounded in normative motivational 
reasons. Now this by itself doesn’t show that love and friendship are subject to rational 
assessment. However, given that love and friendship are psychologically grounded in normative 
motivational reasons, we may then be inclined to ask: are these reasons good ones? In other 
words: are these normative motivational reasons also full-blown normative ones as well? Insofar 
as this question seems to make sense and doesn’t seem to rest on a mistake, it follows that there 
is some standard of normative reasons for love and friendship that we can use to measure 
whether the normative motivational reasons that psychologically ground our love or friendship 
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are, if factually correct, actually good ones. But the reality of such a standard of course implies 
that love and friendship are subject to rational assessment.  
So far, then, we have found some decent grounds for thinking that love and friendship are 
subject to rational assessment, yet insufficient grounds for thinking that they aren’t. We can 
therefore tentatively proceed on the rationalist assumption that love and friendship are subject to 
rational assessment—they can be justified or unjustified—and turn to the normative reasons that 
might actually justify them.47  
 
3.3 Reasons for Love and Friendship 
 
In order to locate the reasons that can (pro tanto) justify love or friendship, we must start 
by making some important distinctions. Two such distinctions, which we saw in the last chapter, 
is that between initial and continuing love and that between initial and continuing friendship. 
Others can be extracted from the following questions pertaining to the justification of love and 
friendship: 
 
Q1: Why love or be friends with anyone instead of no one? 
Q2: Why love or be friends with someone in particular instead of no one or someone else?48  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Since I defined friendship in the previous chapter as a bidirectional logical relationship that obtains just in case 
two people are friends with each other, my talk so far and in the ensuing discussion of “friendship” being subject to 
rational assessment and there being reasons that justify or count against “friendship” must be technically understood, 
respectively, as (a) the unidirectional logical relationship of being someone’s friend as being subject to rational 
assessment as well as (b) there being reasons that justify or count against this unidirectional logical relationship. For 
the sake of simplicity, however, I will continue in the ensuing discussion to speak of reasons that justify or count 
against friendship.  
48 Jeske (2008) and Helm (2013b) pose similar questions.  
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Now the first question here is asking for reasons that justify participation in the business of 
loving or being friends with others instead of staying out of them altogether; it isn’t asking for 
reasons to love or be friends with any particular person. It’s analogous to asking for reasons to be 
a car owner, but not the owner of any particular car, instead of not owning a car at all. This 
question, then, seeks justification for what I shall call, for lack of a better label, unspecified love 
and friendship. By contrast, the second question clearly asks for reasons to love or be friends 
with some particular person rather than no one at all or someone else. It’s analogous to asking for 
reasons to own a particular car rather than some other car or eschewing car ownership altogether. 
So this question seeks justification for what I shall call specified love and friendship. 
Since the distinctions between initial and continuing love and between initial and 
continuing friendship only matter when it comes to specified love and friendship, we effectively 
have three kinds of love and friendship here—unspecified love and friendship, initial specified 
love and friendship, and continuing specified love and friendship—each of which can be the 
focus of a justificatory inquiry. Now it’s true that unspecified love and friendship cannot exist 
apart from specified love and friendship and vice versa: being in the love or friendship business 
in general requires loving or being friends with particular people, while loving or being friends 
with particular people automatically brings us into the love or friendship business in general. So I 
don’t mean to imply here that the three kinds of love and friendship are completely separable. 
Rather, I think that, just as we can draw useful theoretical distinctions among general car 
ownership, initial ownership of particular cars, and continuing ownership of particular cars, we 
can draw the above theoretical distinctions among the three kinds of love and friendship and 
make each kind the focus of a justificatory inquiry in order to unearth the pluralism of reasons 
that can justify love and friendship.  
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3.3.1 Reasons for Unspecified Love and Friendship: Value-Based Reasons 
 
Let’s begin then with unspecified love and friendship, which again refers to the general 
business of loving or being friends with others. Why should we love or have friends at all, 
especially given the pain, frustration, unhappiness, and other costs that love and friendship are 
very likely to bring? As far as I can see the only viable answers here will cite what I shall call 
value-based reasons for love or friendship, where such reasons consist in facts pertaining to how 
love or friendship actually, probably, or potentially promotes, or is required for, something 
valuable.49 And to unearth specific reasons here, we must now ask: What valuable things do 
loving or being friends with others in general actually, probably, or potentially promote? What 
valuable things require either?  
A few answers here come from Harry Frankfurt (1998, 2001, 2004). Speaking only of 
love, he maintains that love in general is valuable because it satisfies our need for final ends. We 
all need things that we regard as non-instrumentally important or valuable to serve as final ends 
that will give shape to our practical reasoning and ultimately to our lives, and love and friendship 
both supply us, through their objects, with such final ends. One value-based reason for 
unspecified love or friendship, then, is that it meets our need for final ends. Also, Frankfurt 
further maintains that loving others is inherently important or valuable to us, and I think that 
being friends with others is no different. That is, loving or being friends with others is like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 That a thing, T, is required for some valuable thing, V, may not always constitute a reason for T; it may only do so 
when certain enabling conditions are in place. So for example, even though putting gas in your empty car is required 
for driving it, this fact seems to count as a reason to put gas in your empty car only if driving your gas-filled car is a 
live option. In the ensuing discussion, then, I will locate possible reasons for love or friendship that consist in facts 
pertaining to how love or friendship is required for something valuable in order to leave it an open question as to 
whether the relevant enabling conditions obtain for these facts to amount to full-blown reasons.  
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engaging in hobbies or having fun: they are all valuable to us in their own right (or “all by 
themselves”) instead of being valuable only because they lead to something else that’s valuable 
in its own right (e.g., a better world).50 So another possible value-based reason for unspecified 
love or friendship is simply that it’s inherently valuable to us.  
 Besides these value-based reasons, the only other possible ones that I can see are those 
based in the possible value of loving relationships or friendships that require love for or being 
friends with the other party as a constitutive feature. So for example, some people think that 
these relationships are intrinsically valuable: they’re valuable in their own right, or apart from 
their contribution to other valuable things. If so, then since love is indeed required for loving 
relationships and being friends with others is required for friendship, another possible value-
based reason for unspecified love or friendship is that it’s required for participation in 
intrinsically valuable relationships.  
  Now this potential value-based reason is based in the intrinsic value of loving 
relationships or friendships. However, these relationships may have non-intrinsic value as well, 
and this value is another potential source of reasons here. So for instance, it’s quite plausible to 
suppose that loving relationships and friendships are valuable because they are constituents of 
good or flourishing lives (Annis 1987). If so, then these relationships would be extrinsically yet 
non-instrumentally valuable: they’re extrinsically valuable because they promote something else 
that’s intrinsically valuable (namely, a flourishing life), yet they’re non-instrumentally valuable 
because they’re constituents of, rather than means to, a flourishing life. And so, as a constituent 
feature of loving relationships or friendships, which are here supposed to be constituent features 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 This isn’t to say that loving or being friends with others is no more valuable or important than engaging in hobbies 
or having fun. The comparison here is meant to show that loving or being friends with others is like these other 
things in that they’re valuable to us in their own right, and this is perfectly compatible with loving or being friends 
with others being much more valuable to us than the other things.  
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of flourishing lives, love for or being friends with others is likewise a constituent feature of 
flourishing lives, which in turn means that loving or being friends with others is required for 
such lives. So another possible value-based reason for unspecified love or friendship is that it’s 
required for living a flourishing life. 
 Finally, in addition to their alleged intrinsic value and extrinsic-yet-non-instrumental 
value, loving relationships and friendships can definitely have instrumental value: they can 
function as means to other valuable ends or benefits. So for instance, as we noted about friends 
in particular in the previous chapter, the other parties involved in our loving relationships and 
friendships tend to “have our backs”: not only do they tend to be particularly disposed to defend 
us from verbal or physical attacks compared to those with whom we share no relationship, but 
they tend to be particularly disposed to help us out of jams and assist us in our various pursuits or 
personal projects. Furthermore, these relationships can have psychological, moral, epistemic, and 
hedonistic benefits. Beginning with the psychological benefits, loving relationships and 
friendships can combat loneliness and boredom, and can foster confidence and self-esteem 
(Annis 1987; LaFollette 1996). Although there are certainly exceptions, those with which we 
share loving relationships and friendships tend to be rather keen on helping us feel good about 
ourselves, especially during times when we’re having difficulty with self-confidence. And 
though it’s certainly possible to be bored when you’re with friends or loved ones, or lonely when 
you have friends or loved ones, these individuals will make both boredom and loneliness less 
likely insofar as these individuals are precisely the kind of people that will be generally 
motivated to reduce our experiences of boredom and will be generally ready to keep us company 
when we need it. Moreover, loving relationships and friendships can help satisfy our needs for 
things such as comfort and meaning in life. When we’re sad or heartbroken, worried or scared, 
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it’s our friends and loved ones that tend to be the ones willing and ready to make us feel better. 
They’re typically the ones that we can go to for comfort in times of distress, and they will 
typically be the most comforting people to which to turn. And when most of us think about what 
it is that makes life worth living, friends and loved ones come readily to mind and are at the top 
of the list. In fact, it’s hard to imagine living a meaningful life without friends and loved ones.  
 In terms of the moral benefits, loving relationships and friendships can lead to moral 
growth or good behavior (Friedman 1989; LaFollette 1996). This of course will not always 
happen; in many cases our relationships can lead to moral deterioration or wickedness (e.g., 
loving parents who nevertheless teach their kids to be white supremacists or friends who 
encourage cruelty). However, these relationships can also inspire the opposite. So for example, 
as Phaedrus claims in Plato’s Symposium (178d-179a), love between boyfriends inspires them to 
refrain from doing anything disgraceful and instead inspires them to strive for honor. A similar 
example is the generic one where a beloved makes their lover want to be a better person. Yet 
besides the power of loved ones and friends to inspire us to be morally better, they can also 
straightforwardly help us to improve on this score by correcting our moral beliefs through 
conversation or our general conduct through explicit direction or sanctioning. As for the 
epistemic benefits, loving relationships and friendships can lead to increased knowledge and 
understanding, especially self-knowledge and self-understanding (LaFollette 1996). Though our 
friends and loved ones may fill us with false information or misunderstandings, they can also be 
trustworthy sources of knowledge and understanding with respect to many things, especially 
those things with which they have more experience. And, even if some of our friends or loved 
ones may be hesitant to tell us what we are like or why we do what we do, they are, as Plato and 
Aristotle thought, like mirrors in that they’re good sources of self-knowledge and self-
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understanding, where this can take the form of new perspectives on oneself that can then 
positively influence one’s thoughts and behaviors.   
 Last we have the potential hedonistic benefits: loving relationships and friendship can be 
significant sources of pleasure or enjoyment, and in many cases they will be “life-enhancing” in 
the sense that enjoyable activities will be even more enjoyable when enjoyed with someone with 
whom we share a loving relationship or a friendship (Telfer 1971). Once again, however, there 
will be exceptions here—some loving relationships or friendships may not be very enjoyable, 
and consensual sex with a stranger, for instance, may be more enjoyable than having such sex 
with your beloved romantic partner. But typically, at least, our loving relationships and 
friendships—especially the latter—will be enjoyable things, and our friends and loved ones will 
typically make otherwise enjoyable things more enjoyable (e.g., concerts). They can also make 
things enjoyable that wouldn’t otherwise be so (e.g., doing chores).  
Overall, then, more possible value-based reasons for unspecified love or friendship 
consist in facts pertaining to how such love or friendship is required for the instrumental benefits 
that these relationships can provide. We therefore have the following set of possible reasons that 
can provide justification for unspecified love or friendship (whether initial or continuing): 
 
(R1) It meets our need for final ends. 
(R2) It’s inherently valuable for us.  
(R3) It’s required for living a flourishing life.  
(R4) It’s required for participation in intrinsically valuable relationships.  
(R5) It’s required for any benefits that the relevant relationships can, are likely to, or will 
provide. 
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3.3.2 Reasons for Initial Specified Love and Friendship: Value-Based and Quality-Based 
Reasons 
 
Let’s now switch our focus to the reasons that can justify specified love or friendship, 
where such love or friendship again refers to love for or being friends with particular people. 
And let’s begin with initial specified love and friendship, or coming to love or be friends with 
particular people. Now the first thing to notice here is that the above value-based reasons that can 
justify unspecified love and friendship can apply, with suitable modifications, to initial specified 
love and friendship as well: beginning to love or be friends with particular people (1) can meet 
our need for final ends, (2) can be inherently valuable to us, either as a mere instance of love or 
friendship or as the particular instance that it is, (3) satisfies a requirement of having a 
flourishing life, (4) satisfies a requirement of having intrinsically valuable relationships, and (5) 
is required for accruing any benefits that the relevant relationships with these people will (or are 
likely to, or might) instrumentally provide. Of course, these reasons can only apply in certain 
justificatory contexts. If, for example, we are seeking justification for coming to love or be 
friends with particular people instead of no one at all, then they can all be applied as stated. 
However, if we are rather seeking justification for coming to love or be friends with particular 
people instead of other particular people, then (1) and (2) will not apply because they will be 
true of both options, and therefore cannot favor one option over the other. Only versions of (3), 
(4), and (5) that indicate the superiority of loving or being friends with particular people over 
others in terms of value promotion can apply here.  
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In addition to these value-based reasons, which are all forward-looking reasons, there are 
also quality-based reasons that can justify initial specified love or friendship. And rather than 
consisting in facts pertaining to such love or friendship’s actual, probable, or potential 
connection to some kind of value promotion, these reasons consist in facts pertaining to the 
potential beloved’s or friend’s personal qualities.51 Yet not just any old fact about personal 
qualities will count as a genuine justifying reason for initial specified love or friendship. For 
instance, facts about a person’s hair color, height, shoe size, or the like don’t count because they 
don’t render love or being a friend a rationally appropriate response to that person. Yeat’s Anne 
Gregory may captivate men or impress other women with her yellow hair, but her hair color does 
not show love or friendship to be a fitting response to her. Likewise, facts about a person’s 
racism, misogyny, homophobia, greed, insensitivity, inconsiderateness, cruelty, abusiveness, 
unfaithfulness, unreliability, untrustworthiness, and so on don’t count because they, too, don’t 
render love or being a friend a rationally appropriate response to that person. They rather speak 
against the rational appropriateness of coming to love or befriend those who have them and 
thereby count as reasons against both love and friendship. Eva Braun could have been smitten 
with Hitler due to his relentless anti-Semitic passion for exterminating Jews, and his murderous 
lackeys may have thought that he was the coolest because of it, but instead of showing love or 
friendship to be a fitting response to Hitler, this passion counts against the rational 
appropriateness of loving him or being his friend.52 Generally speaking, then, facts pertaining to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 These quality-based reasons will also include any facts pertaining to the unique value that particular people have. 
For even though these facts pertain to value, they do not pertain to the actual, probable, or potential promotion of 
any value by coming to love or be friends with these people, but rather pertain to a kind of non-relational value that 
people might have (i.e., value they might have in their own right).  
52 Of course, people may be justified in the belief-relative sense in loving or befriending the morally depraved even 
if they wouldn’t be justified in the fact-relative sense. Their moral beliefs, for instance, may make it look like 
exterminating Jews is virtuous, and so Hitler’s passion, under these morally warped lenses, would mistakenly look 
like a reason-giving virtue rather than a horrific vice that counts decisively against the rational appropriateness of 
loving or being friends with him.   
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the shallow or immoral qualities that others have do not constitute reasons that justify coming to 
love or befriend them (Abramson and Leite 2011). It’s instead only those facts pertaining to 
morally acceptable qualities that define who the potential beloveds or friends are (LaFollette 
1996; Helm 2010) that can render love or friendship a rationally appropriate response and 
thereby constitute reasons that justify their initiation.  
Also, when it comes to love, it’s only those facts pertaining to morally acceptable 
qualities that define who the potential beloveds are and that make these individuals lovable 
things that constitute reasons that justify coming to love them. And when it comes to being 
friends with another, it’s only those facts pertaining to morally acceptable qualities that define 
who the potential friend is and that makes that person a lovable, respectable thing that’s fitting 
for the desire for the interactions, activities, and experiences of friendship that constitute reasons 
that justify becoming friends with them. And these defining, morally acceptable qualities can 
provide agent-neutral reasons for love or friendship, or they can provide agent-relative reasons. 
Our moral virtues, for instance, are reason-giving qualities (Abramson and Leite 2011) that 
provide agent-neutral reasons for love or friendship because, insofar as they are present, they 
make people lovable, respectable, and fitting for the desires of friendship to anyone. By contrast, 
so long as they aren’t shallow or immoral qualities, our specific interests or passions, our senses 
of humor, and the like will be reason-giving qualities that provide agent-relative reasons for love 
or friendship because they make people lovable, respectable, and fitting for the desires for the 
interactions, activities, and experiences of friendship to only people with compatible or 
comparable characters. The artist’s passion for producing art, for example, is a reason for those 
who share a comparable or similar passion to start loving or being friends with them, yet it 
wouldn’t be a reason for someone who absolutely despises art and regards it as a waste of time 
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and resources. Unlike the other’s moral virtues, which make initial love or friendship rationally 
appropriate and therefore justified independently of what our characters are like, whether the 
other’s non-moral character traits will make love or friendship rationally appropriate depends on 
what our non-moral characters are like and, in particular, on whether our non-moral characters 
are compatible with his or her character.  
Furthermore, the facts that constitute these quality-based reasons will be different 
depending on the justificatory context. If we are again seeking justification for coming to love or 
be friends with particular people rather than no one at all, then the relevant facts needn’t be 
comparative ones pertaining to qualitative differences across persons that favor some over 
others. Instead, these facts will pertain only to the other’s personal qualities that meet the two 
conditions above and thereby render a response of love or friendship rationally appropriate. But 
if we are rather seeking justification for coming to love or be friends with particular people 
instead of other particular people, then the relevant facts here will need to be the comparative 
ones just described. So for example, if we’re asking why we should come to love Betty instead 
of no one at all, then we can cite her moral virtues, her wonderful sense of humor, and her 
fondness of cats. However, if we’re asking why we should come to love Betty instead of Linda, 
then we would need to cite qualitative differences between Betty and Linda that favor Betty, 
such as Betty’s superior moral virtues, her better sense of humor, or the fact that Betty likes cats 
more than Linda does (dog people should feel free to switch dogs and cats here).53  
Now one might object to the above restrictions placed on these quality-based reasons on 
the following grounds. First of all, “lovable” is not a determinable quality because there are no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Asking why we should come to love Betty instead of Linda or no one at all, which is our concern here, is different 
from asking why we do come to love Betty instead of Linda or no one at all. And though this latter question is not 
our concern here, it’s worth noting that non-normative factors of mere fortune will always be heavily involved in 
explaining why people end up loving certain people instead of others or no one (e.g., we meet some people first or 
have spent more time with them at work or something).  
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constraints on the determinate qualities that we might take to ground it (Taylor 1976). It’s instead 
the lover’s gaze that alone determines what qualities make others “lovable”. And because it’s 
rationally appropriate to love what’s lovable, it’s rationally appropriate to love others in virtue of 
the qualities that make them lovable, which in turn means that these qualities provide reasons 
that justify coming to love these others. But since the lover’s gaze alone determines what 
qualities make others lovable, it follows that the lover’s gaze alone determines what qualities 
provide reasons that justify coming to love others. Shallow or immoral qualities, then, can 
provide such reasons if the lover sees them as ones that make others lovable. We could also run a 
structurally identical argument with respect to the quality of being a “lovable, respectable person 
that’s fitting for the desires of friendship” that culminates in the friend’s gaze alone determining 
what qualities provide reasons that justify coming to be friends with others, which again means 
that shallow or immoral qualities can provide such reasons.  
Although seemingly plausible, this objection begs the question in asserting that “lovable” 
and “lovable, respectable, and fitting for the desires of friendship” are not determinable qualities 
because there are no constraints on the determinate qualities that we might take to ground them. 
In fact, this objection is outright mistaken in asserting this because there are constraints on the 
determinate qualities that can ground the determinable qualities in question. They are the very 
constraints that I’ve already spelled out above: these qualities must be morally acceptable ones 
that define who the other is as a person rather than immoral or shallow ones, and they must 
consist of either moral virtues or non-moral traits that are compatible with our own characters.  
Alternatively, one may object that my account is overly moralized by restricting the 
reason-giving facts about qualities to those about morally acceptable qualities. For even if 
shallow qualities cannot provide reasons for love or friendship, maybe immoral qualities can. 
	  96 
Perhaps immoral qualities can provide agent-relative reasons for those with compatible or 
comparably immoral characters. If so, then my account is wrong to treat immoral qualities as 
giving rise to (agent-neutral) reasons against love or friendship and morally acceptable qualities 
as the only ones that can give rise to reasons for love or friendship. However, even though it may 
sometimes make sense for people with comparably immoral characters to love each other or be 
friends (e.g., white supremacists), this doesn’t mean that immoral qualities can provide any 
justification for love or friendship. Indeed, they cannot. Just imagine asking a white guy why he 
is friends with another white guy, or why he’s married to a white woman, and he responds by 
talking fondly of the other’s white supremacist ideology and agenda. It may make sense for a 
fellow white supremacist to respond with love or friendship to other white supremacists given 
their comparable characters, but one’s white supremacist qualities, like morally rotten qualities in 
general, do not provide any justification for any such response even if others have comparably 
deplorable characters. Only morally acceptable qualities, as my account maintains, can provide 
justification for love or friendship.54  
 
3.3.3 Reasons for Continuing Specified Love and Friendship: Value-Based, Quality-Based, 
and History-Based Reasons 
 
This brings us to the reasons that can justify continuing specified love and friendship, or 
ongoing love and friendship with particular people. And the first thing to notice here is that both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It may be worth noting here that it’s still possible for love or friendship to be a fitting response to immoral people 
even if, as my account maintains, morally acceptable qualities are the only ones that can render such a response 
fitting. For as long as people have enough by way of moral virtue or reason-giving non-moral character traits to 
sufficiently counterbalance the reasons against loving or befriending them that stem from their immoral qualities, 
they can still be fitting objects of love in spite of their moral flaws. They just can’t be such objects because of these 
flaws.  
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the value-based reasons and the quality-based reasons that can justify initial specified love and 
friendship can equally apply to continuing specified love and friendship. This isn’t to say that 
these reasons will necessarily apply to continuing specified love and friendship if they applied to 
these things in their initial form because the qualities that define who people are, as well as the 
benefits that loving relationships can provide, can change for the worse over time. I’m only 
pointing out that the reasons that can justify initial specified love and friendship can remain in 
force to justify continuing these things. Yet besides the forward-looking value-based reasons and 
the quality-based reasons, there seem to be backward-looking reasons that can also justify 
continual specified love and friendship. And these additional reasons, which only apply to 
continual specified love and friendship, consist in facts pertaining to intimate historical 
relationships or shared histories with the other parties (Brink 1999; Kolodny 2003; Hurka 
2017). So for example, it seems that the romantic partnership that I’ve shared with Bethany for 
almost 20 years is a good reason for me to continue loving her because it seems appropriate for 
me to do so in light of this shared history with her. Similarly, the fact that I’ve enjoyed a 
friendship with Noel for the last 6 years seems to give me a good reason to continue being 
friends with him. However, personal relationships and shared histories that are of poor enough 
quality do not provide reasons for continuing love; if, for instance, my romantic partnership with 
Bethany had been very bad for the last 15 of our 20 years together, then our shared history 
wouldn’t provide a reason to continue loving her. As Hurka (2017) plausibly maintains, shared 
histories must be satisfying or sufficiently good in some way in order to be reason-giving, and 
we can go further by maintaining that our shared histories with others being sufficiently good 
enables these very same histories to count as reasons to continue loving or being friends with 
them.55 Let’s call these reasons history-based reasons.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 This idea of certain facts “enabling” other facts to count as normative reasons comes from Dancy (2004).  
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Now it’s very important to distinguish these history-based reasons from value-based 
reasons that consist in facts about the potential, likely, or actual value of intimate relationships. 
For even if our histories with others must be sufficiently good or valuable in order to count as 
good reasons for continuing love or friendship with them, it is nevertheless those histories 
themselves, rather than the potential, likely, or actual benefits of continuing with the 
relationships, that seem to count in favor of such love or friendship in their own right. In other 
words, even if the potential, likely, or actual benefits of continuing with intimate relationships 
provide us with value-based reasons to continue loving or being friends with others, our intimate 
or special histories with others themselves seem to provide additional, history-based reasons to 
continue. 
 
3.3.4 Challenges to My Pluralistic Rationalism 
 
According to my pluralistic rationalism, then, initial specified love and friendship can be 
justified by value-based and quality-based reasons, while continuing specified love and 
friendship can be justified by value-based, quality-based, and history-based reasons. However, 
there are multiple challenges to my position that I must address. One comes from Kolodny 
(2003), who seems to adhere to a monistic rationalism that claims history-based reasons as the 
only ones that can justify love. Contra my pluralistic rationalism, then, such a monistic 
rationalism implies that only history-based reasons—or facts about personal relationships or 
shared histories with others—can justify continuing specified love. However, even if history-
based reasons can justify such love, they are not the only ones that can do so; value-based and 
quality-based reasons will do important justificatory work in at least some cases of continuing 
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specified love. For example, suppose that you share a romantic partnership with Greg, who has 
fairly recently become cold, overly selfish, insensitive, distant, and unfaithful. And let’s also 
suppose that your relationship with Greg is not very beneficial anymore, but is rather an almost 
constant source of frustration, disappointment, sadness, and resentment. In this scenario, 
continuing to love Greg might be rationally inappropriate all-things-considered in spite of your 
shared history with him in light of his nasty qualities and the relationship’s going sour. By 
contrast, if the relationship had not gone sour, and if Greg had remained warm, selfless, 
sensitive, and faithful, then continuing to love him would have indeed been rationally 
appropriate and therefore justified. So facts pertaining to Greg’s positive qualities and to the 
value of your relationship with him contribute significantly to the justification of continuing to 
love him, which means that quality-based and value-based reasons are doing some important 
justificatory work here. In fact, these two scenarios suggest that both quality-based and value-
based reasons are required for the rational appropriateness of continuing specified love in at least 
certain cases, which means that history-based reasons are not the only ones that can justify such 
love.  
Furthermore, consider what Kolodny’s monistic rationalism implies about the 
justification of initial specified love. If facts about shared histories or relationships were the only 
ones that could justify love, then there could be no justification for initial specified love. This, 
however, seems false—such love can be justified (or unjustified). For suppose that Greg and Bob 
are both wanting a romantic partnership with you, but unlike Greg, Bob is warm, sensitive, 
faithful, and caring. You will also have a much better relationship with Bob, especially given his 
qualitative superiority. Given Bob’s good qualities and the prospect of a good relationship with 
him, coming to love him seems appropriate and thus justified, whereas the opposite is true for 
	  100 
Greg in light of his lousy qualities and the prospect of a poor relationship. Under Kolodny’s 
monistic rationalism, however, coming to love either person is neither justified nor unjustified 
because the only possible reason that could justify love is a relationship that hasn’t yet 
materialized.  
Moreover, consider the difficulty that Kolodny’s monistic rationalism has for vindicating 
the justifiability of terminating love for people with lousy qualities, such as Greg mentioned 
above. How can no longer loving Greg be justified if facts about shared histories or relationships 
are the only ones that bear on the rational appropriateness of loving him? It doesn’t seem like it 
can be justified; rather, it’s either unjustified or neither-justified-nor-unjustified. For if facts 
about shared histories or relationships are the only ones that bear on the rational appropriateness 
of loving Greg, then the fact that you have had a romantic partnership with Greg will have one of 
two results. It could function as the only reason to continue loving him, with no reasons on the 
other side to counterbalance this one, in which case it would be unjustified to go against this 
reason and stop loving him. Alternatively, it may not function as a reason at all if the relationship 
hasn’t been good enough to be reason-giving, in which case it would be neither justified nor 
unjustified to stop loving Greg because there are no reasons speaking in favor of it or against it. 
Either conclusion, however, seems false in so far as it seems completely justified to terminate 
love for people with lousy qualities precisely in virtue of those qualities. One advantage of my 
pluralistic rationalism that recognizes value-based, quality-based, and history-based reasons for 
love is that it allows us to justify coming to love people with good qualities or terminating love 
for people with lousy qualities.  
A second challenge here comes from Helm (2010), who questions the validity of history-
based reasons on the grounds that it’s unclear how facts pertaining to shared histories with others 
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can provide any justification for continuing specified love. Though many of us will feel the 
intuitive force of thinking that having a special history with someone is a good reason to 
continue loving him or her instead of loving no one or someone else, we might be hard-pressed 
to explain how such history is a reason here. How does sharing an intimate, special history with 
someone provide any justification for continuing to love (or to be friends with) that person? I 
don’t think that there’s an explanation here, yet I also don’t think that this gives us good grounds 
for doubting the validity of history-based reasons. We may not be able to explain how intimate 
or special histories can provide justification for continuing specified love or friendship, but we’re 
in no better position when it comes to explaining how other historical considerations count as 
reasons. For instance, we can’t explain why the fact that you competently and freely promised 
last week to read some of my poems and give me feedback on them this week constitutes a 
reason to do what you promised, or why the fact that you treated me to lunch yesterday 
constitutes a reason for me to express gratitude and even reciprocate today. But the lack of 
explanation here doesn’t bring into question the validity of these reasons; it only means that 
certain facts directly and non-derivatively justify certain things (which must be true of some facts 
if there is to be justification at all). Moreover, while we can’t explain how special histories can 
provide justification for continuing specified love or friendship, we’re no better off when it 
comes to explaining how the value of such love or friendship can provide such justification or 
how certain qualities of our beloveds or friends can do so. Instead, it seems to be a basic 
normative truth that facts pertaining to special histories shared with others, certain qualities that 
they possess, or the value of loving or being friends with them each render continuing to love or 
be friends with these people pro tanto rationally appropriate and thereby constitute reasons for 
continuing specified love and friendship.56  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 I don’t mean to suggest here that nothing can be said to justify facts that directly and non-derivatively (i.e., 
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A third challenge here is the following. Consider first the fact that continuing specified 
love is a constitutive part of loving relationships, and then notice what happens when we 
combine this with the intuitive thought that such historical relationships provide justifying reason 
for such love: historical relationships as a whole end up providing justification for continuing 
with a part of these very relationships. And yet the situation here seems analogous to claiming 
that one’s history of holding a job in the fast food industry per se provides reason to continue 
taking orders from customers or mopping floors, which seems pretty absurd. After all, the fact 
that someone has had a certain job for an extended period of time per se does not seem to 
provide any justification whatsoever for continuing with any given part of that very job. 
Historical considerations here will justify only indirectly by pointing to certain advantages that 
are bound up with staying put in a particular occupation rather than switching (e.g., retirement 
savings, familiarity with the job requirements, and so on). So how, then, are historical 
relationships any different? How can such relationships with others directly justify continuing to 
love them when such love is a constitutive part of those very relationships?57  
Once again, I don’t think that there’s an explanation here. Instead, as we saw above, it 
just seems to be a basic normative truth that facts pertaining to intimate histories shared with 
others constitute pro tanto reasons for continuing to love them. Perhaps some support for the 
validity of these history-based reasons, however, can be found in the theoretical usefulness of 
having such reasons available when it comes to justifying our continuing love. In particular, 
there could be cases of continuing specified love for certain people such that (1) it would be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without explanation) provide justification for certain things. In fact, I’ve been defending facts that directly and non-
derivatively justify continuing specified love or friendship by pointing to their intuitive appeal and to some 
companions in guilt.  
57 One might be tempted to deny the asymmetry here and maintain that history in both cases counts as a reason to 
continue. However, it seems very implausible to maintain that one’s history of holding a fast food job per se 
provides any reason or justification whatsoever for continuing with certain parts of that very job. Also, even if this 
didn’t seem so implausible, it wouldn’t address the question of how a history of doing something (as opposed to the 
value of doing something) can provide any direct justification for continuing with a part of that very something.  
	  103 
rationally appropriate to replace them on the basis of value-based and quality-based reasons 
alone, and yet (2) it also seems all-things-considered rationally appropriate not to replace them. 
If we then had history-based reasons at our disposal, we could throw them into the mix so that 
we get what seems to be the right result. So for instance, let’s bring Betty and Linda back, but 
this time let’s suppose that I already share an intimate, historical relationship with Linda. Why 
should I continue to love Linda instead of replacing her with Betty? Even though Linda is 
morally virtuous, has a good sense of humor, and likes cats (but not as much as dogs), Betty has 
slightly superior moral virtues, a slightly better sense of humor, and likes cats much more than 
Linda does, which—in my estimation at least—makes her qualitatively superior to Linda. Let’s 
also say that a relationship with Betty would be slightly more beneficial than the current one 
shared with Linda given the former’s qualitative superiority: Betty’s superior moral virtues will 
provide greater psychological benefits, her better sense of humor will lead to greater enjoyment, 
her greater fondness for cats will lead to her “owning” cats, which will lead to greater enjoyment 
as well, and her sheer newness will lead to more excitement. On the basis of quality-based and 
value-based reasons alone, then, it seems rationally appropriate to replace Linda with Betty. 
However, since Linda is still quite lovable, it also seems all-things-considered appropriate not to 
replace her with Betty, which we can then explain by claiming that my intimate, shared history 
with Linda supplies a reason to continue loving her that, when combined with the non-
comparative facts about her lovable-making qualities and the benefits of my relationship with 
her, render it rationally appropriate to stick with Linda instead of replacing her with Betty.  
A fourth and final challenge here is an anti-rationalist argument that tries to show that all 
three kinds of reasons for love and friendship—valued-based, quality-based, and history-based—
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are illusory because they’re inconsistent with the nature of these phenomena.58 Starting with 
value-based reasons, if the potential, likely, or actual benefits of a loving relationship or a 
friendship were reasons that justified one’s love or friendship, this would make the beloved or 
the friend replaceable because other people could provide these same benefits. However, since 
this consequence of value-based reasons conflicts with the very nature of love and friendship—
as we saw in the previous chapter, our beloveds and our friends are irreplaceable—there can be 
no such reasons. Moreover, since both love and friendship constitutively involve special concern 
for the other, which we saw in the previous chapter to be non-instrumental by its very nature, 
then these things cannot be grounded in any benefits that the subject might or would accrue from 
them because this would make the concern involved instrumental after all rather than non-
instrumental.  
We get similar results with quality-based and history-based reasons. For if we suppose 
first that the defining, morally acceptable qualities of others—whether moral virtues or non-
moral traits that are compatible with our characters—are reasons that can justify our love or 
friendship, then our beloveds or friends would again be replaceable because other people can 
instantiate these same qualities, and so we again have a conflict with the nature of love and 
friendship because our beloveds and friends are irreplaceable.59 In fact, if these qualities were 
reasons that justify love or friendship, then since others can do a better job of instantiating these 
same qualities, then it follows that we’d be rationally required to trade our beloveds or friends in 
for better replacements (Jollimore 2017), yet we saw in the previous chapter that both love and 
friendship constitutively involve an unwillingness to trade in our beloveds and friends for such 
replacements. Either way it doesn’t look like there can be quality-based reasons for love and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 This anti-rationalist argument is a reconstruction and an extension of anti-rationalist arguments only with respect 
to love mounted in Smuts 2013 and Smuts 2014b.  
59 Kolodny (2003) and Zangwill (2013) seem to offer similar arguments against quality-based reasons for love.  
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friendship. And if we next suppose that our shared histories with our beloveds or friends can 
justify our love or friendship, then even if no potential replacements currently share such 
histories with us, such histories will be easy to create with any of these potential replacements 
that are willing to share a loving relationship or a friendship with us. So once again it seems that 
our beloveds and our friends would be replaceable if shared histories justified loving or being 
friends with them, yet our beloveds and friends are not replaceable. So there are no history-based 
reasons for love or friendship.  
Although seemingly plausible, every part of this anti-rationalist argument is questionable. 
Let’s take the parts in order. Even if we suppose that (a) the potential, likely, or actual benefits of 
loving relationships and friendships are value-based reasons that can justify love or friendship 
and this would (b) make beloveds and friends replaceable because other people could provide 
these same benefits, this doesn’t conflict with the nature of love and friendship. For as we saw in 
the last chapter, these phenomena constitutively involve the belief in and corresponding 
perception of the other’s irreplaceability or non-fungibility, and this is perfectly consistent with 
the other being actually replaceable. In other words, (a) and (b) would not genuinely conflict 
with the natures of love and friendship, but would at worst show that love and friendship 
constitutively involve beliefs that are not only false, but that are irrational due to their 
unwavering nature. Yet it’s not even clear that this actually results because we may not believe 
our beloveds and friends to be irreplaceable or non-fungible in the sense that would render these 
beliefs false by the actual fact of their being replaceable with respect to the benefits they can 
provide through intimate relationships with them. In fact, I don’t think that love and friendship 
constitutively involve believing that the other is irreplaceable with respect to the benefits that 
they can provide through sharing the requisite relationships with them. Instead, our beloveds and 
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friends are irreplaceable in some other sense, which we shall discuss in more detail later in this 
chapter when we address challenges to the very possibility of a completely rational love or 
friendship. Accordingly, the belief in the other’s irreplaceability that partly constitutes love or 
friendship is not falsified by the fact that our beloveds and friends are replaceable with respect to 
the benefits they provide through our personal relationships with them.   
Next consider the added point that, because they constitutively involve special concern 
for the other, love and friendship cannot be grounded in the benefits that they can provide, where 
this is supposed to sink the idea that these benefits can provide justification for these phenomena. 
Even though it’s true that love and friendship cannot be psychologically grounded in these 
benefits precisely because they constitutively involve special concern for the other that’s by 
nature non-instrumental, it doesn’t follow that these benefits no longer constitute normative 
reasons that make love or friendship rationally appropriate and therefore rationally justified to 
the extent that they’re present. The situation here is somewhat analogous to what we might think 
of the deterring effects of punishment. The fact that punishing people for wrongdoing will likely 
deter others from wrongdoing is obviously a good reason to punish people for wrongdoing, yet 
this fact cannot be our reason for punishing people because, if it were, then we’d be using them 
as mere means to our end of deterring others from wrongdoing. In other words, the deterrent 
effects of punishment constitute normative reasons for us to punish because they render 
punishment pro tanto rationally appropriate, but they cannot be among the considerations that 
motivate us to punish because then we’d be using those punished as mere means rather than 
treating them as ends-in-themselves. At best we can recognize the deterrent effects of 
punishment as fortunate by-products of justly punishing others only for the sake of justice that, 
along with the serving of justice, make such punishment rationally appropriate. Something 
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similar can then be true of love and friendship. Because of the nature of these phenomena, the 
benefits of loving relationships and friendships cannot be motivating the parties involved, for 
otherwise we don’t have genuine love or friendship. Yet this doesn’t imply that these benefits 
aren’t normative reasons for them, as these benefits still render these things rationally 
appropriate and therefore justified to the extent that they’re present even though they cannot 
possibly be our reasons for loving or being friends with others.60 
Next we have the claim that the qualities of others can’t be reasons that justify one’s love 
or friendship because then the beloved or the friend would be replaceable given that other people 
can instantiate these same qualities, which is again supposed to conflict with the nature of love 
and friendship since our beloveds and friends are irreplaceable. But again, love and friendship 
constitutively involve believing in the other’s irreplaceability, so at worst the other’s qualities 
render these beliefs false and irrational because these qualities constitute justifying reasons that 
render the beloved or the friend replaceable. Yet it’s also not clear that this even results this time 
around either because we may not believe that our beloveds and friends are irreplaceable with 
respect to the general qualities that they may share with others. And finally, even if potential 
replacements can do a better job of instantiating the same qualities that justify our current loves 
or friendships and this rationally requires us to trade our beloveds or friends in for those better 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 In case the analogy with deterrence is unclear, consider another. Suppose that you’re an agnostic, and that an 
eccentric atheist billionaire will give you a million dollars to start disbelieving in God. While the fact that you will 
receive a million dollars by becoming an atheist is obviously a good reason to actually become one, it is not a reason 
that could actually motivate you to become an atheist given the nature of belief. For belief is, roughly speaking, a 
mental state in which we regard a proposition as true for the sake of the truth (as opposed to, say, for the sake of 
argument as we would when making a mere assumption), and so any reasons that could motivate us to adopt a given 
belief would have to be considerations that indicate its truth rather than its prudential payoff. In the hypothetical case 
I’ve constructed here, the only reasons that could actually motivate someone to truly believe that there’s no God 
would be epistemic considerations that suggest the non-existence of God (e.g., the probable existence of gratuitous 
evil). The fact that you would receive a million dollars for coming to believe that there’s no God, then, could not be 
your reason for coming to have this belief even though it is surely a good reason to come to have it. I’m arguing 
above for a similar conclusion with respect to love and friendship: though they cannot be our reasons for loving or 
being friends with others given the nature of love and friendship, the potential, likely, or actual benefits from doing 
so are still good reasons for doing so.  
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replacements, this would again only make our unwillingness to do so irrational—there would yet 
again be no conflict with the nature of these phenomena. Moreover, we may not be rationally 
required to trade up because the reasons that favor replacement may be non-insistent or 
warranting reasons rather than insistent or requiring ones (Kolodny 2003; Abramson and Leite 
2011). As the names suggest, non-insistent or warranting reasons are considerations that warrant 
or justify something, yet do not require that something on pain of irrationality. By contrast, 
insistent or requiring reasons are considerations that pro tanto justify something and require it on 
pain of irrationality. So for example, if you clearly observe your significant other cheating on 
you in public, then your observation constitutes an insistent or requiring reason to believe that he 
or she is an unfaithful partner: your observation not only justifies this belief, but failing to 
believe this would be patently irrational because of this observation. However, if you live on the 
coast and enjoy relaxing on the beach, then the fact that driving to the beach will allow you to 
relax on it constitutes a non-insistent or warranting reason to drive to the beach: this fact pro 
tanto justifies you driving to the beach, but it doesn’t render failing to drive to the beach pro 
tanto irrational. If others then have superior reason-giving qualities compared to our beloveds or 
friends, if these qualities happen to provide merely non-insistent or warranting ones, then they 
will not rationally require that we trade up even if they render it rationally permissible to do so.  
Last we have the idea that shared history can’t justify love or friendship because if it did, 
it would render the beloved or the friend replaceable, which conflicts with the nature of these 
phenomena. But again there is no such conflict here: because love and friendship constitutively 
involve believing in the other’s irreplaceability, shared history would at worst render these 
constitutive beliefs false and irrational by being justifying reason for love or friendship. Also, yet 
again this may not even result because again we may not believe that our beloveds and friends 
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are irreplaceable with respect to shared history. How we see our beloveds and friends as 
irreplaceable will be something that we tackle at the end of this chapter, so for now it will suffice 
to conclude that no part of this anti-rationalist argument succeeds in undermining my pluralistic 
rationalism.  
 
3.4 Justified Love and Friendship vs. Unjustified Love and Friendship 
 
Now that we have unearthed and defended these three different kinds of reasons that can 
pro tanto justify love and friendship, we can move on to addressing the issue of when love and 
friendship are all-things-considered justified or unjustified. Let’s begin with unspecified love and 
friendship of either the initial and continual variety, which again can only be justified by value-
based reasons. And here the answer is pretty simple: such love or friendship is justified just in 
case the value-based reasons for it outweigh or equal the reasons against it, where these latter 
reasons are constituted by facts pertaining to the actual or expected costs of such love or 
friendship. Just like being a car owner in general, being in the love or friendship business in 
general is justified just in case the actual or expected costs do not outweigh the actual or 
expected benefits, which implies that unspecified love or friendship is unjustified just in case the 
costs do outweigh the benefits.61  
 Things aren’t so simple, however, when it comes to initial specified love and friendship 
and to continual specified love and friendship because, as we’ve seen, there are more than just 
value-based reasons in play, which means that justification isn’t straightforwardly measured by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 I’m not saying here that love and friendship are completely like car ownership, or that lovers and friends should 
be constantly subjecting their love and friendships to cost-benefit analyses. I’m only drawing a parallel with car 
ownership to establish a normative claim about when unspecified love and friendship are justified or unjustified; I’m 
not saying anything about how lovers and friends should (or must) think.  
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balancing values. And to further complicate matters, it’s not clear how we are to weigh value-
based, quality-based, and history-based reasons against each other, or even how we are to weigh 
the different quality-based reasons against each other. Nevertheless, I think that we can nail some 
things down here. To begin with, it seems clear enough that either kind of specified love or 
friendship is justified just in case the balance of reasons renders such love or friendship all-
things-considered rationally appropriate, where this balance obtains just in case the reasons that 
render such love or friendship pro tanto rationally appropriate collectively outweigh or equal any 
reasons that render it pro tanto inappropriate.62  
Furthermore, although we cannot precisely state when the former reasons collectively 
outweigh the latter ones—or vice versa—given the above difficulties with weighing the different 
kinds of reasons against each other, and will instead have to make intuitive judgments of this 
matter on a case-by-case basis, I think that we can locate some useful facts that will help us make 
such judgments. First and foremost, we need to locate the relevant facts that constitute the 
reasons to consider in each case. For we saw in the last section that the facts constituting the 
three different kinds of reasons that can justify specified love or friendship differ slightly 
depending on the justificatory context. When seeking reasons that justify coming to, or 
continuing to, love or befriend someone instead of no one at all, such reasons can be found in 
non-comparative facts pertaining to (1) any value actually, probably, or potentially promoted by 
loving or being friends with that person, (2) that person’s morally acceptable, defining qualities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 I’d like to note two things here. First, I’m once again only asserting a normative claim here about when love and 
friendship are justified or unjustified; I’m not saying that lovers or friends should be constantly assessing the balance 
of reasons to see if love or friendships are rationally appropriate. Second, the claim here about when specified love 
and friendship are justified or unjustified is true about unspecified love and friendship as well, but in the case of 
specified love and friendship we cannot state in exact terms when the balance of reasons renders either rationally 
appropriate, whereas we can do so in the case of unspecified love and friendship: the balance of reasons renders 
them appropriate just in case the value-based reasons in favor of them equal or outweigh the value-based reasons 
against them, where this happens just in case their actual or expected benefits equal or outweigh their actual or 
expected costs.  
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that make her a fitting object of love or friendship, or (3) any intimate histories shared with that 
person. However, when seeking reasons that can justify coming to, or continuing to, love or 
befriend someone instead of someone else, such reasons can found in comparative facts 
pertaining to (1’) any greater value actually, probably, or potentially promoted by loving or being 
friends with the former instead of the latter, (2’) the former’s superior morally acceptable, 
defining qualities that make her a fitting object of love or friendship, or (3’) any intimate 
histories shared with the former instead of the latter. So which reason-constituting facts are 
relevant when it comes to determining whether the balance of reasons renders specified love all-
things-considered rationally appropriate? 
 I contend that it’s only the non-comparative facts that are relevant here. To see why, let’s 
first bring Linda and Betty back again, but let’s suppose that I don’t have an intimate history 
with either so that only value-based and quality-based reasons will be relevant here. Which 
person should I love or be friends with? Recall that when it comes to the comparative facts, Betty 
is superior: while Linda is morally virtuous, has a good sense of humor, likes cats, and would 
give me an instrumentally valuable relationship, Betty has slightly superior moral virtues, a 
slightly better sense of humor, likes cats more, and would give me a more instrumentally 
valuable relationship. So these reasons favor me coming to love or befriend Betty over Linda and 
thereby render it rationally appropriate to do so. But does it follow that it would be rationally 
inappropriate for me to love or befriend Linda instead? It certainly doesn’t seem like it. Despite 
the comparative facts constituting reasons that favor loving or befriending Betty over Linda, 
there are many non-comparative facts about Linda that still seem to render it rationally 
appropriate to love or be friends with her (e.g., she still has many good qualities and would still 
give me an instrumentally valuable relationship). And something similar is of course true about 
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Betty: the comparative facts pertaining to her superiority over Linda can be translated into non-
comparative facts about Betty that render it rationally appropriate to love her. Moreover, if we 
were to suppose instead that Linda is a morally rotten person, has a lousy sense of humor, 
despises all non-human animals, especially cats, and would give me a very costly relationship, 
whereas Betty would still be superior because she is not so rotten, has a slightly less lousy sense 
of humor, despises all non-human animals a little less, and would give me a less costly 
relationship, then even though the comparative facts would again favor loving or befriending 
Betty over Linda, it would be rationally inappropriate to love or be friends with either in virtue 
of the non-comparative facts about their rotten characters and the costly relationship that I 
would have with either of them. It therefore seems to be the non-comparative facts that really 
matter when it comes to determining whether the balance of reasons renders specified love or 
friendship all-things-considered rationally appropriate, where the reasons that render such love or 
friendship pro tanto appropriate are again the non-comparative facts pertaining to (1) any value 
actually, probably, or potentially promoted by loving or being friends with the other, (2) the 
other’s morally acceptable, defining qualities that make her a fitting object of love or friendship, 
or (3) any intimate history shared with the other, while the reasons that render love pro tanto 
inappropriate are the non-comparative facts pertaining instead to (4) the other’s negative or 
immoral qualities, or (5) the superior costs of loving or being friends with the other compared to 
their benefits.  
 Now that the relevant facts to consider for determining whether the balance of reasons 
renders specified love or friendship all-things-considered rationally appropriate or inappropriate 
have been found, we should try to locate some useful facts for determining when the balance 
goes one way or another. A few such facts stem from Hugh LaFollette’s (1996) suggestion that 
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good reasons for love lie in qualities that support good personal relationships, where these 
relationships must refer to those that have more value than bad relationships. If this suggestion is 
right, then it follows that quality-based reasons and value-based reasons for specified love or 
friendship will tend to hang together, which in turn means that, when a love- or friendship-
favoring set of one kind of reason is present, chances are that a love- or friendship-favoring set of 
the other kind is also present, and so the balance of reasons is likely to lie in favor of love or 
friendship. And conversely, if there are many rotten qualities present in the actual or potential 
beloveds or friends, which ground reasons against specified love or friendship of either variety 
and are likely to undergird poor relationships with them, then the odds are that the balance of 
reasons will not lie in favor of love or friendship.  
In fact, it looks like the actual or potential other’s moral qualities are particularly 
important to pay attention to when trying to discern which way the balance of reasons goes. Not 
only are these qualities going to positively correlate with the benefits that one will tend to receive 
from sharing a relationship with those who possess such qualities, but they seem to be 
particularly important in their own right for determining the rational appropriateness or 
inappropriateness of specified love or friendship. For on the one hand, when someone is 
thoroughly immoral, it will be rationally inappropriate to love or be friends with that person 
regardless of any reasons that weigh against those grounded in that person’s rotten character. So 
even if, for example, you share an intimate history with a passionate and single-minded artist, 
whose single-minded passion for producing art makes him lovable to you, it would nevertheless 
be all-things-considered rationally inappropriate to continue loving him if he is an 
overwhelmingly selfish, self-centered, insensitive, inconsiderate, disrespectful, abusive, 
unfaithful wretch. In sufficient numbers, then, the reasons against specified love or friendship 
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that stem from our morally rotten qualities will trump other reasons entirely. On the other hand, 
when someone is morally exemplary, it will be rationally appropriate to love or be friends with 
that person because they are not only universally fit for love or friendship in virtue of their 
exemplary moral character, but there will not be much of the reasons against love or friendship 
just discussed to weigh against the reasons that justify love or friendship.  
 
3.5 Challenges to Completely Rational Love and Friendship 
 
My discussion thus far suggests that love and friendship can be justified overall. In 
particular, it suggests that (specified) love and friendship are justified overall just in case the 
relevant, non-comparative facts render either all-things-considered-rationally-appropriate. 
Despite this, however, there are at least three challenges to the possibilities of completely 
rational love or friendship, which is love or friendship that’s guilty of no charge of irrationality 
whatsoever. It’s still possible for love and friendship to be guilty of some charge of irrationality 
even if they can sometimes be practically all-things-considered justified in virtue of the relevant, 
non-comparative facts, so in this final section of this chapter I will address three challenges to 
the possibilities of completely rational love or friendship and will attempt to vindicate these 
possibilities.  
The first challenge here is the following.63 As we saw in the previous chapter, initial love 
for or friendship with other people is psychologically grounded in certain character traits that 
they seem to possess, which makes both initial love and friendship responses to certain perceived 
character traits. Additionally, there seems to be a rational constraint of consistency on our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 My reconstruction of this challenge is based on similar discussions found in Lamb (1997) and Jollimore (2011, 
2017).  
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property-based responses to other people. So for example, if we appropriately adopt an attitude 
of respect or pity for someone based on certain properties that we see in them, then we are 
rationally constrained to respond in the same way to any other people that seem to have these 
same properties. Likewise, the rational constraint of consistency seems to demand that we 
respond in kind to any other people that seem to have the same traits to which our love or 
friendship is a response. However, our responses of love and friendship do not seem to be 
sensitive to this constraint, but are rather special, exclusive responses to certain people. These 
responses thus seem to be irrationally inconsistent even if they’re originally appropriate, and so 
we seem to be unavoidably irrational when coming to love or becoming friends with other 
people, which seems to carry forward into continuing love or friendship (if a response of initial 
love or friendship is doomed to irrationality, then it’s hard to see why persisting in either 
response would be any different).  
 Although forceful, I think that we can meet this challenge in two ways.64 One begins by 
wheeling out our earlier distinction between insistent/requiring reasons and non-
insistent/warranting ones (Kolodny 2003; Abramson and Leite 2011). While both kinds of 
reasons render responses to them pro tanto rational, only insistent/requiring reasons render the 
lack of response to them pro tanto irrational. Yet the rational constraint of consistency on our 
appropriate responses discussed above is only valid when these responses are called for by 
insistent/requiring reasons: it’s only when perceived properties in things demand a certain 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 It will not meet this challenge to argue that we aren’t necessarily irrationally inconsistent for failing to love or be 
friends with everyone that has the same qualities that ground our current loves or friendships with others because we 
simply can’t love or be friends with so many people. For even though it may be true that we will max out our 
capacities for love and friendship at certain points and thus that the rational constraint of consistency will not require 
that we extend our love and friendship beyond these points, this rational constraint of consistency will nevertheless 
demand that we extend our love and friendship to others with the same qualities that ground our current loves or 
friendships until we reach these points, yet our responses of love and friendship do not seem sensitive to even this 
constraint, but are rather special, exclusive responses to only certain people regardless of whether we’ve reached our 
maximum capacity for love and friendship.  
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response on pain of irrationality that we must so respond to them whenever we seem to find 
them. Therefore, if we insist that the perceived character traits to which love or friendship are 
appropriate responses provide only warranting reasons for love or friendship (Abramson and 
Leite 2011), then the rational constraint of consistency doesn’t apply to love or friendship, and so 
this first challenge collapses. 
 Alternatively we can maintain that, while the rational constraint of consistency does 
apply to love and friendship, it’s not necessarily irrational to respond with love or friendship to 
only certain people in virtue of their qualities. For there are two ways of understanding 
“qualities” here: we could either understand them as the general qualities that many people share, 
or as the particular instances of these qualities that have an idiosyncratic character to them. So 
for example, we could understand “Bethany’s playfulness” as referring to her general quality of 
playfulness that others have as well, or to her particular, idiosyncratic way of being playful. But 
if we understand “qualities” in the latter sense, then even if we are rationally required to respond 
with love or friendship to others that have the same qualities as those that ground our current 
loves or friendships, this rational constraint will never really “kick in” because others will not 
have the same particular, idiosyncratic qualities that ground our current loves or friendships (they 
will instead have their own particular, idiosyncratic qualities). It therefore may not violate this 
constraint and thereby be irrationally inconsistent to love or be friends with only certain people 
in virtue of their qualities.   
The second challenge here stems from the volitional feature that we saw in the previous 
chapter to be common to both love and friendship of being unwilling to trade the beloved or 
friend in for a better replacement (i.e., to “trade up”). And the challenge here is pretty simple: 
isn’t it just straightforwardly irrational to be unwilling to trade in for a better replacement? It 
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certainly seems like it, and so it seems that love and friendship is at least somewhat irrational in 
virtue of this common constitutive feature. However, once again I think that there are two ways 
of meeting this challenge. One is to concede that this unwillingness can sometimes be irrational, 
but also to insist that it may not be irrational, and that whether it’s irrational or not depends on 
the reasons in play (especially quality-based and value-based reasons, as they’re what measure 
how much better any potential replacement might be). So for example, if the good qualities of a 
potential replacement are much better than a current beloved’s or friend’s qualities, and the 
potential relationship with the replacement would have much more value than the current 
relationship, then an unwillingness to replace the current beloved or friend does seem irrational. 
However, if the relevant qualities of the potential beloved or friend and the value of the potential 
relationship with that person aren’t too much better, respectively, than the relevant qualities of 
the current beloved or friend and the value of the relationship with him or her, then the fact that 
you have an intimate history with the current beloved or friend constitutes a history-based reason 
that tips the scales in favor of not trading up. In such a case it would not be irrational to be 
unwilling to trade up.  
Alternatively we can argue that the unwillingness to trade up is not irrational so long as 
the non-comparative facts render it rationally appropriate to love or be friends with someone. 
Recall yet again our example of Betty and Linda. We saw above that, so long as the non-
comparative facts render it rationally appropriate to love or be friends with Linda, it doesn’t 
matter if the comparative facts favor loving or being friends with Betty instead; it’s still 
rationally acceptable to love or be friends with Linda. And so long as it’s rationally acceptable to 
love or be friends with Linda, it’s rationally acceptable to be unwilling to trade her in for a better 
replacement. Now this, to be sure, is a counterintuitive conclusion, as it seems obvious that an 
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unwillingness to trade something in for something better is patently irrational. However, it’s 
important to recognize that this only holds up when the “something” in question here is a mere 
commodity that occupies a place in our lives only because of its ability to serve as a means to our 
own ends. For when we are judging the rationality of holding on to a mere commodity, the 
comparative facts—those pertaining to how well the commodity serves our own purposes 
compared to alternatives that could replace it—are all that matter. If something else could serve 
our own purposes better than that which we currently have, then unless our current possession 
has some sort of special, sentimental value to make it preferable to potential replacements, it 
would be irrational not to replace or to refuse to acquire the superior commodity in the first 
place. But as we saw above things seem to be different when it comes to the objects of love or 
friendship. These do not occupy places in our lives just because of their instrumental benefits, 
and as such they are not to be regarded in the same way. Unlike mere commodities, whether it’s 
rational to latch onto them is determined by the non-comparative facts rather than the 
comparative ones, and so unlike the unwillingness to trade in mere commodities for better 
replacements, it’s not necessarily irrational to be so unwilling to trade in beloveds and friends.   
The third and final challenge here is what I referred to toward the end of the previous 
chapter as “the fungibility problem.” And this problem, as I understand it, stems from the 
doxastic feature that we saw in the previous chapter to be common to both love and friendship of 
believing in the beloved’s or the friend’s non-fungibility, which is believing that the beloved or 
friend cannot be replaced without a loss of value. Now this problem is most easily seen as a 
result of trying to justify love or friendship. So suppose, for example, that you tried to justify 
loving or being friends with someone by recourse to the value that it would realize or that 
requires it (i.e., with value-based reasons). Since loving or being friends with certain people 
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instead would do at least as good of a job at realizing, or satisfying a necessary condition of, the 
relevant value here, it looks like your beloved or your friend is fungible—you can replace him or 
her without a loss of value. Similarly, if we tried to justify loving or being friends with someone 
by recourse to their good qualities (i.e., with quality-based reasons), then again, since there will 
be at least some other people that could do at least as good of a job at instantiating these 
qualities, it looks like your beloved or friend is fungible. And finally, if we try to justify loving 
or being friends with someone by recourse to an intimate history shared with him or her (i.e., 
with history-based reasons), then once again, since we can have such a history with loads of 
other people instead, it yet again looks like your beloved or friend is fungible. Therefore, no 
matter how we try to justify love or friendship, we end up with the beloved’s or the friend’s 
fungibility, which then renders false our belief to the contrary as a lover or a friend. And insofar 
as our love or friendship necessarily commits us to a false belief, it is irrational to some degree.65  
Although forceful, I think that this challenge can be met as well. Recall first from the last 
chapter that love and friendship constitutively involve seeing the other as possessing a kind of 
non-moral, intrinsic, unique (and therefore irreplaceable) value. Consequently, the above 
problem of love and friendship necessarily committing us to a false belief only materializes if 
our beloveds and friends lack this specific kind of value. But if they possess this value, then 
there’s no fungibility problem even if they’re fungible with respect to other kinds of value (e.g., 
the value realized by sharing personal relationships with them) because the belief in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 I want to note two things here. First, this third challenge is distinct from the previous one because it’s based on a 
doxastic feature of love and friendship as opposed to a volitional one, and as a result the irrationality that love and 
friendship supposedly commit us to according to this third challenge is epistemic irrationality as opposed to practical 
irrationality. Second, although the fungibility problem is most easily seen as a result of trying to justify love or 
friendship, the problem still remains for those anti-rationalists who deny that love or friendship can be justified. For 
even if there are no normative reasons for love or friendship, these phenomena will still constitutively involve the 
belief in the beloved’s or the friend’s non-fungibility, but as the discussion in this paragraph shows, our beloveds 
and our friends are fungible with respect to valuable qualities, valuable histories, or valuable relationships. So it still 
looks like love and friendship necessarily commit us to a false belief and are irrational insofar as they do.  
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beloved’s or the friend’s non-fungibility that’s constitutive of both love and friendship does not 
attempt to capture these other kinds of value. The crucial question for whether we can dissolve 
the fungibility problem, then, is whether our beloveds and friends do in fact possess the kind of 
non-moral, intrinsic, unique value that we must see in them.  
Though far from conclusive, the following provides good grounds for thinking that our 
beloveds and friends can possess the kind of value in question. First of all, it’s plausible to 
suppose that people are bearers of genuine, non-moral, intrinsic value, and that, as appearances 
suggest, people bear such value on the basis of their qualities. Next recall the distinction that we 
drew above in our second response to the first challenge between personal qualities in their 
generic and their particular, idiosyncratic forms, where the former are qualities that different 
people can share, while the latter are ones that only particular individuals can have (barring of 
course the possibility of exact qualitative duplicates). Now, since people bear genuine, non-
moral, intrinsic value on the basis of their qualities, we can draw a parallel distinction between 
this value in its general form that supervenes on generic qualities and this value in particular, 
idiosyncratic forms that supervene on particular, idiosyncratic qualities, where the former value 
is value that many different people can share, while the latter is value that only particular people 
can have. This latter kind of value is the non-moral, intrinsic, unique kind of value in individuals 
that we’re after here, so it looks like love and friendship needn’t involve the false belief that our 
beloveds or friends possess this kind of value because it looks like they can possess it in virtue of 
their particular, idiosyncratic qualities.   
 Of course, one may object to this solution on the following grounds. When we believe 
that our beloveds and friends each possess a kind of non-moral, intrinsic, unique (and therefore 
irreplaceable) value, we don’t believe that they possess this kind of value only with respect to 
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other actually or potentially existing people. In other words, we don’t believe that they are each 
non-fungible with respect to only other actually or potentially existing people, such that none of 
those people could ever replace them. Instead, we believe that our beloveds and friends are non-
fungible with respect to all theoretically conceivable people, including exact qualitative 
duplicates of our beloveds and friends. Not even an exact qualitative duplicate of a beloved or a 
friend could replace them without a loss of value. Accordingly, even if our beloveds and friends 
are non-fungible with respect to other actually or potentially existing people in virtue of their 
particular, idiosyncratic qualities (which are only so compared to the qualities of other actually 
or potentially existing people), they will not be non-fungible with respect to exact qualitative 
duplicates in virtue of particular, idiosyncratic qualities precisely because their qualities are no 
longer particular or idiosyncratic with respect to these duplicates (they are rather exactly the 
same). Love and friendship, then, still necessarily commit us to a false belief in the non-
fungibility of our beloveds and friends because these individuals, though non-fungible with 
respect to other actually or potentially existing people, are not non-fungible with respect to exact 
qualitative duplicates.  
  In response to this, some may maintain that our beloveds and friends are still non-
fungible even with respect to exact qualitative duplicates because, unlike these duplicates, our 
beloveds and friends share a history with us (Grau 2004). In other words, their sharing a history 
with us gives our beloveds and friends a unique, non-moral value that makes them non-fungible. 
But even if this is true, it doesn’t quite solve the fungibility problem. For that problem, as I’ve 
described it, is that love and friendship seem to necessarily commit us to a false belief—and thus 
are to some degree irrational—because they necessarily commit us to the belief that the other has 
a non-moral, unique, irreplaceable value that’s intrinsic to them, where this belief is hard to 
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vindicate because it’s hard to locate this specific kind of value. Yet the value that one may have 
in virtue of sharing a history with someone is not intrinsic to that person, but is rather something 
that the lover or the friend projects onto that person. This kind of value will therefore not 
vindicate the right belief. Moreover, shared history does not account for the irreplaceable value 
of every beloved because such a history is not always there. Parents who fall in love with their 
children as soon as they find out about their existence in the womb would surely find their 
children to be irreplaceable, yet since they have no shared history it cannot be that which makes 
their children irreplaceable. And if love at first sight is a genuine phenomenon, then once again 
there can be no shared history to make the loved-at-first-sight irreplaceable. Such cases suggest 
that the irreplaceable value that our beloveds and friends necessarily seem to have is intrinsic to 
them rather than projected onto them due to their history with us. And just in case those cases are 
not sufficient here, take a moment to reflect upon your beloveds and your friends and ask 
yourself if they are irreplaceable to you simply because they share a history with you. Chances 
are this isn’t the case because, on the one hand, other people in your life share a history with you 
even though you don’t see them as irreplaceable. And on the other hand, if you were to envision 
your beloveds or friends as having a history without you, then even though such a history would 
lead to a present in which you don’t love them, you’d still believe that your beloveds or your 
friends are non-fungible. Removing their shared history with you would probably not change 
your belief in their non-fungibility. Yet this indicates that there’s supposed to be something 
special about them, some value intrinsic to them, that renders them non-fungible even with 
respect to exact qualitative duplicates. And the fungibility problem is, once again, the problem of 
locating this value and thereby vindicating the belief in such value to which love and friendship 
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seem to necessarily commit us in order to avoid the consequence of love and friendship being 
necessarily irrational to some degree.  
 At this point I see only two responses to the problem. One is to simply bite the bullet and 
accept that love and friendship are necessarily irrational to some degree because they do 
necessarily commit us to believing in the other’s non-fungibility with respect to all real, 
potential, and theoretically possible people, including exact qualitative duplicates. This isn’t 
what we were after here, but it would at least be in line with the popular thought that love is an 
inherently irrational phenomenon. However, a potential solution to the problem lies in adding 
our haecceities to the mix of particular, idiosyncratic qualities that can ground the value we’re 
after here. With respect to other actually or potentially existing people, your beloveds and friends 
possess a non-moral, intrinsic, unique and therefore irreplaceable value in virtue of their unique 
set of particular, idiosyncratic intrinsic qualities (or in the particular, idiosyncratic ways in which 
they instantiate general intrinsic qualities). Yet with respect to exact qualitative duplicates, your 
beloveds and friends can only possess the same kind of value as the duplicates in virtue of their 
set of particular, idiosyncratic intrinsic qualities unless we include their haecceities in the mix. 
Once we include them, we get things that set your beloveds or friends apart from their exact 
qualitative duplicates and therefore something that can help ground the value that we’re after 
here. The only question left to consider, then, is whether haecceities can do the work we need 
them to do here. And though it may seem strange, I think that they can, or at least that it’s 
plausible to entertain the thought that they can. After all, there does seem to be some intuitive 
pull to the thought that, compared to all of her exact qualitative duplicates, it’s my beloved’s 
simply being her that makes her irreplaceable with respect to those duplicates. This isn’t to say 
that her haecceity is the only thing that gives her the value we’re after here; her other qualities do 
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as well. All I’m saying is that her haecceity is what gives her a value that sets her apart from her 
exact qualitative duplicates and thus the combination of it with her other particular, idiosyncratic 
qualities delivers the value that we’re after here. If haecceities plus particular, idiosyncratic 
qualities deliver this value, then our beloveds and friends can have the value that we believe 
them to have, which in turn means that love and friendship may not necessarily commit us to 
false beliefs about their objects’ value.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I’ve ventured into normative territory and tackled the issues pertaining to 
the rational justification of love and friendship. Beginning with the issue of whether these 
phenomena are subject to rational assessment, we’ve seen, on the one hand, that none of the anti-
rationalist arguments purporting to show that they aren’t subject to such assessment succeed, and 
on the other that there are some pretty good grounds for agreeing with the rationalists that they 
are subject to such assessment. It’s therefore pretty safe to conclude, along with the rationalists, 
that love and friendship are subject to rational assessment. Then we addressed the related issue of 
what normative reasons can justify these phenomena, and there we found three types of such 
reasons: value-based reasons, quality-based reasons, and history-based reasons. Value-based 
reasons refer to facts pertaining to how love or friendship actually, probably, or potentially 
promotes, or is required for, something valuable. These reasons alone can justify unspecified 
love and friendship, but they can also justify specified love and friendship of either the initial or 
continual variety. Quality-based reasons refer to facts pertaining to morally acceptable, defining 
personal qualities that make the beloved or the friend a fitting object of love or friendship. These 
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reasons can justify specified love and friendship of both the initial and continual varieties. And 
history-based reasons refer to facts pertaining to histories shared with the beloved or the friend. 
Unlike the other reasons, history-based ones can only justify continuing specified love and 
friendship.  
 Next we tackled the issue of when love and friendship are all-things-considered rationally 
justified or unjustified, and there we were only able to establish some general conclusions. 
Beginning with unspecified love and friendship of either the initial and continual variety, we saw 
that such love or friendship is justified just in case the value-based reasons for it outweigh or 
equal the reasons against it, where these latter reasons refer to facts pertaining to the actual or 
expected costs of such love or friendship. As for specified love and friendship of either the initial 
or continuing variety, we saw that, while it’s not at all clear how to weigh value-based, quality-
based, and history-based reasons against each other—or even how to weigh quality-based 
reasons against each other—these phenomena are justified just in case the balance of reasons 
renders them all-things-considered rationally appropriate, where this balance obtains just in case 
the reasons that render them pro tanto rationally appropriate collectively outweigh or equal any 
reasons that render them pro tanto inappropriate. We also saw that, when it comes to trying to 
determine on a case-by-case basis where the balance of reasons here lies, one should be looking 
only for the non-comparative reason-constituting facts pertaining to (1) any value actually, 
probably, or potentially promoted by loving or being friends with the other, (2) the other’s 
morally acceptable, defining qualities that make her a fitting object of love or friendship, (3) any 
intimate history shared with the other, (4) the other’s negative or immoral qualities, and (5) the 
superior costs of loving or being friends with the other compared to their benefits.  
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 Last we tackled the issue of whether love and friendship can ever be completely free of 
irrationality by addressing three challenges to the possibilities of completely rational love or 
friendship. The first challenge tried to show that love and friendship are guilty of irrationality 
because, as special or exclusive responses to only certain people on the basis of their apparent 
properties, they’re inconsistent responses to those properties. However, we saw that exclusive 
responses to others on the basis of their properties can be justified if they’re rationally warranted 
yet not rationally required by those properties, or if those properties are particular to the 
individual that has them. So long, then, as love and friendship are appropriate responses to 
properties to begin with, they can be rational if they’re rationally warranted yet not rationally 
required by those properties or if they’re appropriate responses to properties that only particular 
individuals have.  
The second challenge tried to show that love and friendship are necessarily irrational 
because they constitutively involve the unwillingness to trade their objects in for better 
replacements. Yet we saw that history-based reasons might be able to tip the scales of rationality 
in favor of not trading up, and also that love and friendship can still be rational, despite their 
unwillingness, if they’re rationally appropriate in virtue of the relevant non-comparative facts. 
And the third challenge tried to show that love and friendship are necessarily irrational because 
they constitutively involve the false belief in the other’s non-fungibility with respect to all 
theoretically conceivable people. However, we were able to locate at least a theoretical 
possibility for the truth this constitutive belief: our beloveds and friends can have unique value 
with respect to all theoretically conceivable people in virtue of their particular instantiations of 
generic personal qualities along with their haecceities because the former can make them 
irreplaceable with respect to any actual or potential person, while the latter can make them 
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irreplaceable with respect to exact qualitative duplicates. Until it can be shown otherwise, then, a 
completely rational love or friendship still seems entirely possible.  
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Chapter 4: The Reasons of Love and Friendship 
 
With the normative issues falling under the justification of love and friendship now 
addressed, we’re ready to move on to our other set of normative issues pertaining to the 
normative significance of love and friendship. How, if at all, do love and friendship alter our 
normative situations?66 Do they give rise to normative reasons for action that we otherwise 
wouldn’t have? If so, what’s the nature of these reasons? Are they moral or non-moral? Are they 
special? How do they stack up to other reasons that we have? Do love and friendship also give 
rise to special moral duties (where again these moral duties are those that only lovers and friends 
have because of their participation in loving relationships and friendships)? If they do give rise to 
special moral duties, what are the grounds of these duties? Are these irreducible, sui generis 
special duties grounded in love or friendship itself, or can they be reduced to other kinds of 
duties that can be found outside of love and friendship? And how do these duties stack up to 
others that we have?67  
As I explained in chapter 1, this chapter will focus on addressing the above questions 
pertaining to normative reasons. After a brief but important discussion about the relationship 
between normative reasons for action and moral duties that is intended to justify treating them 
separately in this chapter and the next, I will answer the questions whether love and friendship 
give rise to new normative reasons and, if so, what kinds of reasons these are. First I will argue 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 In previous chapters I dealt with love as a psychological condition—or as a syndrome—of the organism, whereas 
in these last two chapters I will be dealing with loving relationships and their normative significance. The normative 
significance of love in the absence of loving relationships will therefore not be addressed.  
67 One could also ask: “Assuming that love and friendship have normative significance, what kind of significance do 
they have? Is it moral or non-moral?” I will effectively be answering this question (my answer is that they have both 
kinds of significance) by addressing the above question about whether the reasons that love and friendship generate 
are moral or non-moral (my answer is that they generate both) as well as the question about whether they give rise to 
special moral duties (my answer is that they do).  
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that love and friendship at least give rise to person-based reasons, which are constituted by facts 
that either (1) identify certain people as our loved ones or friends or (2) specify how certain 
actions do or might relate to the welfares or wills of our loved ones or friends, as well as 
relationship-based reasons, which are constituted by facts that specify how certain actions will 
or might affect our loving relationships or friendships. Then I will argue that some of these 
reasons are moral ones, while others are non-moral ones. I will also argue that some of these 
reasons are special in the sense of only being had by participants in loving relationships and 
friendships, while some are special in the distinct sense that they’re stronger or weightier 
compared to other reasons with comparable contents that the relationship participants may have. 
As for how the reasons of love and friendship stack up against others that we may have, I aim to 
show that the answer will vary depending on the nature of the reasons in play. Sometimes the 
reasons of love and friendship win out, and sometimes their competitors outweigh them; their 
fate here depends on the balance of different sorts of reasons.  
 
4.1 Practical Reasons and Moral Duties 
 
As we have seen, normative reasons for things are considerations that actually justify 
those things. In the previous chapter we talked about normative reasons for love and friendship, 
while in this chapter we’re concerned with the normative reasons of love and friendship, where 
these reasons are, specifically, reasons for action. Let’s call reasons for action “practical 
reasons.” What is the relationship between practical reasons and our moral duties?  
 Any answer to this question will, unsurprisingly, be controversial, and will depend on 
whether one is an internalist or an externalist about practical reasons, on the one hand, and on the 
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other on whether one holds a certain brand of moral rationalism that will be defined below. 
According to reasons-internalism, the only practical reasons that agents have are internal ones, 
which are reasons that are dependent on an agent’s motivations in the sense that an agent has 
them because, and only because, he or she has some element in his or her “subjective 
motivational set”—some desire, interest, value, concern, commitment, or whatever—that is 
served by performing the actions favored by the reasons (Williams 1980). So let’s say, for 
example, that I have a reason to drink some coffee—namely, that it will wake me up and give me 
energy. This would be an internal reason because I would not have it if I had no desire, aim, or 
whatever that would be served by becoming more awake and energized via drinking coffee. I 
would only have a reason to drink coffee if I had a desire or the aim to stay awake, or to do 
something important that requires being awake and having more energy than I could muster 
without coffee. An implication of reasons-internalism, then, is that the relationship between 
moral duties and practical reasons (assuming the former exist) is a function of each agent’s 
motivational set: an agent’s moral duties are practical reasons for that agent just in case she has a 
desire or a commitment to be moral. If she has no desire or aim to be moral, then the fact that 
something is her moral duty is no reason for her to do it, whereas if she does have a desire or a 
commitment to be moral, then the mere fact that something is her moral duty is a reason for her 
to do it. On this view, then, moral duties can be practical reasons, but they need not be so, and 
even if they are they will certainly not be exhaustive of our practical reasons because we will 
have all sorts desires, interests, or commitments besides our commitment to being moral that will 
give us practical reasons.  
By contrast, reasons-externalism denies that our practical reasons are all internal ones and 
maintains instead that some or all of our practical reasons are independent of our motivational 
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sets. So for example, if some behavior is unhealthy for you, then the very fact that it is unhealthy 
seems to be a reason not to engage in that behavior regardless of whether you have a desire for or 
an interest in being healthy. Also, according to certain brand of moral rationalism (which entails 
reasons-externalism but isn’t necessarily entailed by it), if some action is morally obligatory, 
then the mere fact that it is morally obligatory constitutes a reason to perform that action 
regardless of whether you have a desire or a commitment to be moral (Shafer-Landau 2003, 
2009).68 Accordingly, if both reasons-externalism and this brand of moral rationalism are true, 
then moral duties must be practical reasons, but once again they will not be exhaustive of these 
reasons. Moral duties may necessarily be practical reasons for us all, but we will certainly have 
many other reasons to do things.  
Overall, then, the situation is this. Assuming that we have moral duties, these duties 
either can, yet need not be, practical reasons for us, or else they must be practical reasons for us. 
Either way, we will have other practical reasons besides those considerations pertaining to our 
moral duties. So, since moral duties will not exhaust our practical reasons and may not even be 
such reasons in the first place, we can divide our inquiry into the normative significance of love 
and friendship by focusing on the practical reasons that they might give rise to, on the one hand, 
and to the moral duties that they might give rise to on the other.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 We can distinguish here between weak moral rationalism, which holds that moral duties constitute pro tanto or 
defeasible reasons for action, and strong moral rationalism, which holds that moral duties constitute sufficient 
reasons for action. This distinction, however, has no bearing on the point of this section, which is just that practical 
reasons and moral duties, while perhaps related, are far from co-extensive and, as such, deserve separate 
philosophical treatment.  
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4.2 The Person-Based and Relationship-Based Reasons of Love and Friendship 
 
Although we must entertain the possibility that love and friendship generate special moral 
duties that constitute practical reasons for everyone bound by them, we can bracket this 
possibility and begin our inquiry into the normative significance of love and friendship by 
asking: what reasons other than these potential ones, if any, do loving relationships and 
friendships generate? I believe that intuitively appealing examples along with theoretical support 
strongly suggest that these relationships at least give rise to both person-based reasons and 
relationship-based reasons. Again, the person-based reasons here are either facts that identify 
certain people as our loved ones or friends, or else they’re facts specifying how certain actions 
do or might relate to the welfares or wills of our loved ones or friends. So for example, the mere 
fact that Bethany is my beloved spouse seems to be a reason for me to give her a ride home from 
the airport rather than no one or someone else, which is a reason that I obviously wouldn’t have 
if Bethany wasn’t, in fact, my beloved spouse. Also, the fact that giving Bethany a ride home 
would make her happy instead of angry seems to be another reason for me here that I again 
wouldn’t have if Bethany wasn’t my beloved spouse who has come to count on me for rides 
home from the airport and is emotionally vulnerable to my decisions on whether to meet her 
expectations. Moreover, the fact that me giving Bethany a ride home is what she wants is yet 
another reason for me here that I wouldn’t have if Bethany wasn’t my beloved spouse who 
always wants me to pick her up from the airport. These are three different facts, but they all seem 
to be practical reasons that I have because of my romantic partnership with Bethany, and they are 
person-based reasons because they either identify Bethany as my beloved spouse or else specify 
how my actions will affect her welfare or fulfill her will. The relationship-based reasons, by 
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contrast, are facts that specify how certain actions will or might affect our loving relationships or 
friendships. So for example, if cooking a meal for Bethany sustains our romantic partnership, 
then that seems to constitute a good reason for me to cook her a meal that I wouldn’t have in the 
absence of such a relationship. Or suppose that I have upset my friend Fred to the point that he is 
thinking about dissolving our friendship, but that he will not do so if I do something nice for him. 
The fact that doing something nice for Fred will save our friendship seems to be a reason for me 
to do something nice for him, where again I wouldn’t have this reason if, in fact, we didn’t share 
a friendship in the first place.69 
 These intuitively appealing examples of reason-constituting facts are further supported by 
multiple theories of practical reasons. Under desire-based theories (e.g., Williams 1980; 
Schroeder 2007), where all of our practical reasons our grounded in our desires, and under 
Michael Smith’s (2017) hybrid theory, where only some of our practical reasons our grounded in 
our desires,70 loving relationships and friendships will generate new reasons because they will 
generate new reason-giving desires. For, generally speaking, our reason-giving desires constitute 
the background conditions that allow certain facts to count as reasons (Goldman 2005; Schroeder 
2007). That is, when we have some desire for an object, O, that satisfies whatever conditions 
need to be satisfied for it to give reasons (e.g., it isn’t based on false belief), then facts pertaining 
to how our actions will or might promote O will constitute reasons for us to perform those 
actions. Now, because of my relationship with Bethany I want Bethany to fare well and get what 
she wants, and I also want our relationship to continue. Therefore, because of these desires, facts 
that specify how actions of mine will or might promote Bethany’s welfare, or will or might fulfill 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 It should be evident that both person-based and relationship-based reasons are agent-relative ones because they are 
reasons that we have in virtue of our loving relationships and friendships rather than our mere personhood, moral 
agency, or causal position in the world.  
70 As I understand it, the only other reasons that we have according to Smith’s account are respect-based reasons, 
where the “respect” here is Kantian moral respect.  
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her desires, or will sustain our relationship, will constitute reasons for me to perform those 
actions.  
 Alternatively, consider Harry Frankfurt’s (2004) theory of practical reasons, which holds 
that care (or love) grounds all of our practical reasons. Under this theory the general story for 
how reasons are generated is virtually identical to how desires generate reasons under the desire-
based theory, except the reason-generating entity is not mere desire for some object, but rather 
caring about it. So when we care about some object, O, and this care satisfies whatever 
conditions need to be satisfied for it to give reasons (e.g., not based on false belief), then again, 
facts pertaining to how our actions will or might promote O will constitute reasons for us to 
perform those actions. Accordingly, since we will care about the welfares and the desire-
satisfaction of those with which we share loving relationships and friendships, and since we will 
care about those relationships themselves, under Frankfurt’s theory our loving relationships and 
friendships will again give us both person-based and relationship-based reasons.71  
 Although the reason-constituting facts may be different, our loving relationships and 
friendships will give rise to practical reasons on other theories of such reasons as well. Consider 
first Christine Korsgaard’s (1996) theory, which holds that our practical identities ground our 
practical reasons. “Practical identities” are descriptions under which we value ourselves and find 
our actions to be worth undertaking. We may value ourselves as spouses, parents, children, 
friends, citizens, practitioners of certain professions, adherents of certain religions, champions of 
certain causes, and so on and so forth, and when we do these things constitute our practical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 The similarity of Frankfurt’s theory to desire-based theories (e.g., those of Williams and Schroeder) that use 
“desire” as a term of art denoting anything that we might find in our motivational sets, including our cares, may 
make one think that Frankfurt’s theory isn’t really an alternative to desire-based theories. However, even though 
these inclusive desire-based theories agree with Frankfurt’s theory that our cares ground practical reasons for us, 
Frankfurt’s theory is still an alternative to them because it holds that only cares—rather than anything that could 
count as a “desire”—is what specifically grounds practical reasons.  
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identities. Under Korsgaard’s theory these identities are the sources of our reasons, and since our 
loving relationships and friendships will presumably change our practical identities, they will 
likewise change our practical reasons. To return again to the example of my relationship with 
Bethany, that relationship has changed my practical identity: as a result of that relationship I am 
Bethany’s romantic partner and primary caregiver, and I’m also a participant of the relationship 
itself. Yet part of having a practical identity is being bound by its associated norms, which 
provide reasons for us to do whatever they say. So for example, I seem to have a reason to attend 
to Bethany when she’s sick in the fact that doing so is what a primary caregiver does (or maybe 
in the fact that doing so is what the norms of caregiving require), which I have only because of 
my identity as Bethany’s primary caregiver. And I may also have a reason to do things that will 
sustain our relationship—namely, that that’s what participants in relationships do (or are required 
to do)—only because of my identity as a participant in our relationship.  
 Next and last, consider a value-based theory of practical reasons, where our reasons are 
grounded in the promotion of objective value. Generally speaking, under such a theory facts 
pertaining to how our actions promote objective value or objectively valuable things will count 
as reasons for us to do those very actions. If we plausibly assume, then, that loving relationships 
and friendships are objectively valuable things, under a value-based theory of practical reasons 
facts pertaining to how our actions sustain loving relationships or friendships will constitute 
reasons for us to perform those actions that we wouldn’t have if these relationships didn’t exist in 
the first place. Furthermore, if we grant that a special kind of objective value attaches to loved 
ones caring for loved ones, or friends caring for friends (Keller 2013), then under this theory 
facts pertaining to how our actions will realize this special value will constitute reasons for us to 
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perform these actions that we again wouldn’t have in the absence of the relevant relationships 
because our actions wouldn’t have the special objective value in question here. 
 Overall, then, it should be evident that the basic thesis that love and friendship give rise 
to practical reasons that we otherwise wouldn’t have is firmly supported by intuitively appealing 
examples and by multiple theories of practical reasons. And according to the examples and a few 
of those theories, love and friendship give rise to person-based and relationship-based reasons, 
while according to a few other theories love and friendship give rise to identity-based and value-
based reasons as well. Now I’m not sure if we should countenance all of these reasons, but given 
the strong, converging support that person-based and relationship-based reasons receive from 
both the intuitively appealing examples and the first three theories of practical reasons that we 
discussed, I contend that we can be pretty confident that love and friendship do indeed give rise 
to these two types of reasons. At any rate, I will proceed on this assumption.  
 
4.3 The Moral vs. Non-Moral Reasons of Love and Friendship 
 
We can now move on to the issue of whether the practical reasons that love and 
friendship generate are moral or non-moral reasons.72 The answer to this question, of course, will 
depend on how we differentiate between moral and non-moral reasons. One way to differentiate 
them is to hold that moral reasons are facts that make explicit reference to clearly moral 
properties or duties. That is: facts that proclaim certain actions to be morally right or wrong, 
obligatory or forbidden, good or evil will count as moral reasons, and so will facts that proclaim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Jeske (2017) thinks that the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons is neither necessary nor helpful, so 
she would presumably reject the need to address this issue. I think, however, that this is an important issue to 
address because the distinctively moral significance of love and friendship is an important part of their more general 
normative significance.  
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certain actions to be our duty. We may also include here (perhaps among others) facts pertaining 
to whether actions are just or unjust, or whether they respect or violate the moral rights of others. 
Any other reasons will then be non-moral ones. This, however, is not how I propose that we 
differentiate between moral and non-moral reasons because this way of differentiating between 
these reasons will categorize some reasons as non-moral when they arguably should be 
categorized as moral ones. So for example, suppose that a stranger is drowning through no fault 
of my own. If trying to save them would likely result in my own death, then the enormous risk 
that trying to save them would pose to me would disable any pro tanto duty that I would have to 
save others from grave danger and thereby render my failure to try to save them morally 
permissible. But since the tremendous personal risk here is a consideration that’s relevant to 
determining the moral status of my failure to save the stranger from drowning, it seems to be a 
moral reason even though it makes no explicit reference to clear moral properties or duties. To 
account for this, then, I propose that we define moral reasons disjunctively: a fact constitutes a 
moral reason just in case it either (1) makes explicit reference to clear moral properties or duties, 
or else (2) is directly relevant to determining the moral status of an action. Accordingly, the 
reasons of love and friendship will be moral ones just in case they satisfy one of these conditions, 
and otherwise they will be non-moral ones.73  
Given this way of differentiating between the moral and non-moral reasons of love and 
friendship, it seems clear that the reasons of love and friendship will be a mixed bag: some will 
be moral, and others will be non-moral. If love and friendship do indeed give rise to special 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 I want to note two things here. First, I obviously haven’t specified when facts are directly relevant to determining 
the moral status of an action (indeed I don’t have a general account of this relevance), and it may of course be 
difficult to determine if a fact is so relevant and thus counts as a moral reason. Nevertheless, I think that my proposal 
here is extremely plausible and that, until a better one is forthcoming, we can just use intuition or argument to make 
our best judgment as to whether certain facts satisfy this second proposed condition. Second, I haven’t offered a 
reductive account of moral reasons because the term “moral” shows up in the analysans and the analysandum, but 
this is no more problematic than defining a “geology expert” as someone who has a lot of knowledge about geology.  
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moral duties that constitute practical reasons for those bound by them, then these reasons will 
obviously be moral ones because they make explicit reference to clear moral duties. Yet even if 
we again bracket the possibility of these reason-constituting special duties, the mixed-bag thesis 
still seems to hold up. For let’s suppose that I face a situation where morality demands that I help 
either Bethany or a stranger, but I can only help one person. Here the fact that Bethany is my 
beloved spouse seems to constitute a person-based moral reason for me to favor her because it 
makes it obligatory—or at least permissible—for me to help her instead of the stranger. In other 
words, since this fact seems directly relevant to determining the moral status of my helping 
Bethany instead of the stranger, it seems to be a moral reason rather than a non-moral one. 
Similarly, the fact that taking Fred out for a ridiculously expensive dinner is the only way to save 
our friendship seems to constitute a relationship-based moral reason to take Fred out for such a 
dinner because it appears to ground a moral permission—or at least can ground such a 
permission—for me to do so despite the moral reasons against doing so (e.g., the money would 
be better used, morally speaking, if given to charity). By contrast, the fact that Fred wants to go 
out for a ridiculously expensive dinner with me seems to constitute a relationship-based non-
moral reason for me to join him for such a dinner because mere facts about what Fred wants in 
terms of luxury cannot ground moral permissions or obligations to act against the moral reasons 
to give to charity instead.  
 
4.4 The Special Reasons of Love and Friendship 
 
Next we have the issue of whether the practical reasons of love and friendship are special 
reasons. If love and friendship give rise to special moral duties that constitute reasons for those 
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bound by them, then those reasons will obviously be special in a sense that will be discussed in 
the next chapter. But even if we again bracket this possibility, at least some of the person-based 
and relationship-based reasons of love and friendship still seem to be special in at least one of 
two ways. On the one hand, at least some of these reasons seem special in the sense that only the 
relationship participants have them. The fact that Bethany is my beloved spouse is a reason for 
me, and only for me, to favor her in situations where morality demands that I help her or a 
stranger when I can’t help both. The fact that taking Fred for a ridiculously expensive dinner is 
the only way to save our friendship and the fact that Fred wants to go out for a ridiculously 
expensive dinner with me are both reasons for me and only me to take him out for such a dinner.  
On the other hand, at least some of these reasons seem special in the sense that they’re 
stronger or weightier compared to other reasons with comparable contents that the relationship 
participants may have. So let’s say, for example, that I’m standing on the shore of a riverbank, 
that two people are drowning in the water, and that I can only save one of them. If I jump in, 
grab the person on the left, and swim them to shore, then I will save my beloved spouse 
Bethany’s life, whereas if I jump in, grab the person on the right, and swim them to shore then I 
will save a stranger’s life. Regardless of which option I choose here I will save a person’s life, so 
the reasons that I have to take each option have comparable contents. However, my reason to 
take the first option—that it will save my beloved spouse Bethany’s life—is a stronger reason 
than that to take the second option—that it will save a stranger’s life. Generally speaking, then, 
when I could either promote the welfare of person A to certain degree or that of person B to the 
same degree, but not both, and person A is a friend or a beloved while person B is neither, then 
the fact that one option will promote A’s welfare to a certain degree, D, constitutes a stronger 
reason to take that option compared to the reason to take the other option that’s constituted by 
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the fact that the other option will promote B’s welfare to degree D.74 Something similar will be 
true in situations where we could either respect the autonomy of person A in a certain way or that 
of person B in the same way, but not both, or where we could either respect or protect the rights 
of A or the same rights of B, but not both. Perhaps we could summarize this second sense in 
which some of the reasons of love and friendship are special by saying that, all else being equal, 
we have more reason to benefit or appropriately treat our loved ones or friends compared to 
strangers. 
 
4.5 The Weight of the Reasons of Love and Friendship 
 
This brings us to our last issue of how the reasons of love and friendship stack up to other 
reasons that we have. We just saw that the person-based reasons of love and friendship seem to 
be stronger than other person-based reasons with comparable contents. Also, if there are special 
moral duties of love and friendship that constitute practical reasons for those bound by them, 
then these reason-constituting duties will likewise be stronger than our reason-constituting, 
general moral duties to others with comparable contents. But what if the contents of our person-
based reasons of love and friendship are no longer comparable to the contents of the competing 
person-based reasons? Or what if we are no longer weighing person-based reasons against each 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 An alternative take on the scenario I’ve offered here would argue that I have most reason to save Bethany because 
there are two reasons to save her—doing so will save a person’s life and doing so will save my beloved spouse’s 
life—but only one reason to save the stranger—doing so will save a person’s life. Accordingly, we cannot conclude 
on the basis of this case that promoting the welfare of a friend or loved one to degree D constitutes a stronger reason 
than promoting the welfare of a stranger to the same degree. Now I’m not sure what to say about this alternative take 
on the reasons in play here, but even if we grant that there are three reasons in play rather than only two and that the 
two reasons to save Bethany clearly outweigh the one reason to save the stranger, we can still raise the issue of how 
the reasons to save Bethany individually stack up to the reason to save the stranger. Obviously, the fact that saving 
Bethany will save a person has the same weight as my reason to save the stranger, as this reason is constituted by the 
same fact, but how does this fact stack up against the fact that saving Bethany will save my beloved spouse? There 
are three possibilities: the fact that I will save a person either weighs less than, more than, or the same as the fact that 
I will save my beloved spouse, yet I don’t see any reason to doubt my above conclusion that it weighs less.   
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other? How do our reasons of love and friendship stack up against our reasons of self-interest? 
And how do the reasons of love and friendship stack up against competing moral reasons? Do 
the moral reasons always win out, or do the reasons of love or friendship sometimes carry the 
day?  
Let’s take these questions in order. We said above that facts pertaining to how our actions 
will promote the welfare of our loved ones or friends to a certain degree, D, constitute stronger 
reasons than facts pertaining to how our actions will promote the welfare of strangers to the same 
degree, and based on this we can draw the further conclusion that facts pertaining to how our 
actions will promote the welfare of our loved ones or friends to degree D will constitute stronger 
reasons than facts pertaining to how our actions will promote the welfare of strangers to a 
smaller degree. But what happens when we can promote either the welfare of our loved ones or 
friends to degree D, or the welfare of strangers to some higher degree, D+? I think the answer 
here depends on how much of a difference there is between D and D+. So long as D+ isn’t too 
much higher than D, then the reasons of love and friendship will still be stronger, yet if D+ 
reaches a certain level compared to D then this will no longer be true. So for example, if I face a 
choice between saving a stranger’s life and preventing Bethany from, say, having her arms and 
legs broken, then I think that the fact that I will save Bethany’s limbs with one option constitutes 
a stronger reason than the fact that I will save a stranger’s life with the other option. However, if 
I face a choice between saving a stranger’s life and preventing Bethany from getting punched, 
then it seems plausible to say that the fact that I will save Bethany from getting punched with one 
option is not a stronger reason than the fact that I will save a stranger’s life with the other option. 
It’s hard to pinpoint the threshold that D+ must reach relative to D before the relevant reasons of 
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love and friendship no longer outweigh those on the other side, but it seems clear enough that 
there is some threshold here.  
What happens, though, if we are no longer considering person-based reasons alone? Let’s 
say that I could spend some large chunk of money on a ridiculously expensive dinner with Fred 
to save our friendship, or else I could give that money to charity instead. The fact that spending 
the money on the dinner with Fred will save our friendship is a relationship-based reason to 
spend the money on the dinner, whereas the fact that giving the money to charity would do an 
enormous amount of good—it may even save lives—is a person-based reason to give the money 
to charity instead. Which of these reasons, if any, is stronger here? The answer to this may 
depend on the importance of my friendship with Fred. If he is my best friend, or even a really 
close friend, then I’m inclined to say that my reason to spend the money on a dinner with Fred 
does indeed outweigh the person-based reason to give to charity. Similarly, if Fred were my 
romantic partner rather than a mere friend, then I’m even more inclined to say that my reason to 
spend the money on a dinner with Fred outweighs the person-based reason to give to charity. If, 
however, Fred is not that close of a friend, then saving the friendship probably isn’t worth 
forgoing the good that giving to charity would do—this good indeed seems to be worth the 
sacrifice of my friendship with Fred. In that case it seems right to say that the person-based 
reason to give to charity does indeed win out. Generally speaking, then, I’m inclined to say that 
the relationship-based reasons of love and friendship will outweigh competing, stranger-based 
reasons when the relationships in question reach a certain level of importance in the participants’ 
lives, although it’s again hard to pinpoint where this threshold lies.  
Next we have the question of how the reasons of love and friendship stack up against 
those of self-interest. Let’s say that reasons of self-interest are facts pertaining to how our actions 
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will benefit us in some way. Although our reasons of self-interest will often—if not usually—
favor the same actions as our reasons of love and friendship do, there will surely be times when 
they conflict, and it’s those times that we’re interested in here. Let’s start with a rather extreme 
scenario in which I could save Bethany from lethal harm by sacrificing my own life to save her. 
If I take action then I will save Bethany’s life, whereas if I take no action I will preserve my own 
life. So here I face competing, person-based reasons—one of love and another of self-interest. 
Which reason, if any, wins out? Honestly, I’m not sure. If the personal cost of saving Bethany 
were not so large, then my reason to take action would certainly win out, but as the personal cost 
goes up and approaches the maximal cost—my own life—it becomes less clear that my reason to 
take action wins out. Furthermore, the quality of our potential future lives may be relevant here 
as well. If only one of us is dying from a terminal disease, then it may be more rational to 
preserve the life of whichever one of us will have more life to live. However, if we ignore the 
complicating factor of quality-of-life, then I believe that we can at least say that, when the lives 
of our loved ones or friends are at stake, then the personal costs that we might incur from saving 
those lives must be pretty high before we can even entertain the possibility that reasons of self-
interest will outweigh those of love or friendship.  
What happens, though, when we lower the stakes? Let’s return to the scenario where 
Bethany is at the airport expecting me to give her a ride home. I could spend the time that it 
would take to pick her up doing things that would benefit me particularly, or I can pick her up 
and make her happy rather than angry. Here I again face competing, person-based reasons: the 
fact that one option will make Bethany happy instead of angry is a reason of love, while the fact 
that taking the other option will benefit me particularly is a reason of self-interest. Now in this 
case it seems pretty obvious that, unless the benefit that I will accrue from failing to pick her up 
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is substantial or important enough, my person-based reason of love will trump my reason of self-
interest. If my reason of self-interest is just, say, that the failure to pick Bethany up will allow me 
to continue watching a fun TV show or secure some other trivial benefit, then my reason of love 
will definitely win out. If, however, I’m under a deadline to finish a seminar paper, and staying 
home is the only way that I can finish on time, then my reason of self-interest arguably wins out 
here. Generally speaking, then, it seems that which reasons win out depend on what all is at 
stake, and that the benefits of acting for our own gain relative to its costs for our loved ones or 
friends must reach a certain threshold before reasons of self-interest will outweigh the reasons of 
love or friendship.  
 This brings us to the final question of how the reasons of love and friendship stack up 
against competing moral reasons, and the answer here of course depends on the nature of these 
reasons. If there are again special moral duties of love and friendship that constitute moral 
reasons for those bound by them, then those reasons can compete with our other reason-
constituting moral duties, and this brings up the particular issue of how these competing duties 
stack up against each other. This issue, however, will be dealt with in the next chapter, so we will 
bracket it for now. Also, when the reasons that we’ve been discussing—person-based and 
relationship-based reasons plus those of self-interest—count as moral reasons, then we can 
simply reiterate our conclusions from earlier. Perhaps the only interesting question left to address 
here, then, is how our non-moral reasons of love and friendship stack up against competing 
moral reasons. When these reasons conflict, do the moral reasons always win out, or do the non-
moral reasons sometimes carry the day?  
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 Although some people may think that the moral reasons will always win, I believe that 
this is too high-minded.75 Now of course the moral reasons will win out sometimes (if not most 
of the time). If, for instance, my friend Fred wants me go around with him smashing car windows 
with baseball bats for kicks, then even though this fact constitutes a non-moral reason for me to 
join him, the fact that I would respect rather than violate my moral duties to (or the property 
rights of) other people by not joining him would be a moral reason that seems to trump the 
former non-moral reason to join him.76 But let’s say that, instead of wanting to go around 
smashing car windows, Fred wants to go to a baseball game with me, which I again take to be a 
non-moral reason to go with Fred. Now I could do volunteer work for some charity organization 
or go to the airport and offer strangers rides home rather than go with Fred, and the good that I 
would do in each case seems to constitute moral reasons to perform one of these alternative 
actions rather than go with Fred. However, these moral reasons do not win out this time. Since it 
seems reasonable to give Fred what he wants by going to the game with him despite the good I 
could do by volunteering for charity, it seems that my non-moral reason to go with Fred is at 
least as weighty as the moral reason to volunteer instead for charity. And, since it seems patently 
unreasonable to go to the airport and offer strangers rides home rather than give Fred what he 
wants by going to the game with him, in this case it looks like my non-moral reason to go with 
Fred indeed outweighs my moral reason to go to the airport and offer strangers rides home.   
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 Smith (2017) appears to be such a person insofar as he maintains that respect-based reasons (which are moral) will 
always trump desire-based reasons (which will include reasons of love and friendship), and that Cocking and 
Kennett (2000) are mistaken to think that the reasons arising out of friendship may override moral considerations.  
76 On my account, then, the moral reason here outweighs the non-moral reason rather than blocking its formation. 
Generally speaking, I don’t think that there are moral constraints on what can count as reasons of love or friendship. 
Any fact that specifies how our actions would or might advance the interests of our loved ones or friends counts as 
such a reason regardless of the morality of those actions, which is not to say that any such fact counts as a decisive 
or sufficient reason.  
	  146 
4.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I’ve addressed our first set of issues pertaining to the normative 
significance of love and friendship. Beginning with the related issues of whether love and 
friendship generate normative reasons for us that we otherwise wouldn’t have and, if so, what 
kinds of reasons they are, after bracketing the possibility of love and friendship generating 
special associative duties that constitute practical reasons for those bound by them, I appealed to 
both intuitively compelling examples and to philosophical theories of practical reasons to argue 
that love and friendship do indeed generate at least person-based reasons and relationship-based 
reasons. Then I argued that some of these reasons are moral ones while others are non-moral 
ones, and that at least some of these reasons are “special” in the sense that they’re had only by 
insiders to loving relationships and friendships while some are “special” in the sense that they’re 
weightier compared to other reasons with comparable contents.  
Next I addressed the issue of how these reasons of love and friendship stack up against 
other reasons that we may have by arguing for multiple claims. After reiterating the previous 
point that at least some reasons of love and friendship—namely, person-based reasons—are 
weightier compared to other person-based reasons (i.e., stranger-based reasons) with comparable 
contents and inferring from this that those person-based reasons of love and friendship will be 
weightier than stranger-based reasons with less significant contents, I first argued that, when 
these stranger-based reasons actually have more significant content compared to that of the 
person-based reasons of love and friendship, then which set of reasons wins out depends on how 
much more significant the contents of the former reasons are compared to that of the latter. If the 
difference is not too high, then the person-based reasons of love and friendship will still be 
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weightier than the competing stranger-based reasons; however, if the difference reaches a certain 
level, then the latter reasons will end up outweighing the former instead. Second, I argued that, 
when we are instead comparing relationship-based reasons of love and friendship to stranger-
based reasons, then which set of reasons wins out depends on how important the relevant 
relationships are for the insiders to them: if they reach a certain level of importance then the 
relationship-based reasons of love and friendship will outweigh competing stranger-based 
reasons, but the opposite will be true if the relevant relationships have not reached this level of 
importance. Third, I argued that even though the reasons of love and friendship will typically 
dovetail with the reasons of self-interest, these reasons sometimes conflict, and which set of 
reasons wins depends again on what is at stake. Our reasons of love and friendship are more 
likely to win as the costs of self-interested behavior for our loved ones and friends go up, and the 
higher this cost becomes, the more significant the personal benefits of imposing these costs on 
our loved ones and friends must be before our reasons of self-interest can even hope to outweigh 
our reasons of love and friendship. As these personal benefits become less significant in their 
own right and less significant relative to the costs to our loved ones and friends, the less likely 
they are to outweigh our reasons of love and friendship. Our reasons of self-interest are more 
likely to win, however, when the benefits of acting for our own gain are very important ones or 
when those benefits are more significant than the costs of our so acting for our loved ones or 
friends. Fourth I argued that, when our reasons of love and friendship—whether moral or non-
moral—conflict with moral reasons, sometimes the former win out and sometimes the latter do.  
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Chapter 5: The Duties of Love and Friendship 
 
Now that I’ve addressed those issues pertaining to the reasons of love and friendship, we 
can move on to our final set of issues pertaining to the duties of love and friendship. Do love and 
friendship generate duties? If they do, what are their grounds? Are these duties irreducible, sui 
generis ones grounded in love or friendship itself, or can they be reduced to other kinds of duties 
that can be found outside of love and friendship (e.g., promissory duties)? How do these duties 
stack up against others that we have? I will answer these questions in this final chapter by 
defending a realist, non-reductionist theory of the duties of love and friendship according to 
which loving relationships and friendships generate irreducible, sui generis, special moral duties 
that are directly grounded in the augmented moral statuses that our beloveds and friends have for 
us in virtue of our special relationships with them. As part of my defense of this position, I will 
address three prominent objections to the reality of these duties: the voluntarist objection, the 
distributive objection, and the respect objection.   
 Before I defend my position here, however, I must make some clarifying remarks about 
the duties of love and friendship with which I’m concerned. First of all, these duties are pro tanto 
duties, which we may think of as presumptive or defeasible duties in virtue of certain facts, as 
opposed to all-things-considered duties, which are our actual duties that get determined by the 
pro tanto duties in force.77 To illustrate, suppose that you are standing on the shore of a body of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 This distinction goes back at least to W. D. Ross (1930), although he used the terms “prima facie duties” and 
“conditional duties” to refer to what I’m calling “pro tanto duties.” This distinction is also similar to the one we 
drew in chapter 3 between pro tanto and all-things-considered justification. Just like all-things-considered 
justification, which is determined by all of the normative reasons in play, all-things-considered duties are determined 
by all of the pro tanto duties in play. Also, just like pro tanto justification, which is defeasible and provided by 
reason-constituting facts regardless of any others in play, pro tanto duties are defeasible and hold in virtue of certain 
facts. These distinctions, however, are importantly different, as one concerns justification and the other concerns 
duty. One’s justification for something may be grounded in one’s duty to do it, and if duties necessarily constitute 
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water, a stranger is drowning in the water, and you can save them with very little risk to your 
own welfare. Because you can save them at a reasonable personal cost, you have a pro tanto duty 
to save them: it is presumptively your duty to save them because you can save them at a 
reasonable personal cost, but it may or may not be your actual duty to save them because there 
may or may not be a set of other morally relevant facts that ground a pro tanto duty to do 
something else. If there is no set of such facts and thus no competing pro tanto duty, then it is 
your actual duty, not just your pro tanto duty, to save the stranger. However, if there is such a 
set—say, your friend is in the water drowning as well and you can save them at a reasonable 
personal cost—then you’ll have a pro tanto duty to save your friend instead as well as a pro tanto 
duty to save the stranger, yet you won’t have actual duties to save both if you can only save one 
(you can’t have duties to do the impossible). Rather, you’ll have an actual duty to save one of 
them, and which one you have a duty to save will depend on the relative strengths of the two pro 
tanto duties in force. If the pro tanto duty to save your friend is stronger, then you’ll have an 
actual duty to save your friend rather than the stranger, but if the pro tanto duty to save the 
stranger is stronger, then you’ll have an actual duty to save the stranger. And if neither is 
stronger—if they have equal weight—then you’ll have an actual duty to save one of them, 
although it doesn’t matter which one.  
Second, in addition to being pro tanto duties, the duties that I’m discussing here are 
moral duties. Wallace (2012) claims that the duties of love are non-moral duties, but I must 
confess that I find the concept of a non-moral duty to be an incoherent one. I understand that 
there are non-moral requirements of practical reason, of etiquette, of gender, of sports, and so on, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reasons then duty cannot fail to provide justification; but even so moral justification need not come from duty, and 
so there can be moral justification without duty. There can also be non-moral justification for things, and this 
justification would certainly not come from duty. Justification can, and more often than not does, obtain without 
duty.  
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but there are no duties or obligations other than moral ones. In other words, the concept of duty, 
as I understand it, is the concept of a moral category.78 Third, I am not merely concerned here 
with duties to loved ones and friends. Since I’m interested in addressing the normative 
significance of love and friendship, I’m interested here in whether love and friendship generate 
special pro tanto moral duties to loved ones and friends that we otherwise wouldn’t have and, if 
so, what it is that grounds these duties and how these duties stack up against others.  
Fourth and last, these duties are “special” ones compared to our “general,” “natural,” or 
“universal” duties (Annis 1987; Scheffler 1994, 1997b; Jeske 1998, 2008; Seglow 2013; Jeske 
2014), which are our duties to all other people in virtue of their personhood, such as not harming 
them without a just cause or respecting their basic rights (e.g., their rights to life and bodily 
control).79 In general, special duties are those duties that we owe to only some other people in 
virtue of something beyond their mere personhood. These special duties include promissory 
duties to those to whom we have made valid promises, contractual duties to those with whom we 
have entered into valid contracts, reparative or compensatory duties to those persons that we 
have wronged, and duties of gratitude to our benefactors.80 Also included within this category of 
special duties are what are standardly referred to as associative duties, which are duties that we 
have to our associates—our friends, romantic partners, family members, and possibly our fellow 
community members, teammates, and citizens—in virtue of the special relationships that we 
have with such people. Clearly, then, our question about whether love and friendship generate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Perhaps Wallace is using “duty” and “requirement” interchangeably. If so, then his claim that the duties of love 
are non-moral duties just amounts to the claim that the requirements of love are non-moral requirements, which is 
not an incoherent claim. It is, however, still false because, even if there are non-moral requirements of love, some of 
these requirements will be moral ones. Or so I shall be arguing soon.  
79 We could—and, I think, should—expand this conception of general duties by construing them as duties to other 
sentient creatures in virtue of their sentience. For the sake of simplicity, though, I will stick with the typical 
construal of such duties as those to all other people in virtue of their personhood.  
80 I would also include parental duties to those that we have created or adopted as a distinct category of special 
duties here.  
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special moral duties is the same as whether love and friendship generate associative duties, 
which again are a sub-class of special duties as defined in relation to our general duties. And yet 
the associative duties of love and friendship may not just be “special” in relation to our general 
duties. While they certainly are special in relation to our general duties in the sense that, unlike 
our general duties to others, which are grounded in their mere personhood, our associative duties 
of love and friendship are grounded in the special relationships that we have with loved ones and 
friends, they may be “special” in relation to our other special duties as well. Indeed, as we shall 
see, on my non-reductionist account of the associative duties of love and friendship most of these 
duties are just weightier and more stringent—and therefore special—versions of the many 
different kinds of non-associative duties just enumerated. Accordingly, on my non-reductionist 
account the associative duties of love and friendship are not just special in relation to our general 
duties by being grounded in something additional to others’ personhood (i.e., loving 
relationships and friendships). Many of them are doubly special by being special in this first 
sense as well as special in relation to other duties that, too, are special in this first sense. I will 
explain this in more detail in the next section as part of my defense of the basic thesis that love 
and friendship do indeed give rise to associative duties. To this defense I now turn.  
 
5.1 Are There Associative Duties of Love and Friendship? 
 
The answer to this question will, unsurprisingly, be controversial. Moral skeptics who 
deny the existence of genuine moral duties will of course deny that there are associative duties of 
love and friendship, yet one need not be a moral skeptic to hold such a position with respect to 
these associative duties. Under certain moral theories, for example, there will be no associative 
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duties of love and friendship because, while we have moral duties, there are no special duties at 
all. Perhaps the clearest instance of such a theory is an act-consequentialist theory claiming that 
our only duties are to do whatever has the best consequences. While love and friendship may 
have an impact on what would have the best consequences and thus on what we have duties to 
do, they will not themselves generate any associative duties to our loved ones or friends because 
all duties are of the same kind—namely, duties to do what has the best consequences. To 
illustrate, let’s look at an Act-Utilitarian account of our duties to loved ones and friends. 
According to Act-Utilitarianism, whatever maximizes overall happiness in the world has the best 
consequences, and so our duties are to maximize happiness. If we then have duties to do things 
for our loved ones and friends, which we surely do if we have duties at all, then we will have 
these duties just in case doing these things for our loved ones or friends maximizes overall 
happiness in the world. If we have the duty to generally privilege our loved ones or friends, then 
this again is because, and only because, such privileging maximizes overall happiness in the 
world. These duties to loved ones and friends, however, are no different than any other duty, as 
all duties are duties to maximize happiness. Under this theory, then, there seem to be no special 
pro tanto duties. In fact, I don’t think that there are any pro tanto duties at all, but rather only 
actual duties to maximize collective happiness, where each person’s happiness is of equal moral 
value, because an action’s promotion of some amount of happiness, H, does not seem to make it 
pro tanto optimal. In any event, since there are no special pro tanto duties, or even pro tanto 
duties at all, under Act-Utilitarianism, then there cannot be associative duties to loved ones and 
friends, which again are special pro tanto duties to loved ones and friends in virtue of our special 
relationships with them.  
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 Although the challenges of moral skepticism and act-consequentialism call for more 
extensive treatment that what I can give them here, I will push back against these positions by 
defending the associative duties of love and friendship by offering some defeasible 
phenomenological considerations in support of them along with refutations to three objections to 
the reality of these duties.81 Such a defense will be far from conclusive or comprehensive, but it 
will provide a nice tentative case for the basic thesis that love and friendship do indeed generate 
associative duties to loved ones and friends. 
One line of support for the reality of genuine moral duties in general is the experience 
that many of us have of being bound by them (Brink 1989), and we can extend this line of 
support to the associative duties of love and friendship. That is, we experience being bound by 
genuine moral duties to others, where some of these are special associative duties to loved ones 
and friends in virtue of our special relationships with them. More specifically, in virtue of our 
loving relationships and friendships we seem to have duties to our loved ones and friends that are 
(1) more extensive than our duties to others as well as (2) both graver and more stringent than 
comparable duties to others (Scheffler 1994; Lazar 2013, 2014).82 So for instance, we have no 
duties to give strangers rides home from the airport even when it would not be very burdensome 
to provide these services to strangers, yet we do seem to have such duties to our loved ones and 
friends when it would not be very burdensome for us to help them out. In this way our 
associative duties to loved ones and friends seem more extensive than our duties to others.  
Furthermore, when we have the same duties to loved ones and friends as we do to 
strangers, the former seem “graver” than the latter in the sense that the former seem to have more 
weight than the latter. So for example, we have general duties not to kill innocent people, but in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 For some good push back against act-consequentialism’s treatment of associative duties, see Brink (2001), who 
argues that act-consequentialism cannot adequately capture the scope or the weight of associative duties.   
82 The useful concepts of “gravity” and “stringency,” which I will explain shortly, come from Lazar (2013, 2014).  
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a situation where you must foreseeably yet unintentionally kill an innocent fellow civilian in a 
self-defensive attack against foreign aggression, and the choice of whom to kill is between a 
loved one or a friend and a stranger, your pro tanto duty not to kill your loved one or friend is 
weightier than your pro tanto duty not to kill the stranger because you must fulfill the former 
instead of the latter to avoid wrongdoing. Similarly, we have general duties to save people from 
drowning when it would not be too risky for us to do so, but in our familiar situation in which 
you can only save one person from drowning and your choice is between a loved one or a friend 
and a stranger, your pro tanto duty to save your loved one or friend outweighs your pro tanto 
duty to save the stranger because, again, you must fulfill the former instead of the latter to avoid 
wrongdoing. The same also applies to our promissory, contractual, compensatory, and gratitude 
duties: they weigh more when owed to loved ones or to friends compared to when they’re owed 
to strangers. Generally speaking, then, our loving relationships and friendships appear to 
“amplify” the weight of the general and special duties that we owe to loved ones and friends in 
the sense that these duties seem to weigh more than—and thus outweigh—the same duties owed 
to strangers. 
Finally, when we have the same duties to loved ones and friends as we do to strangers, 
the former seem to be “more stringent” than the latter in the sense that the former seem harder to 
disable by the personal costs of fulfillment. Returning to one of our previous examples, we have 
general duties to save people from drowning when it would not be too risky to do so, but what 
counts as “too risky” here will be easier to meet if the person needing to be saved is a stranger 
than if the person is a loved one or a friend. In other words, our pro tanto duty to save a loved 
one or friend will require more in terms of cost or risk to ourselves before such a duty is disabled 
compared to the amount required to disable the same pro tanto duty to a stranger. Just as they do 
	  155 
with the weight of duties, then, our loving relationships and friendships appear to amplify the 
stringency of the general and special duties that we owe to loved ones and friends in the sense 
that these duties are harder to disable by the personal costs of fulfillment compared to 
comparable duties owed to strangers.  
While subject to defeat, these phenomenological considerations at least create a 
reasonable presumption in favor of the basic thesis that love and friendship do indeed give rise to 
associative duties. However, there are at least three objections to this claim that must be refuted 
in order to preserve our reasonable presumption here: the voluntarist objection, the distributive 
objection, and the respect objection. In the next three subsections I will explain and address these 
three objections in order to preserve our reasonable presumption in favor of—and complete my 
provisional case for—the basic thesis that love and friendship generate associative duties.  
 
5.2 The Voluntarist Objection to the Associative Duties of Love and Friendship 
 
Let’s begin with the voluntarist objection.83 According this objection, we can only have 
special duties by voluntarily incurring them; we cannot have special duties that are imposed on 
us involuntarily. Consequently, we cannot have associative duties in virtue of special 
relationships that are imposed on us involuntarily because such duties would be involuntarily 
imposed on us if we had them in virtue of these relationships. Yet as we saw in chapter 2, love 
and friendship are not things that are completely under our voluntary control, but are rather 
things that ultimately “just happen to us.” So, since loving relationships require mutual love, 
where the latter is ultimately something outside of the parties’ control insofar as it “just happens 
to them,” loving relationships are involuntarily to at least some degree. And as something that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 This objection is discussed in Scheffler (1994, 1997a, 1997b), Brink (2001), and Seglow (2013). 
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ultimately “just happens to people,” friendship is involuntarily to at least some degree as well. 
Insofar as loving relationships and friendships are involuntary, then, they do not generate 
associative duties because such duties would be involuntarily incurred.  
 While seemingly plausible, this objection fails to demonstrate the non-existence of the 
associative duties of love and friendship for at least two reasons. First of all, this objection is 
based on the voluntarist principle that we can only have special duties voluntarily, yet this 
principle is highly problematic. It’s only clearly true if we restrict “special duties” to promissory, 
contractual, compensatory, and gratitude duties, which are obviously duties that we can only 
have voluntarily. And yet the fact that these four kinds of duty can only be had voluntarily does 
not imply that associative duties can only be had voluntarily, so this clearly true interpretation of 
the voluntarist principle cannot animate the voluntarist objection. We must instead understand 
the voluntarist principle to assert that special duties as such can only be had voluntarily, yet this 
interpretation of the principle, unlike the previous one, is highly problematic. Why should we 
grant it? Why should we believe that people must have special duties voluntarily? At this point 
the principle lacks a rationale (Brink 2001) and therefore begs the question. To avoid this, one 
may try to motivate the principle with the following argument. Special duties, qua duties, are 
burdensome, and it would be unfair for us to be saddled with those burdensome duties 
involuntarily. The unfairness of involuntarily incurred special duties, then, makes them morally 
problematic, and it seems plausible to suppose that we cannot have morally problematic moral 
duties. It therefore seems plausible to suppose that we cannot have special duties involuntarily, 
but can only have them voluntarily.  
This rationale of the voluntarist principle, however, is itself problematic. For even if we 
grant the plausible claims that (a) we cannot have morally problematic moral duties and that (b) 
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unfair moral duties are morally problematic duties, this rationale, if successful, would prove too 
much. In particular, if special duties, qua duties, are burdensome, then our general duties, qua 
duties, are also burdensome. Furthermore, if it would be unfair for us to be saddled with special 
duties involuntarily, then it would also be unfair for us to be saddled with general duties 
involuntarily. Now we clearly don’t have any way—other than suicide perhaps—to avoid our 
general duties, such as our minimal samaritan duties to do what we can to meet the basic needs 
of others at a reasonable personal cost. We have them involuntarily. It therefore follows that our 
general duties, including our minimal samaritan duties, are unfairly imposed on us, which makes 
them morally problematic duties that we then don’t really have. If this rationale for the 
voluntarist principle were successful, then, it would prove that we don’t really have any general 
duties, which I take to prove too much. Surely we at least have minimal samaritan duties as well 
as many other general moral duties (e.g., respecting liberty that doesn’t harm others). We have 
them involuntarily, yet not unfairly (Scheffler 1997b). But if it isn’t unfair for us to be saddled 
with these general duties involuntarily, then it isn’t necessarily unfair for us to be saddled with 
special duties involuntarily. Put differently, if we can have general duties involuntarily yet fairly, 
then we can have other duties, such as special associative duties, involuntarily yet fairly. This 
undermines the above rationale for the voluntarist principle, which means that the principle still 
lacks an adequate rationale.84  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 An alternative rationale may explicitly appeal to the importance of human autonomy, but I must admit that I don’t 
know how the importance of human autonomy is supposed to support the idea that duties can only be voluntarily 
incurred. Our autonomy—our capacity for self-direction or self-governance or self-determination—is morally 
important in the sense that it entitles us to what I shall call the respect of non-interference, which is a kind of respect 
that’s at least constituted by not interfering with this capacity’s free operation so long our exercise of this capacity 
isn’t running afoul of any moral constraints or obligations. Yet even if we assume that we cannot have or probably 
don’t have morally problematic moral duties, involuntarily incurred duties would not be morally problematic—and 
therefore existentially suspect—by failing to give us the respect of non-interference because they aren’t agents 
interfering with our autonomy. In order for human autonomy to ground a voluntarist principle, then, it must be 
morally important for us in some other sense that has yet to be articulated and shown to ground such a principle.  
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 Second, even if we were to grant the voluntarist principle that special duties as such can 
only be had voluntarily, the voluntarist objection still fails because loving relationships and 
friendships are sufficiently voluntary to generate associative duties (Jeske 1998; Brink 2001). 
Though it’s true that loving relationships and friendships are somewhat outside of our control 
insofar as they involve psychological realities that we cannot straightforwardly will, it’s not at all 
true that these relationships are completely outside of our control such that they aren’t 
voluntarily generated. The actions and interactions that largely make up these relationships are 
voluntary, and even their psychological realities that we cannot straightforwardly will are 
voluntarily generated in so far as we voluntarily put ourselves into the situations where these 
realities will be created or sustained. So for example, Noel and I are friends, and I certainly did 
not straightforwardly choose to love or have appraisal respect for him, which are, on my 
syndrome account of friendship, required psychological realities of us being friends. However, I 
have chosen to spend enough time interacting with Noel for these psychological realities to 
develop (and continue) as a result of such interaction. The interactions that we’ve had were 
voluntarily entered into, and even though I couldn’t straightforwardly choose to love him or have 
appraisal respect for him, I still chose the interactions that led to me loving and having appraisal 
respect for him. Our friendship, then, may be partly outside of our control because the requisite 
psychological realities are not just things that we can straightforwardly choose to happen, but 
since these realities were formed as a result of voluntary choice, our friendship itself was still 
voluntarily generated, and so our friendship is sufficiently voluntary to generate associative 
duties. Generalizing, then, we can say that even though parts of our loving relationships and 
friendships are somewhat outside of our control, the relationships are still generated by voluntary 
choices, and so they’re sufficiently voluntary to generate special associative duties. 
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Now at this point, one may be tempted to cite certain cases of loving relationships 
between parents and young children as counterexamples to this second response to the 
voluntarist objection. After all, the younger the children, the less choice they’ve had when it 
comes to interacting with their parents in ways that will create loving parent-child relationships, 
and so any associative duties that the children may have toward their parents would be 
involuntarily incurred. However, the younger the children, the less likely they are to be moral 
agents with moral duties, and so even if younger children will have less choice to interact with 
their parents, they will not be saddled with involuntary associative duties if they are too young to 
have any moral duties at all. In order for a parent-child relationship of mutual love to constitute a 
genuine counterexample to this response to the voluntarist objection, the child involved must be 
a sufficiently developed moral agent with moral duties that has, at the same time, found herself 
with associative duties toward her parent that were not generated by her voluntary choices. Such 
a counterexample, however, may not be so easy to find given that the likelihood of choice when 
it comes to interacting with one’s parents in ways that create or sustain a loving relationship is 
going to be positively correlated with the development of duty-bearing moral agency. That is, 
when there is no duty-bearing moral agency, there will be very little to no choice when it comes 
to interacting with one’s parents in the relevant ways, and so there can’t be any involuntarily 
incurred associative duties even though there is little to no voluntary choice. Conversely, as this 
duty-bearing moral agency develops, the possibility of choice when it comes to interacting with 
one’s parents in the relevant ways at some point emerges and continues, after this point, to 
increase in likelihood. In any event, no such counterexample has yet been offered, and so the 
second response to the voluntarist objection remains undefeated. (And even if it could be 
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defeated, this wouldn’t matter much because the voluntarist objection still fails in light of the 
first response to it that I offered.)  
 
5.3 The Distributive Objection to the Associative Duties of Love and Friendship 
 
Next we have the distributive objection, which will receive the most treatment of the 
three given its complexity and strength.85 As the name suggests, this objection is animated by a 
concern for distributive justice (i.e., a fair distribution of burdens and benefits). In order to 
understand this objection, we must first return to our earlier characterization of the associative 
duties of love and friendship as those duties to loved ones and friends in virtue of our loving 
relationships and friendships that are, on the one hand, more extensive than our duties to others, 
and on the other are both graver and more stringent than comparable duties to others. Now these 
associative duties give our loved ones and friends, respectively, more extensive and stronger 
moral claims on us compared to the moral claims that strangers have on us, which are 
correspondingly less extensive and weaker.86 To briefly illustrate, let’s return again to two 
familiar situations. In one situation I have a pro tanto duty to pick Bethany up from the airport, 
whereas I have no such pro tanto duty to strangers. Now corresponding to this asymmetry is an 
asymmetry in moral claims: strangers have no moral claim to a ride home from the airport, yet 
Bethany does have such a claim. She therefore has more extensive moral claims compared to 
strangers in virtue of our romantic partnership. In the other situation, you can only save one 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 This objection is discussed in Scheffler (1994, 1997a, 1997b, 1999), Brink (2001), Lazar (2009), and Seglow 
(2013).  
86 I am not sure if these “moral claims” here should be understood as claim-rights. One reason for thinking that they 
should not be understood as claim-rights is that, if they were such rights, then this would effectively render all moral 
duties as duties of justice, but these do not seem to be the only duties that we have. To be sure, some of our moral 
claims on others are based on our moral rights, but the moral claims that we generally have on others are probably 
better understood as correlates of the duties that they have to us, where these duties could be, yet need not be, 
grounded in our rights.  
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person from drowning and your choice is between a loved one or a friend and a stranger, yet 
your pro tanto duty to save your loved one or friend (1) outweighs your pro tanto duty to save the 
stranger and (2) is harder to disable by the personal costs of fulfillment. Because the pro tanto 
duty to save your loved one or friend outweighs the pro tanto duty to save the stranger and is 
harder to disable by the personal costs of fulfillment, the stranger has a weaker moral claim to 
your rescue compared to your loved one or friend.  
There is, then, an asymmetry in moral claims that associative duties to loved ones and 
friends would generate: they would give our loved ones and friends stronger and more extensive 
moral claims on us compared to the moral claims that strangers have on us. Now, since these 
moral claims are resources—namely, normative resources (Scheffler 1997a)—associative duties 
would effectively create an unequal distribution of these resources, and it’s this inequality in 
normative resources that animate the distributive objection. In particular, this objection questions 
the fairness of this distributional inequality, but the exact way that it does so is open to two 
different interpretations.87  
One interpretation is a prioritarian one. Since loving relationships and friendships are 
valuable things, the insiders of these relationships benefit largely just by having them. At the 
same time, however, the outsiders to these relationships do not benefit from these relationships, 
and so the insiders of these relationships have an advantage over the outsiders in this regard.88 
And yet, as we just saw in the previous paragraph, these relationships are supposed to give rise to 
duties that the insiders have to each other that, in turn, give these insiders more extensive and 
stronger moral claims on each other compared to the moral claims that outsiders have on them. 
Overall, then, the insiders of these special relationships are not only better off than outsiders in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The two slightly different interpretations of the distributive objection that I’m about to discuss come from 
Scheffler’s many essays discussing this objection.  
88 I borrow the labels “insiders” and “outsiders” from Brink (2001). 
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virtue of participating in the relationships themselves, but they receive extra benefits in the form 
of more extensive and stronger moral claims on one another that make them better off than the 
outsiders even more, whose claims on the insiders are accordingly less extensive and weaker. But 
this, according to this first interpretation of the distributive objection, is unfair to outsiders 
because it effectively makes them, the worse-off, even more worse off: since they are already 
disadvantaged compared to insiders just by being outsiders, they are disadvantaged even more 
compared to insiders by having their moral claims on insiders weakened and rendered less 
extensive due to the more extensive and stronger moral claims that the insiders have on one 
another.   
 The other interpretation of the distributive objection is more straightforwardly egalitarian 
in spirit. According to Scheffler (1994), the distributive objection is animated by the ideal of 
equality, or the idea that all people are of equal moral value and importance. So, as matter of 
justice or fairness, people are to be given equal moral concern, where this in turn means that 
there should be, for any given bearer of moral duties to others, an equal distribution of the 
corresponding moral claims on the moral concern of that duty-bearer. Clearly, however, the 
distributional inequalities that arise from associative duties contravene this ideal of equality, and 
so they appear to be unfair. Though I am skeptical of this ideal of equality as a fundamental 
moral truth,89 there is surely at least a justified presumption in favor of human equality: people 
are to be given equal moral concern, and therefore have equal moral claims on others, unless 
there is a legitimate moral explanation that demonstrates otherwise. As such, there is at least a 
presumptive unfairness in the distributional inequalities of moral claims that result from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 My skepticism is based, on the one hand, on obvious counterexamples: the Hitlers and sociopaths of the world are 
not as morally valuable or important as virtuous people. On the other hand, the prospects of finding a rationale for 
even the weaker claim that all people have equal basic or unearned moral worth, which is compatible with denying 
that all people have equal moral worth overall, are rather dim. For discussions of these dim prospects see Arneson 
(1999) and (2015).   
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associative duties of love and friendship, as there has been no legitimate moral explanation 
provided as of yet that shows such inequalities to be fair. 
 The upshot of the distributive objection in either case, then, is that the distributional 
inequalities in moral claims that necessarily result from the associative duties of love and 
friendship appear to be unfair, and therefore unjust; and so the distributive objection purports to 
locate a systematic tension between distributive justice and the associative duties of love and 
friendship. This surely makes these alleged duties morally problematic duties, and so, given 
again the plausible assumption that we cannot have morally problematic moral duties, it follows 
that we don’t really have the associative duties of love and friendship.90  
 Although apparently quite forceful, this objection also fails to show the non-existence of 
the associative duties of love and friendship. For starters, this objection is partly based on the 
implicit assumption—which in turn is based on the Schefflerian idea that moral claims are a kind 
of resource—that the moral claims that we have on each other corresponding to the moral duties 
that we have to each other are part of the currency of distributive justice, such that any inequality 
in the distribution of these claims constitutes at least a presumptive distributional unfairness. It 
is, however, quite dubious—if not downright mistaken—to treat the moral claims that we have 
on each other as a resource to be included in the currency of distributive justice (Lazar 2009). 
After all, even if these moral claims can be thought of as “normative resources,” they are not 
actual resources that we can straightforwardly use to better our lives in some way. We can of 
course press our moral claims on others, and this may result in an improvement in our lot, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 I have yet to see the idea that we cannot have morally problematic duties explicitly articulated as a key premise of 
both the voluntarist and distributive objections, but I don’t see how they can be objections to the reality of 
associative duties of any stripe without such a premise. At any rate, I take it that both of these objections rely on 
such a key premise. Also, I’m obviously interpreting the distributive objection as aiming to show that we don’t 
actually have associative duties of love and friendship rather than aiming to show that such duties are real yet 
systematically overridden by considerations of distributive justice. I interpret the objection in this manner because 
it’s supposed to be an objection to the duties themselves rather than our acting in accordance with such duties.  
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whether this happens is due to the actions of those upon which we press our claims rather than 
our own actions. We cannot straightforwardly use our moral claims upon others as we could use 
freedoms, opportunities, wealth, income, or other plausible candidates for the currency of 
distributive justice.  
Moreover, I know of no prominent philosophical theory of distributive justice that 
includes moral claims on others as part of the currency of distributive justice. Let’s start with 
John Rawls’ (1971) “justice as fairness” theory, which is surely the most prominent theory of 
justice here. It effectively claims that certain liberties, opportunities to secure positions of social 
and economic advantage, wealth, income, and the social bases of self-respect constitute the 
currency of distributive justice. By contrast, Robert Nozick’s (1974) “entitlement theory,” which 
is arguably the most famous rival to Rawls’ theory, effectively claims that material possessions 
over which we can have property rights constitute the currency of distributive justice. And 
similarly, Ronald Dworkin’s (1981) “equality of resources” theory claims that material resources 
constitute this currency. Then there’s the so-called “capabilities approach” to the currency of 
distributive justice fathered by Amartya Sen and adopted by well-known theorists such as 
Elizabeth Anderson (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2003), which holds that capabilities—
roughly, actual abilities to be or do certain valuable things—are the currency of distributive 
justice. And despite the differences among these theories, they all effectively agree that moral 
claims on others are not part of the currency of distributive justice. Now these theories may all be 
mistaken about the currency of distributive justice, but the fact that all of these plausible, well-
known, influential theories converge on the same negative verdict for including moral claims in 
the currency of distributive justice casts serious doubt on the already dubious assumption made 
by the distributive objection that moral claims are part of this currency.  
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 Though we may not need to say anything more to defeat the distributive objection, there 
are at least two other ways of refuting it. One way comes from David Brink (2001), and the basic 
idea of his rebuttal is that the distributive objection focuses only on the moral benefits that 
insiders receive from associative duties and mistakenly ignores the moral burdens that such 
duties place on insiders as well. More specifically, associative duties place extra moral demands 
on insiders compared to general duties because (1) associative duties are more extensive than 
general duties and (2) associative duties are more stringent than general duties in the sense that 
the former are harder to disable by the personal costs of fulfillment than the latter are. 
Accordingly, even if insiders to loving relationships and friendships gain moral benefits in the 
form of more extensive and stronger moral claims on each other compared to the claims of 
outsiders on them, insiders are also saddled with the increased moral burdens of having extra 
moral demands placed on them. These moral burdens, then, balance out the moral benefits, and 
so the latter does not result in a net moral advantage for the insiders and thus does not result in an 
unfair moral advantage over outsiders. Put differently, once we factor in the moral burdens of the 
associative duties of love and friendship, which are burdens that insiders have and outsiders 
don’t, then there will be no tension between these duties and distributive justice because, even if 
there is an unequal distribution of moral benefits (or moral claims) between insiders and 
outsiders that favor the insiders, there’s also an unequal distribution of moral burdens (or moral 
duties) between insiders and outsiders that favors the outsiders, which when combined result in 
neither the insiders or outsiders being the better off in terms of their share of moral burdens and 
benefits.  
Alternatively, even if we were to grant that insiders do have a net advantage over 
outsiders and thus that there is an overall inequality between insiders and outsiders (insiders, 
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after all, have the benefits of the relationships themselves as well), we can still defeat the 
distributive objection to the associative duties of love and friendship with the following rebuttal. 
First notice that the more extensive and stronger moral claims that insiders to loving 
relationships and friendships are supposed to have on each other compared to the moral claims 
that outsiders have on these insiders must arise from the associative duties of love and friendship, 
which in turn would necessarily arise from the loving relationships and friendships themselves. If 
there are associative duties of love and friendship, then, the moral claims that necessarily arise 
from them along with the relationships that necessarily give rise to the duties (and thus to the 
claims as well) are metaphysically packaged goods such that they cannot be metaphysically 
disentangled from one another. Let’s call these packages of goods the “associative packages” of 
love and friendship.  
Notice next that these associative packages are not appropriate objects to which anyone 
could be entitled as a matter of justice: no one is so entitled to a loving relationship or a 
friendship with another person, so no one could be so entitled to any associative package that’s 
constituted by such a relationship with another person and the moral claims that come with it.91 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 One possible challenge to this claim is the idea that children are entitled, as a matter of justice, to loving 
relationships with their parents—or at least some parental figure—and thus to the associative packages that are 
constituted by these relationships and the moral claims that come with them. This idea, however, is not clearly true, 
as children are not clearly entitled to full-blown loving relationships even if they are entitled to things that would 
occur within such relationships, such as having their basic needs met. Moreover, if some child’s parents die, yet they 
are entitled to loving relationships with a parental figure, then it would follow that they suffer an injustice if no one 
steps up and enters into a loving relationship with them. But even if it is sad and unfortunate for no one to step up 
here, it’s not clearly an injustice. Furthermore, suppose that children are entitled to loving relationships with their 
parents or some parental figures, such that these relationships—and thus the moral claims that come with them—
constitute part of the currency of distributive justice. Even so, we would still generally not be entitled to loving 
relationships or friendships with other people, and so the argument I’m making here would still generally hold up. 
Also, any unjust distribution of these relationships and their associated moral claims among children would not 
result from an inherent tension between the associative duties generated by these relationships and distributive 
justice. There would be no such tension because these duties do not necessarily generate distributional inequality in 
the moral claims that children have on their loving parental figures. If all parents survived and were appropriately 
wired so that they try to enter into loving relationships with their children and succeed in doing so, then there would 
be no injustice in the distribution of these relationships or the moral claims upon parents that come with them. Any 
injustice here would be the result of other factors, such as parents dying (or leaving) and no one stepping in to take 
their place, or parents not being sufficiently equipped to have loving relationships with their children. The upshot 
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At most one could be entitled to a sufficient level of opportunity to secure the associative 
packages of love or friendship. And yet, even if this were so—and it’s not clear that it is because 
it’s not clear that such opportunity is part of the currency of distributive justice—the associative 
duties of love and friendship would no longer be existentially suspect because they’d no longer 
be morally problematic. For if we were entitled only to sufficient levels of opportunity to secure 
the associative packages of love and friendship, then any unfair inequalities in the moral claims 
of these packages would really be generated by the unfair or unjust conditions that led to them—
namely, the unjust distribution of opportunities to secure the associative packages of love and 
friendship—rather than the associative duties of love and friendship. Fair initial conditions with 
respect to the opportunity to secure the associative packages of love and friendship will generate 
no unfair inequalities in the distribution of these packages and thus no unfair inequalities in the 
distribution of moral claims. This ultimately reveals the lack of a systematic or inherent tension 
between distributive justice and the associative duties of love and friendship and thereby 
undermines the charge that these duties are morally problematic ones.   
 
5.4 The Respect Objection to the Associative Duties of Love and Friendship 
 
This brings us to the respect objection.92 Suppose we have two white supremacists that 
are friends or romantic partners only because they’re white people that share a passion for white 
supremacy and that spend a healthy amount of time together talking the white supremacy talk 
and treating non-whites as such with disrespect. Would these people owe special associative 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
here, then, is that this challenge either rests on a false premise about children being entitled to loving relationships, 
in which case it fails, or else its premise is true, in which case I would only need to reformulate my argument in 
order to get the same result that there’s no inherent tension between distributive justice and the associative duties of 
love and friendship.  
92 This objection is introduced in Seglow (2013).  
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duties to each other? It may not seem like it given that such duties would presumably be morally 
problematic due to the deplorable basis and contents of the special relationships that would 
generate them. But if there wouldn’t be associative duties in these cases, then why would there 
be such duties in other cases? If we have good reason to doubt that there’d be associative duties 
in cases of love or friendship where the relationships are based on or involve severe failures of 
respect toward other people, then we have good reason to doubt that there are associative duties 
of love and friendship at all.  
 Like the other two objections, this one does not provide sufficient grounds for doubting 
or rejecting the existence of the associative duties of love and friendship. At most this objection 
provides good grounds for believing that there are no associative duties of love or friendship in 
some cases and thus that love and friendship per se do not generate associative duties. Even so, 
however, there can still be associative duties of love and friendship in other cases—namely, 
those in which the relationships are not based in severe failures of disrespect toward other 
people. In fact, I see no reason at this point to think that there cannot be moral constraints on the 
kinds of loving relationships or friendships that can generate associative duties; indeed, this 
objection suggests that there are such constraints (namely, that these relationships must have 
morally acceptable grounds before they can generate associative duties).93  
Furthermore, this objection does not even provide sufficient grounds to believe that there 
are no associative duties of love or friendship in cases where the relevant relationships are based 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Further support for this comes from the fact that there are moral constraints on duty-generating promises and 
agreements. A promise to the KKK to work toward the purification of the white race, for instance, does not generate 
a promissory duty to work toward this despicable goal. And agreeing to murder an innocent person in exchange for a 
healthy amount of money does not generate a contractual duty to murder. Making promises or entering contracts of 
moral disrespect do not generate promissory or contractual duties, but this doesn’t at all suggest that there are no 
promissory or contractual duties. Rather, it only goes to show that there are moral constraints on the kinds of 
promises or agreements that can generate special promissory or contractual duties. At most, then, the respect 
objection shows that there are analogous moral constraints on the kinds of special relationships that can generate 
associative duties.  
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on severe failures of moral respect toward others. Though it’s true that certain loving 
relationships and friendships may be partly grounded in morally disrespectful attitudes toward 
others, it’s not at all clear that this implies that they cannot generate associative duties because 
such duties would be morally problematic. It may seem plausible to think that these duties would 
be problematic because of the morally problematic relationships that generate them, but we can’t 
reject compensatory duties as morally problematic ones just because the conditions that generate 
them are morally problematic (such duties aren’t morally problematic despite the morally 
problematic conditions that generate them). In fact, these duties demonstrate that we cannot infer 
that duties would be morally problematic from the fact that those duties would be generated by 
morally problematic conditions, which means that we cannot infer that the associative duties of 
love and friendship would be morally problematic from the fact that the relevant relationships are 
morally problematic.  
At this point, however, one may think that the associative duties of love and friendship in 
cases where the relevant relationships are partly grounded in severe failures of moral respect 
toward others would still be morally problematic—and thus actually non-existent—based on the 
following kind of reasoning. Let’s return to our familiar scenario in which two people are 
drowning in the water, and there’s a person on the shore who can save either of the two people, 
but not both, at a reasonable personal cost. Let’s also say that one of the drowning people is a 
friend or a loved one of the person on the shore, while the other drowning person is a stranger. 
Now as we’ve seen, the person on the shore has a pro tanto duty to save her friend or loved one 
that’s stronger (i.e., graver and more stringent) than her pro tanto duty to save the stranger 
precisely because of the difference in their statuses (one person is a friend/loved one while the 
other is a stranger). But now let’s suppose further that the person on the shore and her 
	  170 
friend/loved one are both white supremacists, while the other drowning person does not have 
morally objectionable attitudes toward any group of people. Does the person on the shore still 
have a stronger pro tanto duty to save her friend or loved one over the stranger? If the person on 
the shore has associative duties to her fellow white supremacist friends or loved ones, then she 
must still have a stronger pro tanto duty to save her friend or loved one over the stranger, yet this 
doesn’t seem right precisely because of the difference in the moral characters of the people 
drowning. In fact, given this difference, it seems that the person on the shore actually has a 
stronger pro tanto duty to save the stranger over the friend or loved one.  
Although there’s much truth to this new line of reasoning, it still does not show that there 
are no associative duties of love and friendship in those cases where the relevant relationships 
are partly based in failures of moral respect. For in the very complicated case in question, we can 
grant both that the person on the shore has a pro tanto duty to save her friend or loved one over 
the stranger precisely because of the difference in their statuses as well as a pro tanto duty to 
save the stranger over the friend or loved one precisely because of the difference in their moral 
characters. That is, because one person is a friend or loved one while the other is a stranger, the 
former person has a stronger claim to rescue. At the same time, however, because the other 
person has a much better moral character than the friend or the loved one, she has a stronger 
claim to rescue. In fact, given how much of a difference there is in moral character between the 
drowning parties, I’m inclined to think that it’s more morally important, all-things-considered, to 
save the stranger over the friend or loved one, and so we can still get the overall verdict of this 
case correct while granting that there are still associative duties that the white supremacists owe 
one another. What we generally have to remember about these associative duties is that they’re 
pro tanto duties that may be overridden by other pro tanto duties, and that, in cases of associative 
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duties between white supremacists or other morally rotten individuals, these duties may be quite 
likely to be overridden by competing pro tanto duties. We therefore need not think that the 
associative duties of love and friendship in the cases at issue here will morally require morally 
reprehensible people to privilege each other over others.  
In the end, then, none of these three objections to the associative duties of love and 
friendship succeed, and so the reasonable presumption in favor of the basic thesis that love and 
friendship generate associative duties remains undefeated. We shall therefore proceed on this 
presumption and inquire next into the grounds of these associative duties.  
 
5.5 The Grounds of the Associative Duties of Love and Friendship 
 
Following terminology from Scheffler (1997b) and Wallace (2012), we can separate 
those who believe in the associative duties of love and friendship into reductionists and non-
reductionists with respect to the grounds of such duties. According to reductionists, the 
associative duties of love and friendship can effectively be reduced to some other kind of duty. 
So for example, Annis (1987) reconstructs the foundation of friendship as mutual voluntary 
pledging, which amounts to reconstructing the formation of friendship as the result of mutual 
promises made between the parties. The associative duties of friendship under this 
reconstruction, then, would be grounded in voluntary promises and would therefore be 
promissory duties. And we could of course extend this kind of reconstruction to loving 
relationships, which would make the associative duties of both love and friendship into 
promissory duties. Alternatively, one could maintain that the associative duties of love and 
friendship are really just contractual duties or, instead, are just duties to meet the expectations 
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that you’ve knowingly and intentionally led others to have about your behavior.94 Generally 
speaking, then, reductionists maintain that the associative duties of love and friendship, while 
genuine pro tanto special duties, are nevertheless reducible to other kinds of special duties that 
can be found outside of loving relationships and friendships.  
By contrast, non-reductionists deny that the associative duties of love and friendship can 
be reduced to some other kind of special duty and instead maintain that these duties are sui 
generis, irreducible special duties. Yet there is still considerable disagreement among non-
reductionists with respect to the exact grounds of such duties. According to Samuel Scheffler 
(1997b), who is arguably the original non-reductionist here, such duties are grounded in loving 
relationships and friendships that we have net reason to value.95 Similarly, Diane Jeske (1998, 
2008, 2017) believes that the associative duties of love and friendship are grounded in intimate 
loving relationships and friendships. According to David Brink (2001), certain interpersonal 
psychological relations obtaining between insiders to special relationships ground associative 
duties in the same way that certain intrapersonal psychological relations that ground our 
persistence as persons over time ground the demands of prudence. However, according to Simon 
Keller (2006, 2013) and Jonathan Seglow (2013), the associative duties of love and friendship 
are grounded in the special goods that only the insiders to these relationships can provide each 
other. And, as I understand Seth Lazar’s (2014) non-reductionism, the associative duties of love 
and friendship are grounded in the fact that the actions demanded by the duties are appropriate 
responses to the valuable relationships that we share with our loved ones and friends. And last 
there is my view briefly described at the beginning of this chapter, which is the most similar to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 Jeske (2014) discusses, though does not endorse, these kinds of reductionism. And similarly, Wallace (2012) 
discusses, though does not endorse, the latter kind of reductionism.   
95 Scheffler actually argues for the more general claim that associative duties are grounded in special relationships 
that we have net reason to value. It follows from this general claim, though, that the associative duties of love and 
friendship are grounded in the relevant kinds of relationships that we have net reason to value.  
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Jeske’s view. Like Jeske, I think that intimate loving relationships and friendships ground the 
associative duties thereof, but unlike her view, which seems to ground such duties directly in 
these relationships, my view grounds such duties directly in the agent-relatively augmented 
moral statuses that loved ones and friends have in virtue of our special relationships with them. 
On my view, then, our loving relationships and friendships indirectly ground the associative 
duties of love and friendship by directly grounding the augmented moral statuses of our loved 
ones and friends, which in turn directly grounds the associative duties of love and friendship. In 
the remainder of this subsection I will motivate my view by leveling criticisms against the 
reductionist views and the other non-reductionist views that do not get any traction on my 
view.96  
The reductionist views of the associative duties of love and friendship briefly described 
above are problematic for at least four reasons. First of all, they’re counterintuitive insofar as the 
associative duties of love and friendship, like all associative duties, seem to be fundamentally 
different from the other kinds of special duties to which reductionists seek to reduce them.97 
Second, they’re problematic because loving relationships and friendships are not actually 
generated by simple, discrete actions in the way that promissory, contractual, or expectation 
obligations are generated by voluntary promises, agreements, or expectation-generating actions 
(Jeske 1998). Though loving relationships and friendships are generated in some sense by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 For Jeske, there is no deeper story to tell about how or why intimate loving relationships and friendships generate 
the associative duties thereof. Just like promises, which directly and brutely generate pro tanto duties to keep them, 
loving relationships and friendships directly and brutely generate associative duties. My view slightly diverges from 
this by claiming that (a) it’s the agent-relatively augmented moral statuses of loved ones and friends in virtue of our 
intimate relationships with them that generate the associative duties of love and friendship, and that (b) there is no 
deeper story to tell about these duties. Now this lack of a deeper story here may sound unsatisfying, but as I will 
essentially argue later on my story here avoids the problems with its rivals, which gives it the strongest claim to truth 
despite the fact that it goes no deeper than it does.  
97 Seglow (2013) appears to level this first criticism against reductionism when he claims that it’s at odds with the 
phenomenology of moral experience, while Wallace (2012) appears to level this same criticism by claiming that 
reductionism is at odds with the “normative appearances” of things.  
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voluntary choices, we’ve seen that they are really generated by a complex mix of choice and 
fortune, which is not how other special duties are generated. Given the different way that loving 
relationships and friendships are generated, then, it would be a mistake to assimilate the 
associative duties of these relationships to other kinds of special duties.  
Third, these reductionist views cannot capture the gravity of our associative duties of love 
and friendship (Bazargan-Forward, forthcoming). Suppose, for example, that these associative 
duties are really just promissory duties in disguise. My associative duty to, say, protect my 
spouse Bethany from harm would then be a promissory duty to protect her from harm. But now 
suppose that I have promised two strangers that I would protect them from harm such that I now 
have promissory duties to them both to protect them from harm. If I then face a runaway trolley 
situation where Bethany is on one track and the two strangers on are on the other and I get to 
decide which track the trolley is going to head down, I have to decide to keep my promise to 
Bethany or to the two strangers. If my associative duty to Bethany is just a promissory duty in 
disguise, then surely my promissory duties to the two strangers would collectively outweigh the 
same promissory duty to Bethany given that each of those two duties seems equivalent to my 
duty to Bethany, yet this does not seem right—my associative duty to protect Bethany from harm 
seems to outweigh my promissory duties to the strangers.98 And something similar is true if we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Bazargan-Forward offers a different set of cases to make this point against reductionism. Suppose that you can 
either save your daughter or three strangers from starvation at a reasonable personal cost. If associative duties were 
promissory duties, then your associative duty to save your daughter would be a promissory duty to save her, and if 
so then it would not outweigh your general duties to save the strangers instead. One can see this by looking at a 
different case where you can either save a stranger that you’ve promised to save or three strangers to which you’ve 
made no such promise. In this case your general duties to the three strangers would outweigh your promissory duty 
to save the other stranger. The same would then be true of your associative duty to your daughter given that it’s a 
promissory duty, yet this seems wrong: your associative duty to save your daughter outweighs your general duties to 
save the strangers instead. Although I agree with the point that these cases are trying to make, I’ve chosen not to rely 
on these cases because I’m not sure if they really demonstrate reductionism’s inability to capture the gravity of 
associative duties. The main problem is that they presume that a promissory duty to save a stranger would not 
outweigh general duties to save three other strangers, yet it’s not entirely clear that this is true. In fact, if it’s not true, 
then the reductionist could flip these cases on their head in favor of reductionism by arguing that (a) a promissory 
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say instead that the associative duties of love and friendship are just contractual duties or duties 
of expectation in disguise. If I’m a bodyguard getting paid to protect some family from harm and 
I again face a runaway trolley situation where I have to choose whether the trolley will crash into 
Bethany or the family I’m paid to protect and thereby expected to protect, then if my associative 
duty to protect Bethany is just a contractual or expectation duty in disguise, then again my 
contractual or expectation duties to protect the family members would outweigh my contractual 
or expectation duty to protect Bethany. Either result, however, seems wrong: my associative duty 
to protect my beloved spouse would outweigh my contractual or expectation duties to the family.  
Fourth, it’s not clear how these reductionist views can account for the fact that our 
promissory, contractual, and expectation obligations to our loved ones and friends are special—
i.e., graver and more stringent—versions of those very obligations. So for example, when we 
make promises to our loved ones or friends, our corresponding obligations to keep those 
promises are graver and more stringent compared to the obligations that we would have to 
strangers for making those same promises. But how can this be if associative duties to loved ones 
and friends are just promissory duties in disguise? How do the promises that I make to loved 
ones and friends carry more moral significance than those made to strangers? If associative 
duties are just promissory duties in disguise, our loved ones and friends are those that we have 
special associative duties to just because we’ve made implicit promises to them that generate 
these duties, and it’s hard to see how this would give our explicit promises to these individuals 
more moral significance than the same promises to strangers to which we’ve made no implicit 
promises.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
duty to save the stranger does outweigh the general duties to save the three other strangers, and therefore (b) your 
associative duty to save your daughter, as an analogous promissory duty, does so as well, which is the right result.  
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Next let’s look at the non-reductionist views, and let’s begin with Keller’s (2006, 2013) 
“special goods” view along with Seglow’s (2013) very similar “relationship goods” view. 
According to the special-goods view, the insiders to special relationships can provide goods to 
their fellow insiders that outsiders cannot provide. It is good, for example, for a stranger to help 
Jill meet her basic needs, but it’s even better if Jill’s friend or loved one helps her meet those 
same basic needs. It is good for me to give strangers rides home from the airport, but it’s even 
better if friends or loved ones take those same strangers home instead. Generally speaking, then, 
when our friends and loved ones do beneficial things for us, it has more value than if strangers 
did those same beneficial things for us. This is at least one sense in which our loved ones and 
friends can provide “special” goods for us. Also, there are arguably certain benefits that only our 
friends and loved ones can provide. As an illustrative example, consider someone who wants to 
go have fun at a concert but will not have fun unless she goes with someone to the show. 
Chances are she will not have the fun time that she is after with just any old person; instead, she 
will probably need to go with a friend or perhaps a loved one in order to have a good time. In this 
case, then, it is only the person’s friends or loved ones that can provide the benefit that the 
person is after here, and this is another sense in which our loved ones and friends can provide 
“special” goods for us.  
Furthermore, according to the special-goods view, it is the provision of special goods that 
ground our associative duties of love and friendship: it is because we can provide special goods 
to our loved ones or friends by doing certain things that we have associative duties to do those 
things. So if, say, I have an associative duty to pick up Bethany from the airport, then it’s 
because my picking her up has more value than anyone else picking her up. In other words, my 
picking her up constitutes a special good, one that no one else can provide, and this is why I have 
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an associative duty to pick her up from the airport. Also, if I have a pro tanto associative duty to 
rescue Bethany from drowning that’s weightier than my pro tanto general duty to rescue a 
stranger instead, this is because the value of me rescuing Bethany is higher than the value of me 
rescuing the stranger instead. In other words, the good of me rescuing Bethany is a special good, 
and this is why I have a special associative duty to rescue her over the stranger.  
The relationship-goods view, by contrast, maintains that the insiders to special 
relationships can co-produce and co-enjoy certain goods that, as the name of the theory suggests, 
can only be so produced by the insiders to such relationships. Only two friends, for instance, can 
co-produce the shared experiences of friendship, which are goods that can only be enjoyed 
within the special relationships of friendships. Friends can also co-produce the good of mutual 
concern, but such a good can be co-produced by insiders to loving relationships of many kinds as 
well. And it is the unique ability of insiders to co-produce these kinds of goods that ground their 
associative duties to one another. That is, it’s because we can produce or sustain certain 
relationship goods with certain actions that we have associative duties to perform those actions. 
So for example, Bethany and I have associative duties to meet each other’s basic needs, and we 
have these duties to perform the requisite actions because they produce or sustain relationship 
goods (such as, perhaps, mutual concern and intimacy). Very much like the special-goods view, 
then, the relationship-goods view holds that special goods that can only be produced within 
relationships ground associative duties such that we have such duties to do certain things because 
those things result in special goods.  
Both of these views, however, run into some serious problems. For starters, the 
relationship-goods view is based on the misguided idea that associative duties are only positive 
duties to associates that go beyond what we owe people in general, which is an 
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oversimplification of such duties (Scheffler 1994). Though we surely do have such positive 
associative duties, some of our associative duties, as we’ve seen, are just graver and more 
stringent versions of our general duties, and some of these duties are negative ones (i.e., not to 
kill unjustly). Furthermore, both views ground associative duties in the realization of goodness, 
yet this is problematic because it’s not at all clear that the mere realization of goodness—even 
special goodness—can give us a duty to do something. Friends can co-produce the relationship 
good of friendship experiences, but are we morally obligated to have such experiences? It 
doesn’t seem like it even though they would be relationship goods. Likewise, it would be a 
special good for many people if Lady Gaga came and cut the turkey at Thanksgiving even 
though she isn’t obligated to do this for anyone. Some duties may realize special goods, but this 
probably isn’t why they’re duties.  
Another problem with these two views, as Jeske (2014, 2015) points out, is that they 
threaten to collapse into consequentialism: if the realization of special goods is what grounds 
duty, then wouldn’t the most of it, impartially construed, ground duty? It certainly seems like it, 
but this would deliver the wrong verdict in certain cases where one should still privilege their 
loved ones or friends over strangers even though that wouldn’t realize the most in terms of 
special goods. By way of illustration, suppose that you can help save your loved one from 
drowning or you can help another person save two of their loved ones from drowning.99 If the 
realization of special goods is what grounds duty, then it seems as if we’d have a duty to help the 
other person save two of their loved ones rather than save our own loved one because that would 
realize the most in terms of special goods. But surely we have an associative duty to save our 
own loved one and let the strangers fend for themselves, one that outweighs any duty we may 
have to help save the strangers from drowning instead.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 This case comes from Jeske and Fumerton (1997).  
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 Finally, two more problems with these views are that they threaten to (a) obligate us to do 
what we can to enter into loving relationships or friendships and (b) strip these relationships of 
their moral significance. If relationship goods or other special goods are the grounds of 
associative duties such that we have these duties to perform certain actions because those actions 
realize or sustain relationship goods or other special goods, then two problematic things appear 
to follow. First of all, if we aren’t in a loving relationship or friendship with someone but could 
co-produce relationships goods with that person or provide that person with special goods if we 
were in such a relationship with them, then we would surely be obligated to try to enter into such 
a relationship with that person because doing so is the first step in co-producing relationship 
goods with them or providing them with special goods, which we are obligated to do under the 
two theories in question. However, it is surely demanding too much of us to obligate us to try to 
enter into loving relationships or friendships with other people. Given their intimacy, their 
demands, and their potential psychological costs, they are not the kind of things that we could be 
required to try to enter into on pain of moral failure. Second, if we can co-produce relationship 
goods with someone or provide them with special goods, then it doesn’t seem to matter if we are 
currently in the kind of relationship with them that would make the realization of these goods 
imminently possible. That is, if the realization of relationship goods or other special goods is 
what grounds associative duties such that our ability to realize these goods with certain actions is 
what obligates us to perform those actions, then it is our ability to realize such goods, rather than 
being in the kinds of relationships that make the realization of such goods imminently possible, 
that has moral significance for us. The relevant kinds of relationships are still necessary for 
realizing relationship goods or other special goods, but they no longer have moral significance in 
the sense that they no longer generate special moral duties.   
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 Next let’s look at Scheffler’s (1997b) view, which maintains that the associative duties of 
love and friendship are grounded in loving relationships and friendships that we have net reason 
to non-instrumentally value because, more generally, associative duties are grounded in 
relationships that we have net reason to so value. The problem with this view, as Arneson (2003) 
and Jeske (2014) point out, is that it doesn’t seem like relationships that we have net reason to 
non-instrumentally value per se generate associative duties. Arneson provides the 
counterexample of colleagueship, while Jeske provides the counterexample of a book club: we 
presumably have net reason to value our relationships with other colleagues or the other 
members of a book club, but we don’t have special associative duties to these other people just 
because we’re colleagues or members of the same book club. Such counterexamples thus suggest 
that having net reason to value loving relationships and friendships is not the reason why they 
generate associative duties even if we do, in fact, have net reason to value such relationships (and 
surely we do). Of course, one may object to these counterexamples by claiming that the 
relationships in question do generate associative duties that are not quite as strong as the 
associative duties of love and friendship, but even if it’s somewhat plausible to think this true in 
the colleague case, it seems rather implausible to think that I have associative duties to people 
just because we happen to be in the same book club. We might be permitted to privilege our 
fellow book club members in virtue of our participation in the same club, but it seems a bit far-
fetched to think that we are required to do so on pain of moral failure.  
 Now let’s look at Brink’s (2001) view, which appeals to a psychological account of 
personal identity and the demands of prudence to analogously ground the associative duties of 
love and friendship. Since (1) the demands of prudence—such as that to be especially concerned 
about one’s own welfare whether present or future—bind individual persons as such and (2) a 
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person’s personal identity over time consists in certain psychological connections obtaining 
between her earlier and later selves, especially deliberative ones, it follows that (3) these 
psychological connections ground the demands of prudence. But if, as Brink argues, the same 
kind of psychological connections that obtain between our current and future selves also obtain 
between the insiders of loving relationships and friendships, then we should show special 
concern for our loved ones and friends because of the psychological connections that we have to 
them just as we should show special concern for our future selves because of the psychological 
connections that we have to them. Moral demands to show special concern for loved ones and 
friends are thus grounded in the same kind of psychological connections that ground prudential 
demands to show special concern for our future selves.  
 Despite its ingenuity, this view faces some problems. If we take seriously the intriguing 
suggestion that the same kind of psychological connections that ground the intrapersonal 
demands of prudence obtain between insiders to loving relationships and friendships and thereby 
ground analogous interpersonal demands, two problems emerge. One is that this suggestion 
appears to have some problematic first-order moral implications. For besides grounding the 
demands of prudence, the psychological connections that make someone one and the same 
person over time will likewise ground moral permissions to put one’s future self at certain risks 
or even do certain things to oneself. So for example, it’s permissible for me to make my future 
self bear the costs of my eating Popeyes for dinner or for going on a bender tonight that I 
wouldn’t be able to make other people bear for me if I could do so. It’s also permissible for me 
to physically hurt myself in certain ways if I decide to do so. However, if the same kind of 
psychological connections that make me one and the same person over time and thereby ground 
such moral permissions obtain between insiders to loving relationships and friendships, then it 
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seems that it would be permissible after all for me to make my loved ones and friends bear 
certain costs for me or even to hurt them in the same ways that I can permissibly hurt myself.100  
The other problem is that, if the same kind of psychological connections that ground the 
intrapersonal demands of prudence obtain between insiders to loving relationships and 
friendships and thereby ground analogous interpersonal demands, the following dilemma arises. 
On the one hand, if we accept that the psychological connections obtaining between someone’s 
current and future selves that make her one and the same person over time ground the demands 
of prudence, then those same connections obtaining between that person and her loved ones or 
friends would give rise to more demands of prudence rather than moral demands. We therefore 
wouldn’t have associative duties to our loved ones and friends; we’d only have prudential 
requirements to be partial toward them in the same way that we have such requirements to be 
partial toward ourselves. On the other hand, if we accept that the psychological connections 
obtaining between us and our loved ones or friends ground special moral duties toward them, 
then those same psychological connections obtaining between our current and future selves 
would ground special moral duties toward ourselves. It is highly doubtful, however, that we have 
any duties to ourselves, let alone special ones. As Arneson (2003) convincingly argues, it doesn’t 
seem appropriate to morally criticize someone for failing to meet their special duties to 
themselves by not privileging themselves over others as they should privilege their loved ones 
and friends over others, yet this would be appropriate if we had special duties to ourselves just as 
we have special duties to our loved ones and friends. It may be morally permissible to privilege 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Similar problems emerge when we consider the moral significance of freely making promises. Though we’re 
obligated to keep our freely made promises to others, especially to our loved ones and friends, we surely aren’t 
obligated to keep our promises to ourselves (assuming we can make such promises in the first place). And yet if the 
same kind of psychological connections that make us the same persons over time and thereby grant us moral 
permissions to break promises to ourselves obtain between insiders to loving relationships and friendships, then it 
seems that we would likewise be permitted to break our promises to loved ones and friends rather than having 
special associative duties to keep these promises.  
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oneself over strangers as one should privilege their loved ones and friends over strangers, but it 
is not morally obligatory to do so.  
Next we have Lazar’s (2014) non-reductionist view of the grounds of associative duties, 
which is based on what he calls “The Appropriate Response View” of ethical reasoning 
(henceforth ARV). According to ARV, to act wrongly is not, as maximizing-teleological views 
maintain, to fail to maximize agent-neutral value, but rather to fail to respond appropriately to 
specific reason-giving properties. And with regard to associative duties, Lazar’s ARV-account of 
them maintains that we have such duties to do certain things because doing those things are 
appropriate responses to the valuable properties of the special valuable relationships that ground 
them. This ARV-account therefore implies that we have associative duties of love and friendship 
because the things that those duties require us to do are appropriate responses to the valuable 
properties of loving relationships and friendships.101  
Despite this account’s apparent plausibility, it faces an unresolved Euthyphro dilemma: 
Do we have duties to do certain things because those things are appropriate responses to other 
things, or are certain actions appropriate responses because they are our duties? It may be 
plausible to maintain that appropriateness grounds duty, but this would not be more plausible 
than maintaining instead that duty grounds appropriateness, and we have no reason at this point 
to agree with the ARV-account that the first possibility is the right one. We need such a reason, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Lazar’s view is actually a bit hard to nail down. For besides the relationship-based interpretation of his ARV-
account of associative duties that I’ve just discussed, Lazar also says some things to suggest a person-based 
interpretation that maintains instead that we have associative duties to do certain things because those things are 
appropriate responses to the persons that we share special relationships with in virtue of their moral statuses. He also 
suggests, when explaining the amplification of associative duties, that loyalty and betrayal are key factors involved 
in the grounding of such duties: we have associative duties to do certain things or refrain from certain things in part 
because those things, respectively, constitute loyal actions or actions of betrayal. To be honest I’m not sure how all 
of this is supposed to fit together, so I’m going to ignore these complications and continue to use the relationship-
based interpretation of Lazar’s ARV-account of associative duties as stated above. The criticisms that I’m going to 
level against this interpretation apply to the person-based interpretation as well, so I see no need to worry about my 
narrow focus on the relationship-based interpretation.  
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however, to agree with how the ARV-account would resolve this dilemma before we can get on 
board with the account itself. Moreover, I think that we have a very good reason to resolve the 
dilemma in favor of duty grounding appropriateness rather than appropriateness grounding duty: 
supererogatory action is surely an appropriate response to situations even though it, by 
definition, is not action that we are ever duty-bound to perform, yet if appropriateness grounded 
duty, as the ARV-account implies, then the supererogatory would, incoherently, be obligatory.  
 This leaves Jeske’s view (1998, 2008, 2017), which grounds associative duties directly in 
intimate relationships: it is just because we have loving relationships and friendships with others 
that we have associative duties to them. However, one potential problem with Jeske’s view is 
that the importance or value of individuals is missing from the grounds of associative duties 
(Keller 2013): it is simply intimate relationships that directly ground associative duties, where 
this includes no mention of the value or importance of the insiders to the relationships. This 
objection, however, suggests that Jeske’s view just needs some modification rather than 
wholesale rejection, and this leads us to my view, which can be understood as Jeske’s view 
suitably modified: loving relationships and friendships augment the moral statuses of our loved 
ones and friends for us, and it is their agent-relatively augmented moral statuses that directly 
ground our associative duties to them. Let me spell out my non-reductionist view in a bit more 
detail.  
 Some (e.g., Keller 2013) proclaim it a basic moral truth that everyone matters morally 
and that nobody matters more than anyone else. The distributive objection to associative duties 
that we earlier refuted is animated by the idea that everyone has equal moral value or 
importance. Now I think that this is a bit too strong, and that such an egalitarian idea needs 
qualification before it can be considered a basic moral truth. Rather than claiming that everyone 
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has equal moral value or importance overall, we should say, as we did in chapter 2, that everyone 
qua person has equal moral value or importance. That is, insofar as we are persons, we possess 
equal moral value or importance such that (a) our welfares and wills should not be run roughshod 
over in the pursuit of personal ends or otherwise disrespected and (b) our welfares should be 
promoted so long as the costs of doing so aren’t unreasonable.  
Unlike its ancestor, this modified egalitarian claim grants us equal moral value or 
importance only to the extent that we are people, and this leaves room for factors other than our 
mere personhood to have an impact on our overall moral value or importance. So for example, 
this modified egalitarian claim is compatible with the attractive idea from chapter 2 that, even 
though everyone qua person has equal moral value or importance, people have unequal moral 
value or importance in virtue of differences in their moral characters. In other words, even 
though, in virtue of our personhood, our welfares and wills shouldn’t be run roughshod over in 
the pursuit of personal ends or otherwise disrespected and our welfares should be promoted so 
long as the costs of doing so aren’t unreasonable, it is more important to satisfy these general 
moral goals for the virtuous rather than for the vicious. This is all that it means for the virtuous to 
have more moral value than, or be more morally important than, the vicious, which in turn is just 
another way of saying that the virtuous have augmented moral statuses compared to the vicious. 
It’s also important to recognize that this status augmentation is an agent-neutral one: the virtuous 
have a higher moral status compared to the vicious on everyone’s moral scorecard rather than on 
just some people’s moral scorecards.  
 Now this picture of how the virtuous have agent-neutrally augmented moral statuses is 
going to serve as my model for the analogous idea that loved ones and friends have agent-
relatively augmented moral statuses that lies at the heart of my non-reductionist view of the 
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associative duties of love and friendship. So just as some people can have augmented moral 
statuses in virtue of their virtuous moral characters despite the fact that all people, qua people, 
have equal moral value or importance, some people can also, despite this egalitarian fact, have 
augmented moral statuses in virtue of the loving relationships and friendships that they share 
with others. That is, even though, in virtue of our personhood, our welfares and wills shouldn’t 
be run roughshod over in the pursuit of personal ends or otherwise disrespected and our welfares 
should be promoted so long as the costs of doing so aren’t unreasonable, it is more important to 
satisfy these general moral goals not just for the virtuous rather than for the vicious, but also for 
our loved ones and friends rather than for strangers. However, unlike the agent-neutral moral-
status augmentation of the virtuous, the moral-status augmentation of a loved one or a friend is 
agent-relative: loved ones and friends have a higher moral status only for those who share loving 
relationships or friendships with them. And it is this heightened moral status that grounds the 
associative duties of love and friendship: because of this heightened status, we not only have 
duties to loved ones and friends that we don’t have to strangers, but any general, promissory, 
contractual, compensatory, or gratitude duties become graver and more stringent compared to 
these same duties that we owe to strangers.102  
 Before we move on to our last issue of the weight of the associative duties of love and 
friendship, it’s worth noting how my non-reductionist view avoids the problems that the other 
non-reductionist views face. It doesn’t, for instance, ground associative duties in the realization 
of special goods, so it avoids the problems that plague the special-goods view and the 
relationship-goods view. It also avoids the problem with Scheffler’s view because it grounds 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Just to be clear, I’m not grounding the associative duties of love and friendship in the psychological fact that 
loved ones and friends tend to have a heightened moral status for us. I’m rather grounding these duties in the 
normative fact that loved ones and friends objectively have a heightened moral status for us regardless of our 
subjective views about their moral statuses.  
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associative duties in augmented moral statuses rather than in relationships that we have net 
reason to value, which may not generate augmented moral statuses. My view also avoids the 
problems with Brink’s view and the problems with Lazar’s view because, respectively, it doesn’t 
try to ground associative duties in the same psychological connections that ground the demands 
of prudence nor does it rely on the controversial and seemingly false idea that appropriateness 
grounds duty. And my view also avoids Keller’s objection to Jeske’s view while staying true to 
the basic spirit of Jeske’s view by directly grounding associative duties in the augmented moral 
value or importance of our loved ones and friends, which they have in virtue of the intimate 
relationships that we share with them. Insofar as my non-reductionist view avoids these problems 
that plague its rivals, then, it seems to be the most promising version of the non-reductionist 
lot.103  
 
5.6 The Weight of the Associative Duties of Love and Friendship 
 
This brings us to our final issue of how the associative duties of love and friendship stack 
up against other duties that we have. Now this issue is a rather large one that deserves more 
extensive treatment than what I can give it here, so I will focus on trying to establish a few 
general conclusions on this matter.104 To begin with, since the nature of many of our associative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 It’s also worth noting here that my view offers a unified account of the grounds of associative duties—namely, 
they’re grounded in agent-relatively augmented moral statuses that people have in virtue of intimate relationships 
shared with them—that meets the consequentialist-skeptic’s demand for such an account. Arneson (2003), who is 
such a skeptic, claims that the lack of such an account renders consequentialist skepticism of associative duties more 
plausible, so my non-reductionist account of the grounds of associative duties makes such skepticism less plausible.  
104 The conclusions that I will argue for here are in line with, and indeed expand upon, Brink’s (2001) idea that our 
associative duties and our general duties “condition each other.” It’s worth noting, however, that this idea could be 
interpreted in two ways (and I believe that Brink has both in mind). One is that these duties “condition each other” 
in the sense that they function as mutual constraints on how we can discharge these duties. So for example, I have an 
associative duty to help Bethany reach her goals, but I also have general duties not to unjustly harm other people. 
These latter duties, then, constrain what I can do to discharge my associative duty to Bethany: I cannot help her 
	  188 
duties of love and friendship are just graver and more stringent versions of general, promissory, 
contractual, compensatory, and gratitude duties to strangers, we can conclude right away that 
associative duties of love and friendship are weightier duties compared to our duties to others 
when these duties have comparable contents. So when, for example, I have associative duties to 
help loved ones or friends along with general duties to help strangers in the same ways, my 
former duties will be weightier than my latter duties. Ditto for my associative duties not to 
unjustly harm my loved ones and friends compared to my general duties not to unjustly harm 
strangers in the same ways. And similarly, my associative duties to keep my promises to my 
loved ones and friends, to honor my contracts with them, to make reparations when I’ve wronged 
them, and to show my gratitude for what they do for me are weightier than my special duties to 
keep the same promises to strangers, honor comparable contracts with them, make reparations 
for the same wrongdoings, and show gratitude for what they do for me. Also, if we were to 
create an asymmetry in content by making the content of the associative duties more significant 
than that of the analogous general and special duties to strangers, then the associative duties will 
again be weightier duties. My associative duties not to unjustly harm my loved ones and friends, 
for example, are weightier than my general duties not to unjustly harm strangers in comparable 
ways, and so of course my associative duties not to unjustly impose greater harm on my loved 
ones and friends are weightier than my general duties not to unjustly impose lesser harm on 
strangers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reach her goals by unjustly harming other people. Conversely, I have general duties to help other people meet their 
basic needs, but I also have an associative duty to respect Bethany’s property rights. And my associative duty to 
Bethany likewise constrains how I can discharge my general duties to help other people meet their basic needs: I 
cannot do this by taking Bethany’s possessions and selling them without her permission. The other sense in which 
these duties may “condition each other” is that they can come into conflict with each other, and sometimes our 
associative duties outweigh our general ones, whereas sometimes our general duties outweigh our associative ones. 
This latter sense obviously deals with the weight of associative duties and how they stack up against other duties that 
we have, which is what I’m concerned with here in this section.  
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Things become much more interesting and complicated, however, when we create the 
opposite asymmetry by making the content of our duties to strangers more significant than the 
content of our associative duties to loved ones and friends. My associative duties to help meet 
the basic needs of my loved ones and friends are weightier than my general duties to help meet 
the basic needs of strangers, but how do my associative duties to do less significant things for my 
loved ones and friends stack up to my general duties to help meet the basic needs of strangers? 
My associative duties to prevent unjust harm to my loved ones and friends are weightier than my 
general duties to prevent comparable harm to strangers, but how do my associative duties to 
prevent smaller harm to my loved ones and friends stack up to my general duties to prevent more 
harm to strangers? My associative duties to keep my promises to loved ones and friends are 
weightier than my special duties to keep comparable promises to strangers, but how do may 
associative duties to keep promises to do less significant things stack up to my promises to do 
more significant things for strangers?  
I believe that it would be mistaken to think that our associative duties to loved ones and 
friends or our duties to strangers systematically outweigh the other. Associative duties do not 
carry lexical priority over our duties to strangers, and duties to strangers do not always outweigh 
our associative duties when the contents of the former are more significant than those of the 
latter. My associative duty to prevent Bethany from getting a paper cut, for instance, does not 
outweigh my general duty to prevent a stranger from being killed unjustly; the latter duty indeed 
outweighs the former. At the same time, however, my general duty to prevent a stranger from 
being killed does not outweigh all of my associative duties to prevent Bethany from non-lethal 
harm: my associative duty to prevent her from, say, getting beaten and raped, for example, 
clearly outweighs my general duties to prevent unjust lethal harm to strangers. It’s hard to say 
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exactly when associative duties outweigh our duties to strangers or vice versa when the contents 
of the latter duties are more significant than that of our former duties, but we can say generally 
that the difference in significance here must reach a certain threshold before the duties to 
strangers outweigh our associative duties. The difference between a paper cut and murder is 
clearly enough to make our duties to prevent unjust lethal harm to strangers graver than our 
associative duties to prevent our loved ones and friends from getting paper cuts, but the 
difference between getting beaten and raped and getting murdered is not enough to make our 
duties to prevent unjust lethal harm to strangers graver than our associative duties to prevent our 
loved ones and friends from getting beaten and raped.  
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this final chapter I’ve addressed our second set of issues pertaining to the normative 
significance of love and friendship. First I addressed the issue of whether love and friendship 
generate associative duties (i.e., special moral duties that we have only to our loved ones and 
friends in virtue of our special relationships with them). Against the moral and consequentialist 
skeptics I argued that they do, and in defense of this position I offered both phenomenological 
considerations and detailed rebuttals of the voluntarist, distributive, and respect objections to 
these associative duties. Next I addressed the issue of the grounds of the associative duties of 
love and friendship. After criticizing reductionist views and several non-reductionist views of 
these duties, I ultimately argued for a non-reductionist theory of these duties according to which 
these duties are special, irreducible moral duties that are directly grounded in the agent-relatively 
augmented moral statues that our loved ones and friends have in virtue of our special 
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relationships with them. Last, I touched briefly on the issue of how the associative duties of love 
and friendship stack up to other duties that we have, and there I argued that these associative 
duties often—though not always—outweigh other duties that we have (especially because many 
of these associative duties are just weightier versions of our duties to strangers with comparable 
contents).  
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